Gomillion v. State
Decision Date | 16 December 2011 |
Docket Number | CR–08–1062. |
Citation | 100 So.3d 1135 |
Parties | Edward Brewster GOMILLION v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Willis Howard Clay, Gadsden, for appellant.
Troy King, atty. gen., and James B. Prude, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
On Return to Remand*
Edward Brewster Gomillion was convicted of third-degree burglary, § 13A–7–7, Ala.Code 1975, and first-degree burglary, § 13A–7–5, Ala.Code 1975.
On appeal, Gomillion does not challenge his convictions; therefore, a detailed recitation of the facts supporting his convictions is unnecessary. The relevant procedural facts, however, are as follows. On February 9, 2006, Gomillion appeared before the Etowah Circuit Court and entered pleas of guilty to three counts of first-degree robbery. At that proceeding, however, Gomillion was not formally adjudicated or sentenced. On August 12, 2007, Gomillion was arrested in Calhoun County for new offenses of first-degree burglary and third-degree burglary—the offenses at issue in this case. On December 12, 2008, Gomillion appeared again before the Etowah Circuit Court and entered pleas of guilty on the same charges to which he had entered pleas in February 2006 and was then sentenced on each count. On January 28, 2009, Gomillion was convicted in the Calhoun Circuit Court for the first-degree-burglary and third-degree-burglary offenses. On February 25, 2009, the Calhoun Circuit Court conducted a sentencing hearing in which the following occurred:
“....
“[The Court]: Any matters to be presented on behalf of the defendant?
“....
“[The Court]: Any response by the [S]tate?
(R. 494–500.) (Emphasis added.) The Calhoun Circuit Court then found that Gomillion had “previously been convicted of three Class A felonies, robbery in the first degree, in Etowah County” and sentenced Gomillion, as an habitual felony offender, to 40 years' imprisonment on the third-degree-burglary conviction and to life without the possibility of parole on the first-degree-burglary conviction, the sentences to be served concurrently. (R. 501.) Additionally, the circuit court ordered Gomillion to pay a $5,000 fine, a $50 crime-victims-compensation assessment, and court costs on each conviction. Gomillion filed posttrial motions, which were denied, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Gomillion contends that it is unclear whether he had been adjudicated guilty of the three counts of first-degree robbery before the commission of the burglary offenses for which he was convicted in this case. 1 Gomillion, therefore, contends that the Calhoun Circuit Court erred when it found that he had “previously been convicted of three Class A felonies, robbery in the first degree, in Etowah County” and enhanced his sentences pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act (“the HFOA”). We agree.
Section 13A–5–9(c), Ala.Code 1975, a part of the HFOA, provides:
“(c) In all cases when it is shown that a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of any three felonies and after such convictions has committed another felony, he or she must be punished as follows:
“(1) On conviction of a Class C felony, he or she must be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term of not more than 99 years but not less than 15 years.
“(2) On conviction of a Class B felony, he or she must be punished by imprisonment for life or any term of not less than 20 years.
“(3) On conviction of a Class A felony, where the defendant has no prior convictions for any Class A felony, he or she must be punished by imprisonment for life or life without the possibility of parole, in the discretion of the trial court.
“(4) On conviction of a Class A felony, where the defendant has one or more prior convictions for any Class A felony, he or she must be punished by imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.”
(Emphasis added.)
“[T]he provisions of the [HFOA] are mandatory and not discretionary,” because “the act specifies that a criminal defendant who has been previously convicted of ... three felonies ‘must be punished as follows ...’ ” and “[t]he word, ‘must,’ as it is used in [§ ] 13A–5–9, leaves no discretion with the court as to whether a repeat offender is to be punished under the statute.” Watson v. State, 392 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) (emphasis omitted). The HFOA, however, applies only when an offender has been “previously convicted” of a felony. Thus, application of the HFOA turns on the meaning of the phrase “previously convicted.”
This Court noted in Carroll v. State, 599 So.2d 1253, 1262 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), that “ ‘[t]he meaning of the term “ ‘conviction’ varies according to the context in which it appears and the purpose to which it relates.” ' ” This Court then noted:
Carroll, 599 So.2d at 1266. In other words, the HFOA applies only when an offender has been previously adjudicated of a felony. See Craig v. State, 893 So.2d 1250, 1258 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); Morgan v. State, 733 So.2d 940, 943 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Stanton v. State, 648 So.2d 638, 647 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Connolly v. State, 602 So.2d 452, 457 (Ala.1992); Congo v. State, 477 So.2d 511, 516 (Ala.Crim.App.1985); Prock v. State, 471 So.2d 519, 521 (Ala.Crim.App.1985); Summerhill v. State, 436 So.2d 2, 5 (Ala.Crim.App.1983).
It is not always clear, however, whether an adjudication has, in fact, occurred for purposes of the HFOA. This is especially true in cases in which the circuit court fails to use formal words of adjudication.2 Although no formal words of adjudication are necessary to “satisfy the requirements of the HFOA” that there be an adjudication of guilt, when a circuit court fails to use formal words of adjudication we must look to the record to determine whether it clearly shows that the circuit court intended to adjudicate the defendant guilty. Morgan, 733 So.2d at 943.
In Morgan, the defendant argued that the HFOA was improperly applied in sentencing him because, he said, “the forms supporting two of the three alleged convictions ... did not include language specifically stating that he had been adjudicated guilty of these prior felonies.” 733 So.2d at 942. This Court found that, although the circuit court did not formally adjudicate the defendant on his prior offenses, the record clearly established that the defendant had pleaded guilty and that a sentence had been imposed for those prior convictions. This Court then held that “[b]ecause the record ... clearly show[ed] that the appellant was adjudicated guilty, although that exact term was not used, ... the State properly proved these prior convictions.” Morgan, 733 So.2d at 944. In other words, Morgan creates an “implied adjudication” in the HFOA context. An “implied adjudication” occurs when the record clearly shows that the defendant has entered a guilty plea and has been sentenced before he commits a new offense. “[T]he reasoning being that a judgment of guilt is implied from the sentence.” Rule 26.1, Ala. R.Crim. P., Committee Comments; see also Ex parte Eason, 929 So.2d 992 (Ala.2005). Morgan does not, however, hold that an “implied adjudication” occurs in cases, like here, where a defendant enters a guilty plea, is not formally adjudicated, commits a new offense, and thereafter reenters his guilty plea and is sentenced for the prior offense.
Here, the State contends that in those situations detailed above, the first guilty plea is an adjudication because, it says, a “ ‘plea of guilty is a conviction itself’ ”—regardless of the second guilty plea and sentence. (State's brief, p. 22 (quoting Stanton, 648 So.2d at 646)). Similarly, the Calhoun Circuit Court stated in its order on return to remand that a guilty plea and an adjudication are inseparable and “[t]o separate a formal guilty plea from adjudication would be nonsensical.” 3 (Record on Return to Remand, C. 4.) The Calhoun Circuit Court, therefore, concluded that the first guilty pleas constitute prior convictions under the HFOA. To adopt the positions of the State and the Calhoun Circuit Court, however, would conflate the concepts of “guilty plea” and “adjudication” and would be contrary to the law. There are, for example, circumstances in which a circuit...
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Walker v. State
...not change the original date of Walker's convictions in those cases. The circuit court's holding is correct.In Gomillion v. State, 100 So. 3d 1135, 1138 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), this Court noted that the enhancement provisions of the HFOA apply to previous felony convictions. In construing t......