Gomez v. JP Trucking, Inc.

Citation490 P.3d 977
Decision Date05 November 2020
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. 17CA2384
CourtCourt of Appeals of Colorado
Parties Leonel GOMEZ, Francisco Gonzalez, Ebarardo Sanchez, and Nathan Abbott, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JP TRUCKING, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

Riley Law LLC, Kelli Riley, Greeley, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Hall and Evans, LLC, Meredith L. McDonald, Paul Yarbrough, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE

¶ 1 In this employment wage dispute, we are asked to address the interplay between provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order. See Colo. Minimum Wage Order No. 31, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1103-1 (effective Dec. 30, 2014-Dec. 31, 2015), https://perma.cc/4DFR-69JU (hereinafter Wage Order).1 The FLSA sets federal minimum wage and overtime requirements for certain employees nationwide, while the Wage Order sets the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for Colorado employees who work in certain industries. As relevant here, both the FLSA and the Wage Order exempt drivers who transport goods in interstate commerce from these requirements. The FLSA's Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption excludes an employee who "in the performance of his duties moves goods in interstate commerce and affects the safe operation of motor vehicles on public highways." Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line, Inc. , 820 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Foxworthy v. Hiland Dairy Co. , 997 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1993) ). Similarly, the Wage Order exempts "interstate drivers" from overtime requirements, see Wage Order § 5 but does not define the term "interstate drivers." Thus, the question before us is whether an "interstate driver" under the Wage Order carries the same meaning as an employee covered under the MCA exemption.

¶ 2 Another division of this court considered this question in Brunson v. Colorado Cab Co. , 2018 COA 17, 433 P.3d 93 (cert. granted , 2018 WL 3019042 (Colo. June 18, 2018) ) (cert. dismissed , 2019 WL 578344 (Colo. Jan. 29, 2019) ). It held that the Wage Order's "interstate driver" exemption applies "only to drivers whose work takes them across state lines," and in doing so, accorded a narrower meaning (and exemption) to "interstate drivers" than accorded under the MCA exemption. Id. at ¶ 45.

¶ 3 In this case, defendant, JP Trucking, Inc., appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs, former employees Leonel Gomez, Francisco Gonzalez, Ebarardo Sanchez, and Nathan Abbott (collectively Employees), following a limited remand ordered by a division of this court for additional factual findings. JP Trucking asks us to reject the Brunson division's holding and urges us to read "interstate drivers" under the Wage Order harmoniously with the MCA exemption. JP Trucking also challenges the damages awarded. For the reasons explained below, we agree with JP Trucking on the first issue and respectfully decline to follow Brunson . See Chavez v. Chavez , 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13, 465 P.3d 133 (the holding of one division of the court of appeals does not bind another division). Finding Deherrera ’s reasoning persuasive, we adopt it and, therefore, reverse the judgment in favor of Employees under the Wage Order and remand the case with directions to enter judgment in favor of JP Trucking. Because we reverse the judgment, we need not address JP Trucking's remaining contentions.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 4 JP Trucking hired Employees as truck drivers. In their complaint, Employees alleged that JP Trucking failed to pay them time and a half as required by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219 (2018), and the Wage Order. JP Trucking answered that because Employees were interstate drivers, they were exempt from overtime under the MCA exemption and the Wage Order.

¶ 5 Following a bench trial, the trial court found for Employees under the FLSA and Wage Order and awarded them damages. JP Trucking appealed. Another division of this court concluded that it could not resolve the appeal without further factual findings. The division ordered a limited remand, instructing the trial court to make additional findings of fact to redetermine whether Employees were exempt from the FLSA, and to decide whether, in light of Brunson , they were exempt under the Wage Order. Gomez v. JP Trucking , (Colo. App. No. 17CA2384, June 18, 2019) (unpublished order).

¶ 6 On remand, a different judge entered additional factual findings.2 As relevant here, the trial court found:

• JP Trucking regularly transported items and materials across state lines and within Colorado when the materials were destined for or coming from other states.
• During Employees’ employment, JP Trucking "was involved in interstate commerce and subject to regulation by the U.S. Department of Transportation."
• JP Trucking "intended to and did comply with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations, including regulations relating to drivers’ qualifications and limits on drivers’ hours," during the period at issue.
• Interstate trips were "indiscriminately and randomly distributed among its drivers."
• Employees "could have been called upon to travel out-of-state for JP Trucking, or to deliver within the state goods that were in interstate commerce."
• JP Trucking provided Employees with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, and Employees agreed to familiarize themselves with them.
• JP Trucking's employment application placed Employees "on notice that they would be subject to investigation, testing and restriction pursuant to the U.S. Department of Transportation regulations."
• JP Trucking's employment application required Employees to provide prior employment information for JP Trucking's investigation of their safety performance histories pursuant to the U.S. Department of Transportation's regulations.
• On the part of the application asking "Intrastate Only," each employee checked the "No" box.
• None of the Employees indicated they were not applying to drive in interstate commerce.

¶ 7 From these additional findings, the trial court concluded that (1) JP Trucking regularly transported goods across state lines and within Colorado when those goods were destined for or came from other states; (2) Employees were randomly assigned trips involving goods in interstate commerce; (3) JP Trucking maintained a company policy regarding and performed the activity of interstate driving by obtaining an interstate permit in 2008 and thereafter consistently complying with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations; and (4) JP Trucking adhered to federal regulations by notifying Employees, through its employment application, of federal policies and regulations, including those addressing investigation, testing, and hours limitations. The trial court then found that JP Trucking had met its burden of proving that Employees were exempt from overtime under the MCA exemption.

¶ 8 Turning to Brunson , the trial court found that Gomez and Sanchez were not "interstate drivers" under the Wage Order because neither had driven out-of-state. And because Gonzalez and Abbott had driven out-of-state only once, their out-of-state driving was de minimis and, therefore, did not qualify them as "interstate drivers." The court then awarded Employees damages under the Wage Order and reasonable fees and costs under section 8-4-110(1), C.R.S. 2019. On appeal, neither party disputes the trial court's FLSA judgment. Instead, they dispute whether an interstate driver under the Wage Order is different from a driver who moves goods in interstate commerce under the MCA exemption.

II. Interstate Driver

¶ 9 JP Trucking contends that the trial court should not have relied on Brunson because the Brunson division got it wrong when it interpreted "interstate drivers" in the Wage Order more narrowly than federal courts that have interpreted the Wage Order consistently with the MCA exemption. It asserts that because many of the Wage Order's provisions are patterned after the FLSA, federal constructions of the Wage Order should be accorded great weight. Alternatively, JP Trucking argues that if out-of-state travel is necessary for an employee to be an interstate driver, then the trial court erred by applying the de minimis rule and by finding Gonzalez and Abbott non-exempt because the undisputed record shows that both drove across state lines.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 We review administrative regulations de novo, and our primary task is to give effect to the enacting body's intent. Colo. Coffee Bean, LLC v. Peaberry Coffee Inc. , 251 P.3d 9, 22 (Colo. App. 2010). When construing administrative regulations, we apply the same rules we use to interpret statutes. Berumen v. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2012 COA 73, ¶ 19, 304 P.3d 601. As with statutes, we first look to the regulation's language and analyze "the words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning," giving effect "to every word and term whenever possible." Id. "We also read and consider the regulatory scheme as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts." Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to other rules of construction. Id. Language "is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of multiple interpretations." Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n v. Martinez , 2019 CO 3, ¶ 19, 433 P.3d 22.

1. MCA Exemption

¶ 11 The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation to employees who work more than forty hours a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2018). But it exempts numerous employees, including "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation [(Secretary)] has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service" (the MCA exemption). 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (2018). Under the MCA exemption, the Secretary may exercise power over an employee who "in the performance of his duties moves goods in interstate commerce and affects the safe operation of motor vehicles on public highways." Deherrera , ...

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  • Gomez v. JP Trucking, Inc.
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
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