Gomez-Arias v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't
| Decision Date | 30 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-CV-00857-MV-KK,20-CV-00857-MV-KK |
| Parties | JUAN GOMEZ-ARIAS, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; COREY PRICE, in his official capacity as Director of the El Paso ICE Field Office; and DORA OROZCO, in her official capacity as Warden, Otero County Processing Center, Respondents-Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff-Petitioner Juan Gomez-Arias's ("Petitioner's") Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Doc. 3. Defendants-Respondents U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), Corey Price, and Dora Orozco ("Respondents") filed a response in opposition [Doc. 8] and Petitioner filed a reply [Doc. 9]. The Court, having considered the Motion, briefs, and relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the Motion is not well-taken and will be DENIED.
Petitioner Juan Gómez-Arias is a 60-year-old Mexican national who is presently in the custody of ICE at the Otero County Processing Center ("Otero"). Doc. 1 at ¶ 1. He entered the United States without inspection or parole, but has been a lawful permanent resident since 1992. Doc. 8 at 2-3. Petitioner was convicted of attempted criminal sexual contact with a minor and attempted bribery of a witness on January 14, 2020 in New Mexico state court. Doc. 1 at ¶ 31. On March 13, Petitioner was served a Notice to Appear alleging that he was subject to removal because of his conviction, and on March 18 he was taken into ICE custody. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. ICE has continued Petitioner's detention during his removal proceedings. Id.
COVID-19 is a highly contagious respiratory illness that has been declared a pandemic. See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 37-43; see also Essien v. Barr, No. 20-CV-1034-WJM, 2020 WL 1974761, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2020) (unpublished). The virus associated with COVID-19 can cause severe health damage, and certain underlying medical conditions increase the risk of serious illness or death among those infected. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 41. No vaccine is available for COVID-19, which is spread by both symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers. Id. at ¶ 43; Doc. 1 Ex. 16 at ¶ 29. To reduce the spread of the virus, public health experts have recommended widespread measures such as social distancing and vigilant hygiene. Doc. 1 at ¶ 7.
On August 26, 2020, Petitioner filed a Complaint against ICE, Corey Price in his official capacity as Director of the El Paso Field Office, and Dora Orozco in her official capacity as Warden of Otero, requesting that this Court intervene and immediately release him from custody. Doc. 1. The Complaint alleges that Petitioner is entitled to immediate release from Otero because his age and underlying medical conditions render him particularly vulnerable to serious illness or death if he is infected with COVID-19 and because Respondents cannot prevent his exposure to the virus while in detention. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. The Complaint seeks a writ of habeas corpus or injunctive relief. Id.
Simultaneously with the filing of the Complaint, Petitioner filed the instant Motion seeking a writ of habeas corpus or in the alternative, a temporary restraining order ("TRO") or injunction. Doc. 3. In the Motion, Petitioner asks for immediate release or for placement in a community-based alternative to detention such as conditional release with appropriate precautionary public health measures or release to live with his wife. Doc. 1 at 29.
In an Order entered on August 26, 2020, the Court found that Petitioner had not provided a basis for the Court to grant ex parte relief, and accordingly ordered Petitioner to serve copies on Respondents of the Complaint and the Motion. Doc. 5 at 1. The Court also set an expedited briefing schedule on the Motion. Id. at 1-2. Pursuant to the Court's request, on September 3, 2020, Respondents filed a response in opposition to Petitioner's Motion [Doc. 8] and Petitioner filed a reply to Respondents' response on September 8, 2020 [Doc. 9].
Respondents oppose Petitioner's Motion on two bases. As an initial matter, Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is not an appropriate vehicle for what is essentially a challenge to Petitioner's conditions of confinement. Doc. 5 at 7-9. Next, Respondents argue that Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that he is entitled to the temporary relief he seeks. Id. at 9-17. As set forth below, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims under § 2241 but that he has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, as he must to obtain the requested TRO.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks "release from unlawful physical confinement." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is available under § 2241 if an immigration detainee is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). As release from custody is an extreme remedy, Congress has circumscribed its use by the courts. It is well-settled in the Tenth Circuit that prisoners who wish to challenge only the conditions of their confinement (as opposed to its fact or duration) must do so through civil rights lawsuits filedpursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than through federal habeas proceedings. Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1280 (10th Cir. 2011). While a successful habeas claim leads to release of the prisoner or detainee, a successful "conditions of confinement" claim leads only to an order requiring improvements, not an order for release. See McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1997).
Here, Respondents assert that Petitioner's allegations—namely that because the detention facility does not allow for social distancing or proper sanitation it puts him at serious risk of contracting COVID-19—state a challenge to the conditions of his confinement, rather than its fact or duration. Doc. 8 at 7-9. Petitioner responds that his challenge is not merely an attack on the conditions of his confinement, but an argument that he should not be confined at all. Doc. 9 at 2. Petitioner argues that "confinement of any duration under the present circumstances [includes] the extreme danger of contracting COVID-19 and the associated risk of severe illness or death in light of his medical condition." Id.
In the absence of controlling authority, each party finds support for its respective position in the existing case law, which "expos[es] a question that has received little or no discussion in the case law: What if confinement itself is the unconstitutional 'condition of confinement'?" Essien, 2020 WL 1974761, at *7. The bright-line rule categorizing conditions-of-confinement claims and fact-or-duration claims can be difficult to apply in practice, especially in response to circumstances regarding COVID-19. See Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-CV-00794, 2020 WL 1940882, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2020) (unpublished), vacated on other grounds, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020). A challenge to a dangerous prison environment may be construed as a challenge to the conditions of the confinement; yet because the only effective remedy to stop the spread of the virus is robust separation of individuals, and because such separation is not possible in densely populated prisonswithout releasing a portion of the prison population, the challenge may also be construed as an action regarding the fact or duration of confinement. Id.
The Tenth Circuit has not yet directly addressed a challenge like Petitioner's that evades clear classification. Other circuit courts, however, have held that "where a petitioner claims that no set of conditions would be constitutionally sufficient[,] the claim should be construed as challenging the fact or extent, rather than the conditions, of the confinement." Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020). The Tenth Circuit has commented that the distinction between conditions of confinement claims and fact or duration claims depends on how those claims are construed: Where an objection is solely to the conditions of confinement and not to the legality of custody, it is not cognizable as a federal habeas proceeding. See Medina v. Williams, No. 20-1193, 2020 WL 4782302, at *2 (10th Cir. August 18, 2020) (unpublished) (citing Standifer, 653 F.3d at 1280). But where a Petitioner is "contending that in light of the pandemic he should be released from custody because there are no conditions of confinement that could adequately prevent an Eighth Amendment violation," then federal habeas proceedings may be appropriate. Medina, 2020 WL 4782302, at *2 (citing Wilson, 961 F.3d at 837-38) (emphasis in original).
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, courts across the country have permitted immigration detainees to assert, through habeas proceedings, challenges that no conditions of confinement under current circumstances are constitutional—including courts in circuits that have held, like the Tenth Circuit, that conditions of confinements claims are not cognizable under § 2241. See, e.g., Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, No. 4:20-CV-1241, 2020 WL 1904497, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2020) (unpublished) (); Malam v. Adducci, No. 20-10829, 2020 WL 1672662, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2020), as amended (Apr. 6,2020) (unpublished) ( jurisdiction under § 2241 where petitioner asserted that there was no facility she could be incarcerated in during the COVID-19 pandemic that would be constitutional); Bent v. Barr, 445 F. Supp. 3d 408, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (...
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