Gomez v. Wilson, Civ. A. No. 2909-67.
Decision Date | 12 February 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2909-67. |
Citation | 323 F. Supp. 87 |
Parties | Manuel de J. GOMEZ, Plaintiff, v. Jerry WILSON, Chief of Police, and Walter R. Bishop, Captain, Third Precinct, Metropolitan Police Department, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Nancy Pyeatt, Washington, D. C., and Ralph J. Temple, Washington, D. C., of counsel, for plaintiff.
C. Francis Murphy, Acting Corp. Counsel, John A. Earnest and Frederic Lee Ruck, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
This action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief was originally before this Court on December 21, 1967. At that time, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a case or controversy, and a finding was made that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, as well as that plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable injury.
After remand1 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the case was again before this Court on February 20, 1970. The defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the case was moot was granted. Finally, on June 23, 1970,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded this case to this Court for the third time in order that a full evidentiary hearing could be held. On October 12, 1970, a hearing was held, and it was agreed at that time that all the evidence submitted to the Court would be by way of stipulation. Likewise, the Court allowed respective counsel forty-five days within which to submit said evidence and to supply supporting briefs.
When the controversy arose in November, 1967, the original complaint asserted that the plaintiff had been stopped and questioned by the Police while walking late at night in the Dupont Circle section of the city. At that time, the plaintiff was the subject of a Police Vagrancy Observation and was warned that further observations would result in his arrest. Subsequent to filing the original complaint, the plaintiff was again confronted by the Police and again was the subject of a Vagrancy Observation, but this time the confrontation was far more intense.
The plaintiff asks this Court to (1) declare his right to walk or be in any public place in the District of Columbia while sober and well-behaved and enjoin interference with that right; (2) order that any "vagrancy observation" records be expunged; and (3) declare the District of Columbia vagrancy statute unconstitutional.
The complaint sounds in the nature of a class action in that it asks for declaratory and injunctive relief for all those similarly situated. Since the ruling of the Court is directed only to the procedures used by the Police in vagrancy observations and not the statute itself, a suit in the nature of a class action is not proper, as the Court will only grant relief to those whose cases are before the Court. Since the plaintiff is the only person bringing this suit, then the Court will only pass on the facts of his case.
In an earlier opinion regarding this case, the Court of Appeals stated the procedure to be followed at the hearing:
.
Before following the groundwork as laid out by the Court of Appeals, the Court thinks it would be helpful to trace the workings of the Police procedure regarding vagrancy observations.
After December 23, 1968, the procedures and forms used by the Police Department changed. On that date, the Court of Appeals decided Ricks v. District of Columbia, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 414 F.2d 1097 (1968). This case held Sections (1), (3) and (8) of the general vagrancy statute,3 hereinafter called the vagrancy statute, unconstitutionally vague.
Prior to the Ricks decision, and during the time of plaintiff's confrontations with the Police, the following were the procedures used by the Police in vagrancy cases. By Memorandum Order No. 23, issued in 1954 by the Deputy Chief of Police, the men on the force were directed to observe certain types of vagrants by questioning them and recording their answers. A varying number of observations, directly related to an approximate time period, were necessary to make an arrest, e. g., persons frequenting suspected gambling establishments were to be observed at least three times over a period of a month or less and then arrested under subsection (5) of the statute. Each precinct had its own vagrancy form and when an observation was recorded, no reference was made on the forms to any particular subsection of the statute.
Subsequent to Ricks, supra, Chief of Police John B. Layton issued a Memorandum on February 17, 1969, directing cessation of vagrancy observations and arrests under subsections (1), (3) and (8) but not the remaining sections. The Memorandum concludes as follows:
(Emphasis added).
It has been stipulated by the parties that since the above-mentioned Memorandum was issued, no other written directive or guideline with respect to subsections (4), (5), (6), (7) and (9) of the vagrancy statute has been made by the Police Department.
As was pointed out above, the only guideline or directive regarding the enforcement of the statute was that issued on February 17, 1969. In essence then, the statute itself is the guideline. The Court draws attention to the partial depositions of six policemen submitted by the plaintiff and stipulated to by the defendant. Only one of the officers had a thorough knowledge of the subsections of the statute. The remaining five had little or no knowledge of the statute's contents. Three policemen, one having "observed" the plaintiff in May, 1967, were not familiar with any departmental guidelines concerning the enforcement of the statute.
All of this testimony would seem to indicate insufficient guidelines defining the activity necessary for an officer to conclude that a vagrancy violation has occurred.
The Court further notes that persons arrested under the vagrancy statute are booked as vagrants without any reference to any particular subsection of the statute. The arrest form, P.D. 163, does not provide for the citation of any statute or portion thereof. It is only when the Assistant Corporation Counsel seeks this arrest form that a section or subsection of the general vagrancy statute is noted.5
The Annual Report of the Metropolitan Police Department shows 263 vagrancy arrests during the fiscal year 1968, 138 vagrancy arrests in fiscal year 1969, and 99 vagrancy arrests in fiscal year 1970, with the majority of the arrests occurring in the Thirteenth Precinct.
The issue presented to the Court is whether the vagrancy observation practices of the Police violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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