Gon-Shay-Ee
Citation | 32 L. Ed. 973,130 U.S. 343,9 S. Ct. 542 |
Decision Date | 15 April 1889 |
Docket Number | 7 |
Parties | <P><B><CENTER> <I>Ex parte</I> GON-SHAY-EE.</CENTER></B></P> |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Ex parte GON-SHAY-EE.
April 15, 1889.
S. F. Phillips, W. H. Lamarand and J. G. Zachry, for petitioner.
Sol. Gen. Jenks, for respondent.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be directed to the marshal of the United States for the territory of Arizona, who, it is alleged, holds the petitioner under a judgment of the district court of the United States for the Second judicial district of that territory, which condemned him to death for the crime of murder. This crime is alleged in the indictment to have been committed by the defendant, an Apache Indian, within said district, naming no county or other location. The allegation of the petitioner is that the court which tried him had not at that time, and in the mode of trial which was pursued, any jurisdiction of the case against him. It is argued by counsel, and alleged in the petition, that the district courts of the United States in the territory of Arizona, as in all other territories, have two distinct jurisdictions; that in the one they sit to exercise the powers and to try the same class of cases that the circuit courts of the United States do within the states, and in the same manner, while in the other they sit as courts having jurisdiction of the ordinary contests between private parties and of criminal offenses arising under the territorial laws. The controversy in this case seems to turn upon the question whether the offense for which Gon-shay-ee was tried was an offense against the laws of the United States, and was of that character which ought to have been tried by the court sitting to try such cases, or whether it was an offense against the laws of the territory, and should have been tried under those laws and by the court sitting to administer justice under them. The petitioner alleges that the offense with which he was charged was of the latter class, but that he was tried by the court while it was exercising its functions under the former.
The record of the case commences with the following statement of the finding of the indictment:
The record of the final judgment of the court is in the following language
It is very clear from these transcripts of the proceedings in the court below that on this trial it proceeded and considered itself as acting as a court for the trial of offenses arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, and as administering them with the same powers as those vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States generally. The grand jurors are described as 'the grand jurors of the United States of America within and for the Second judicial district, territory of Arizona, being duly impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire within and for the body of said district of all offenses committed therein against the United States.' The court was held in the city of Phoenix, in the county of Maricopa, and the offense is described as having been committed within the Second judicial district of the territory, without any further reference to the county in which the act was done. In the final judgment of condemnation it is declared to be rendered in the 'district court, Second judicial district of Arizona, having and exercising the same jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of the United States as is vested in the district and circuit courts of the United States.' Both the grand and the petit jurors were summoned by the marshal of the United States, and the execution of the sentence was imposed upon that officer, who now holds the prisoner in custody under it.
If the court which tried the prisoner had been sitting for the trial of offenses committed against the territorial law, all this would have been different. The grand...
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