Gomez v. Children's Hosp. Colo.
| Decision Date | 05 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-cv-00002-MEH |
| Parties | VERONICA GOMEZ, Plaintiff, v. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL COLORADO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
VERONICA GOMEZ, Plaintiff,
v.
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL COLORADO, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 18-cv-00002-MEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
July 5, 2018
ORDER
Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge.
Defendant Children's Hospital Colorado ("CHCO") seeks to dismiss five of Plaintiff Veronica Gomez' ten causes of action, which arise from Ms. Gomez' employment with CHCO. I hold the FLSA preempts Ms. Gomez' breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims arising out of CHCO's failure to pay overtime. Additionally, Ms. Gomez fails to allege a violation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act ("CWCA") based on CHCO's refusal to pay out her accrued sick leave at the time of her resignation. However, Ms. Gomez sufficiently alleges breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims for failure to pay straight time while on call. Accordingly, I grant in part and deny in part CHCO's Partial Motion to Dismiss.
I. Facts
The following are relevant factual allegations (as opposed to legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory allegations) made by Ms. Gomez in her Amended Complaint,
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which I take as true for my analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Ms. Gomez began working for CHCO as a medical assistant in November 2007. Am. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 21. On August 30, 2015, Ms. Gomez transferred to CHCO's risk management department as a non-supervisor risk management analyst. Id. ¶ 17. This position, which is salaried, required Ms. Gomez to occasionally work overtime and on-call shifts. See id. ¶¶ 35, 47, 58, 88. CHCO classified Ms. Gomez as exempt pursuant to the FLSA and its On-Call/Callback Pay Policy ("on-call policy"). Id. ¶¶ 17, 136, 149. The on-call policy used essentially identical standards as the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to determine whether an employee is exempt. Id. ¶ 137.
Ms. Gomez alleges the on-call policy required that CHCO pay exempt employees $4.00 per hour for time spent on call. Id. ¶ 138. Non-exempt employees received $4.00 per hour in addition to straight time or overtime pay, if applicable. Id. ¶ 181. CHCO did not pay Ms. Gomez $4.00 per hour, and it did not provide straight time or overtime pay for her time spent on call. Id. ¶ 182.
In April 2016, Ms. Gomez discussed with a co-worker the possibility of switching to an hourly position, because Lisa Shannon (Ms. Gomez' supervisor) told her that she was required to stay at work until 5:00 p.m. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Although Ms. Shannon initially informed Ms. Gomez that she could transfer to an hourly position, she told Ms. Gomez four days later that she must remain a salaried employee. Id. ¶¶ 58, 64.
In early May 2016, Ms. Gomez contacted Ms. Shannon about her belief that CHCO must pay
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her for on-call time. Id. ¶ 62. When Ms. Gomez and Ms. Shannon met on May 27, 2016, Ms. Shannon informed Ms. Gomez that salaried employees do not receive on-call pay. Id. ¶ 65. In a July 13, 2016 meeting with BJ Thompson in Human Resources ("HR"), Ms. Gomez asked for clarification regarding the on-call policy. Id. ¶¶ 105, 121. Mr. Thompson informed Ms. Gomez that the policy is outdated and not all exempt employees receive on-call pay. Id. ¶ 122.
After Ms. Gomez and Ms. Shannon had numerous disagreements regarding Ms. Gomez' work performance and Ms. Shannon's differential treatment of her, Ms. Gomez told Ms. Shannon that her last day would be September 21, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 66-75, 131. However, Ms. Shannon informed Ms. Gomez that she could finish working on September 16 but remain on payroll until September 21. Id. ¶ 132.
Ms. Gomez had 396.46 unused hours of sick leave when she resigned. Id. ¶ 206. Although Ms. Gomez provided a written demand requesting that CHCO compensate her for this time, CHCO failed to do so. Id. ¶¶ 207-08.
II. Procedural History
Based on the preceding allegations, Ms. Gomez initiated this case in Colorado state court on November 28, 2017. Compl., ECF No. 6. In an Amended Complaint filed on February 13, 2018, Ms. Gomez asserts ten causes of action: (1) breach of contract for refusal to pay on-call wages; (2) promissory estoppel based on failure to pay wages for time spent on-call; (3) denial of overtime pay in violation of the FLSA; (4) denial of overtime pay in violation of the CWCA; (5) breach of contract for failure to pay overtime and straight time while on call; (6) promissory estoppel based on refusal to pay overtime and straight time for on-call hours; (7) breach of implied contract for failure to pay overtime; (8) promissory estoppel based on a denial of overtime pay; (9) refusal to pay
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accrued illness hours in violation of the CWCA; and (10) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 134-228, ECF No. 21. At first glance, the first and fifth claims appear to be duplicative; however, a review of Ms. Gomez' allegations reveals she pleads these claims in the alternative. The first claim alleges CHCO failed to pay her wages as an exempt employee pursuant to the on-call policy. Id. ¶¶ 138-39. Ms. Gomez' fifth claim asserts CHCO improperly classified her as exempt and failed to pay her straight time and overtime wages required by the on-call policy for non-exempt employees. Id. ¶¶ 181-82.
On February 13, 2018, CHCO responded to the Amended Complaint by filing the present Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 25. CHCO seeks dismissal of Ms. Gomez' fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action. Id. According to CHCO, the FLSA preempts the fifth through eighth claims to the extent they seek overtime. Id. at 5-7. Additionally, CHCO contends the fifth and sixth claims fail to allege Ms. Gomez was entitled to straight time for her on-call hours. Id. at 7-9. Lastly, CHCO asserts its internal policies and the CWCA do not require that it pay Ms. Gomez her accrued sick leave at resignation. Id. at 9-12.
Ms. Gomez responded to CHCO's motion on March 6, 2018. Resp. to Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 32. Ms. Gomez first asserts she may recover her accrued sick leave under the CWCA, because this benefit is earned, vested, and determinable. Id. at 3-6. Ms. Gomez then argues the FLSA does not preempt her breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims, because CHCO denies that its procedures for determining whether employees are exempt are different from those in the FLSA. Id. at 7-8. Lastly, Ms. Gomez contends she states breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims for straight time, because she alleges CHCO improperly classified her as exempt under its on-call policy. Id. at 8-9. CHCO subsequently filed a reply brief. Reply in Supp. of
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Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 33.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pleaded facts which allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Twombly requires a two prong analysis. First, a court must identify "the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth," that is, those allegations which are legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 679-80. Second, the Court must consider the factual allegations "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for relief, such claim survives the motion to dismiss. Id. at 680.
Plausibility refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs 'have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)). "The nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context." Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, while the Rule 12(b)(6) standard does not require that a plaintiff establish a prima facie case in a complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action may help to determine whether the plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191.
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I. Ms. Gomez' Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Claims: Breach of Contract and Promissory Estoppel
Ms. Gomez' fifth through eighth claims assert CHCO breached a contract and is liable for promissory estoppel, because it failed to pay overtime wages. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 179-203, ECF No. 21. I find that the FLSA preempts these claims. Ms. Gomez' fifth and sixth claims also allege CHCO failed to pay her straight time. Id. ¶¶ 181, 188. The FLSA does not preempt these causes of action, and Ms. Gomez includes sufficient allegations to state claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel.
A. Failure to Pay Overtime (Fifth Through Eighth Claims)
The FLSA preempts state-law contract claims that "essentially require the same proof as claims asserted under the FLSA itself." Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); Valverde v. Xclusive Staffing, Inc., No. 16-cv-00671-RM-MJW, 2017 WL 3866769, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2017) ("Plaintiffs' contract/quasi contract claims are preempted to the extent they are for unpaid overtime wages or are simply a restatement of their FLSA claim."). Claims require the same proof when the facts alleged in support of the FLSA claim "merely echo[]" those supporting the state law claims. Barnett v. Pikes Peak Cmty. Coll. Police Dep't, No. 14-cv-02820-LTB, 2015 WL 4245822, at *5 (D. Colo. July 14, 2015). Thus, if Ms. Gomez alleges essentially identical facts in support of her state...
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