Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 16 June 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 81-985,81-985 |
Citation | 436 N.E.2d 1347,24 O.O.3d 274,70 Ohio St.2d 166 |
Parties | , 24 O.O.3d 274 GOMOLKA, Exrx., Appellee, v. STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where the language of an endorsement attached by the insurer to a contract of insurance may reasonably be read by a person of ordinary experience and intelligence as having extended, without additional premium charge or other act, underinsured motorist coverage to all of its policy owners having purchased uninsured motorist coverage, and where another part of such contract may similarly be read as excluding such endorsements where it is not listed among those endorsements made applicable thereto, the insurance contract is reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations, is therefore ambiguous, and will be construed most favorably for the insured and against the insurer.
In May of 1979, Leonard J. and Eleanor R. Gomolka renewed an automobile insurance policy issued by appellant, State Automobile Insurance Company, for the period of June 17, 1979, to December 17, 1979. The policy, No. SBP 1620529, insured the Gomolkas' three automobiles and extended, among other coverages, uninsured motorist coverage to a limit of liability of $300,000 for each accident.
On June 30, 1979, Leonard Gomolka, while operating one of his covered automobiles, was involved in a collision with an automobile operated by Duk K. Kim. Kim was insured by Buckeye Union Insurance Company under a policy with a liability limit of $100,000. Some weeks after the collision, Gomolka expired as a result of injuries received in the accident. The aggregate of damages asserted by appellee, Gomolka's surviving spouse and executrix, exceeded the $100,000 policy limitation of the tortfeasor's insurance. Demand was accordingly made upon appellant for coverage of the excess under an endorsement to the Gomolka policy claimed to extend its uninsured motorist coverage to an "underinsured highway vehicle," i.e., to a vehicle with respect to which the limits of liability under its applicable insurance are less than the limits of liability under the claimant's policy. This demand was rejected by appellant, and appellee thereupon commenced a declaratory judgment action for, inter alia, a determination that the policy of insurance issued by appellant to the Gomolkas extended underinsured motorist coverage. The trial court found, however, that the policy of insurance did not provide underinsured coverage and entered judgment accordingly.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding from its examination of the relevant documents that an ambiguity with respect to underinsured coverage existed and, construing the policy most favorably for the insured and against the insurer, determined that underinsured coverage existed.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Mansour, Gavin, Gerlack, & Manos Co., L. P. A., Ernest P. Mansour and Jeffrey M. Embleton, Cleveland, for appellee.
Cronquist, Smith, Marshall & Kagels and Jack F. Smith, Cleveland, for appellant.
The sole question presented is whether the policy of insurance issued by appellant to the Gomolkas and in force at the time of the accident to Mr. Gomolka extended to them underinsured motorist coverage, in addition to a conceded uninsured motorist coverage.
Such questions of law are determined, in the first instance, by an examination of the relevant insurance documents, utilizing therein the familiar rules of construction and interpretation applicable to contracts generally. Wagner v. National Fire Ins. Co. (1973), 132 Ohio St. 405, 412, 8 N.E.2d 144. To the extent that a brief review of those rules of construction relevant to the instant question may be useful before examining the language of the policy in detail, we note, initially, that words and phrases used in an insurance policy must be given their natural and commonly accepted meaning, where they in fact possess such meaning, to the end that a reasonable interpretation of the insurance contract consistent with the apparent object and plain intent of the parties may be determined. Dealers Dairy Products Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. (1960), 170 Ohio St. 336, 164 N.E.2d 745, paragraph one of the syllabus. The insurer, having prepared the policy, must also be prepared to accept any reasonable interpretation, consistent with the foregoing, in favor of the insured. Home Indem. Co. v. Plymouth (1945), 146 Ohio St. 96, 101, 64 N.E.2d 248.
It is quite proper to emphasize, as appellant does, that such rules of construction and interpretation possess definite limitations. Thus, where the provisions of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous courts may not indulge themselves in enlarging the contract by implication in order to embrace an object distinct from that contemplated by the parties, Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. (1939), 136 Ohio St. 49, 23 N.E.2d 839, paragraph one of the syllabus, nor read into the contract a meaning not placed there by an act of the parties, Motorists Ins. Co. v. Tomanski (1970), 27 Ohio St.2d 222, 226, 271 N.E.2d 924; Olmstead v. Lumbermens Mutl. Ins. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 212, 216, 259 N.E.2d 123, nor make a new contract for the parties where their unequivocal acts demonstrate an intention to the contrary, Jackson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 138, 140, 296 N.E.2d 679; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Hartzell Bros. Co. (1924), 109 Ohio St. 566, 143 N.E. 137.
Where, however, it may reasonably be concluded that the language of a policy is ambiguous and may therefore be subject to different interpretations, a universally applied axiom of construction becomes appropriate to resolve the ambiguity. As stated in Butche v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. (1962), 174 Ohio St. 144, 146, 187 N.E.2d 20:
." See, also, Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Price (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 95, 313 N.E.2d 844; American Financial Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 171, 173, 239 N.E.2d 33; 44 Corpus Juris Secundum 1166, Insurance, Section 297(C). See generally, 1 Couch on Insurance 2d 776, Section 15:73; 30 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 225, Insurance, Section 215.
Bearing these several principles of construction in mind, an examination of the relevant insurance policy reveals that it consisted of a printed, multi-page contract form entitled, Special Budget/Automobile Policy, containing general provisions relating to liability, medical expense, uninsured motorist and other coverage, protection against automobile physical damage, and various conditions and exclusions. Attached to this printed form was a one-page computer printout sheet entitled, Renewal Declarations Page-Part Two Special Budget Automobile Policy, the open boxes of which were completed with the relevant information typed in. Several printed endorsement forms and a general printed form entitled, Automobile Amendatory Endorsements, and designated as Form AU-18, completed the contract documents delivered to the Gomolkas by appellant.
The language contained in this policy relevant to the instant issue may be summarized in the following manner. The basic printed policy form commences:
(Emphasis added.) This printed form further provides:
" 'uninsured highway vehicle' " means:
"(a) a highway vehicle with respect to the ownership maintenance or use of which there is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally garaged, no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such vehicle, or with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing the same denies coverage thereunder, or a hit-and-run vehicle." (Emphasis added.)
The various inserts made part of the contract of insurance begin with the Declarations Page, which recites in relevant part:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Stychno v. Ohio Edison Co.
...that their reliance had been upon a broken reed. A court cannot sustain such a contention. See, e.g., Gomolka v. State Automobile Mutual Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982); Taulbee v. The Travelers Cos., 42 Ohio App.3d 209, 537 N.E.2d 670 (1987), motion overruled, (1987). I......
-
Northbrook Excess and Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co.
...See, e.g., King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ohio 1988); Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1352 (Ohio 1982). However, it is clear that the rule is grounded in the need to protect an insured from an insurer who has ......
-
PI&I Motor Express, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., CASE NO. 4:19CV1008
...the parties is evident, i.e., if the language of the policy's provisions is clear and unambiguous . . . ."); Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1351 (Ohio 1982) ("The intention of the parties must be derived instead from the instrument as a whole, and not from detached o......
-
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Insurance Co. of State of Pa.
...contract consistent with the apparent object and plain intent of the parties may be determined." Gomolka v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 167-168, 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1348 (1982). To determine the "plain meaning of an insurance contract, the contract should be read as a whole an......
-
The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses
...Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co, of Winterthur, Switz., 170 A.2d 800, 803-04 (N.J. 1961)); Gomolka v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1348-49 (Ohio 1982) ("Policies of insurance, which are in language selected by the insurer and which are reasonably open to different interpre......