Gomes v. Hameed

• Decision Date: 22 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 103,013.,103,013.
• Citation: Gomes v. Hameed, 184 P.3d 479, 2008 OK 3 (Okla. 2008)
• Parties: Linda GOMES, Edward B. Gomes, and Joseph Michael Coover, Co-Guardians of the Estate and Person of Alyssa Marie Gomes Coover, the minor child and next of kin of Georgette Rosa Gomes, Deceased, on behalf of Alyssa Marie Gomes Coover, and on behalf of Linda C. Gomes and Edward B. Gomes, Surviving Parents of Georgette Rosa Gomes, Deceased; and Linda Gomes and Edward B. Gomes, individually, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Akhtar HAMEED, M.D. and Jennifer L. Miles Holter, M.D., Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

184 P.3d 479

2008 OK 3

Linda GOMES, Edward B. Gomes, and Joseph Michael Coover, Co-Guardians of the Estate and Person of Alyssa Marie Gomes Coover, the minor child and next of kin of Georgette Rosa Gomes, Deceased, on behalf of Alyssa Marie Gomes Coover, and on behalf of Linda C. Gomes and Edward B. Gomes, Surviving Parents of Georgette Rosa Gomes, Deceased; and Linda Gomes and Edward B. Gomes, individually, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Akhtar HAMEED, M.D. and Jennifer L. Miles Holter, M.D., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 103,013.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

January 22, 2008.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 2008.

Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, Division 4; Carolyn R. Ricks, Trial Judge

¶ 0 While receiving treatment at a hospital, Georgette Gomes (patient) stopped breathing. The appellees, Dr. Akhtar Hameed, and Dr. Jennifer L. Miles Holter, responded to a code blue. The patient was resuscitated, suffered permanent brain damage, and eventually died. Thereafter, her guardian ad litem sued the hospital for negligence. The doctors allege that the attorney for the guardian ad litem verbally agreed not to sue them if they provided information and testimony in the guardian's lawsuit against the hospital. Although the doctors cooperated, the hospital won. The doctors filed motions for summary judgment insisting that the verbal contract had been breached, and that even if it had not, statutory immunity barred any negligence claims. The trial court, Honorable Carolyn Ricks, granted summary judgment in favor of both doctors. The guardian appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We hold that: 1) the absence of a contractual relationship with an emergency room patient entitles a doctor to statutory immunity from claims of negligence pursuant to The Good Samaritan Act, 76 O.S.2001 § 5, et seq.; and 2) an agreement not to sue negotiated on behalf of a minor and/or incapacitated person requires court approval to be enforceable.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

John W. Norman, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Stephen J. Rodolf, Brent L. Thompson, Elizabeth S. Reynolds, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee Holter.

L. Earl Ogletree, Lane O. Krieger, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellee Hameed.

KAUGER, J.

¶ 1 The determinative issues are whether: 1) statutory immunity pursuant to the Good Samaritan Act, 76 O.S.2001 § 5 et seq., precludes recovery against a doctor who attempted to provide care to an emergency room patient with whom he had no contractual relationship; and 2) an agreement not to sue negotiated on behalf of a minor and/or incapacitated person requires court approval to be enforceable. We hold that the doctor is entitled to statutory immunity and that such an agreement requires court approval.

FACTS

¶ 2 On June 8, 2001, seventeen year old Georgette Gomes (patient), who was in her twenty-fourth week of pregnancy when she went into premature labor, was transported to Presbyterian Hospital (hospital) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma from Memorial Hospital in Chickasha, Oklahoma. In the course of treatment, she was given magnesium sulfate intravenously to delay and control her contractions.

¶ 3 Between 8:52 and 8:56 a.m. on June 9, 2001, she delivered twins. Sometime after 9:55 a.m., she stopped breathing and a code blue was called at 10:18 a.m. The appellees, Dr. Akhtar Hameed, (Hameed) and Jennifer L. Miles Holter, (Holter)(doctors) responded to the code blue. At the time, Dr. Holter was a resident participating in the University of Oklahoma College of Medicine Residency Program and Dr. Hameed was a solo practitioner visiting the labor and delivery department of the hospital "doing records and caring for his own patient." The patient was resuscitated, but she suffered permanent brain damage.

¶ 4 On August 30, 2001, Joe Womack, as guardian ad litem on behalf of the patient filed suit against the hospital for negligence. According to both doctors, sometime in February of 2003, about a month before the hospital trial began, they entered into an oral contract with the guardian's lawyer John Norman (lawyer/attorney). They allege that he agreed not to sue them in exchange for their testimony against the hospital. The lawyer contends that he merely said when asked whether he was going to sue the doctors, that he "had no plans of doing so." Although the doctors complied with the agreement, the cause ended in a verdict in favor of the hospital on March 12, 2003.

¶ 5 After he failed to recover against the hospital, the guardian ad litem, on behalf of Georgette Gomes, filed a wrongful death/negligence action against the doctors on June 5, 2003. She died on July 29, 2003, and the case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice.¹ On September 22, 2004, the appellees, the patient's parents and the father of her minor child acting as co-guardians (guardians) and represented by the same lawyer who sued the hospital, brought a wrongful death/negligence action against the doctors, asserting claims on her behalf and on behalf of her surviving child and parents.

¶ 6 On October 4, 2005, Doctor Holter filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the cause should be dismissed because: 1) the attorney had breached the agreement not to sue; 2) even if the agreement were unenforceable due to lack of consideration, promissory estoppel precluded a lawsuit; and 3) the statute of frauds was inapplicable because the contract was performed within a year.² On October 26, 2005, Dr. Hameed also filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that: 1) he had entered into an agreement not to sue with the lawyer which had been breached; and 2) pursuant to 76 O.S.2001 § 5³ and 59 O.S.2001 § 518⁴, he was immune from liability.

¶ 7 On December 28, 2005, the trial court entered separate orders granting summary judgment in favor of the doctors without explaining the basis of its decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court, determining that the doctors were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based on the agreement not to sue them made by counsel for the guardian of the patient to secure their assistance in the guardian's suit against the hospital. We granted certiorari on February 20, 2007.

I.

¶ 8 THE ABSENCE OF A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH AN EMERGENCY ROOM PATIENT ENTITLES A DOCTOR TO STATUTORY IMMUNITY FROM CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENCE PURSUANT TO THE GOOD SAMARITAN ACT, 76 O.S.2001 § 5 et seq.

¶ 9 Doctor Hameed argues that summary judgment should have been entered in his favor because, as a matter of law, he is statutorily immune from liability. He alleges that our decision in Jackson v. Mercy Health Center, Inc., 1993 OK 155, 864 P.2d 839, is dispositive of the issue. The lawyer contends that Jackson is distinguishable on its facts and that even if it weren't, because Hameed did not render any care, he cannot invoke statutory immunity. Although the lawyer had apparently alleged in a previous lawsuit that "the fluid containing magnesium sulfate was given by Defendant Akhtar Hameed,"⁵ now he insists that Hameed was negligent because, by his own admission, he merely observed what was happening, rather than providing proper care.⁶

¶ 10 The immunity statutes at issue are 76 O.S.2001 § 5⁷ and 59 O.S.2001 § 518.⁸ Title 76 O.S.2001 § 5 is known as the Good Samaritan Act (the Act). It provides statutory immunity from acts of negligence when a physician renders or attempts to render emergency care.⁹ In Jackson v. Mercy Health Center, Inc., 1993 OK 155, 864 P.2d 839, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Good Samaritan Act, 76 O.S.1991 § 5,¹⁰ cloaked the hospital with statutory immunity from liability for its personnel's allegedly negligent attempt to render medical aid to a hospital visitor. There, the visitor, while accompanying his pregnant wife to the operating room became dizzy and the hospital personnel helped him to take a seat. After being seated, but not secured, he fell and was injured. The visitor sued the hospital for negligence.

¶ 11 The hospital asserted that it was statutorily immune from liability pursuant to the Act. The Jackson Court recognized that the Act had abrogated the common-law rescue doctrine for medical providers in an effort to encourage them to risk assisting strangers in need of help when they had no duty to render aid. The Act provided immunity from liability for negligence to all those health care providers who, while not contractually bound to assist an injured person, render, or attempt to render, care in good faith.

¶ 12 The Court noted that Good Samaritan immunity rests on three elements: 1) the absence of a prior contractual relationship between the rescuer and the injured person; 2) the characterization of the rescuer's act as having been done in good faith, voluntarily and without compensation; and 3) the injured person's apparent need of emergency medical aid. The Court also noted that rescue is not limited to any particular place, but that it may occur anywhere ___ including a hospital.

¶ 13 The Jackson Court did not address what actions were required to qualify as rendering or attempting to render emergency care.¹¹ It did determine that the Act's immunity was inapplicable in the context of a hospital/patient relationship because the Act expressly requires the absence of a prior contractual relationship between the rescuer and the injured person. No hospital is ever a Good Samaritan vis-a-vis its own patient. However, the Court concluded that under the facts of that cause that: 1) the visitor had no contractual relationship with the Hospital which would make him a patient and thus take him out of the range of statutory immunity; and 2) the hospital was clearly responding to an apparent emergency which called for immediate action.

¶ 14 Here, Georgette Gomes' was not that of a visitor, invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Her status was...