Gonsalves v. City of West Haven

• Decision Date: 31 January 1995
• Citation: 653 A.2d 156,232 Conn. 17
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Lucille GONSALVES v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN et al. 15022.

Page 156

653 A.2d 156

232 Conn. 17

Lucille GONSALVES v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN et al.

15022.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 25, 1994.

Decided Jan. 31, 1995.

Jeremy G. Zimmermann, with whom, on the brief, was Jennifer S. Aniskovich, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

Henry C. Szadkowski, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Charles A Graham, Corp. Counsel, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Paul J. Dorsi, with whom were Eugene J. Dorsi, West Haven and Louis Smith Votto, Clinton, for appellee (defendant Anne Gonsalves).

Bradford J. Rieger, with whom, on the brief, was Kimberly Simon, New Haven, for appellee (defendant Edward Connelly).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

This case requires us to decide whether the plaintiff, Lucille Gonsalves, is entitled to benefits under the police pension fund ¹ of the named defendant, the city of West Haven, as a consequence of her marriage to the decedent, Luis J. Gonsalves, a former member of the West Haven police department. The plaintiff applied to the defendant West Haven police pension board (pension board) for benefits under the fund. The pension board denied the application, concluding that the plaintiff is not a "widow" as defined by the special act (act) ² establishing the fund's eligibility criteria. The plaintiff thereupon commenced this action, ³ seeking a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to benefits under the act. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to benefits and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are undisputed. The decedent married his first wife, Anne, in 1956. In 1963, the decedent was appointed to serve as a police officer for the city of West Haven, a position he held until May 6, 1977, when he retired due to a disability. ⁴ Approximately one month after his retirement, the decedent and Anne Gonsalves were divorced, and on September 3, 1977, the decedent married the plaintiff. The decedent died on September 30, 1990.

Following his death, Anne Gonsalves and the plaintiff each applied to the pension board for widow's benefits ⁵ under the pension fund. On October 30, 1990, the pension board voted to award benefits to Anne Gonsalves and to deny the plaintiff's application. Thereafter, upon the plaintiff's request for reconsideration, the pension board affirmed its decision. The plaintiff then brought this declaratory judgment action, ⁶ claiming that she alone is entitled to widow's benefits under the act. ⁷ The parties stipulated to the relevant facts, and also agreed that the plaintiff's eligibility for benefits depends upon whether she is a "widow" as that term is defined by the act.

The trial court concluded that the act unambiguously limits the class of widows of department members entitled to benefits to those surviving wives who (1) were living with a department member at the time of his death, or, if not so living with him, were absent by reason of the member's fault, and (2) were married to the department member at the time of his retirement. Applying this test, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff is not eligible for widow's benefits because she was not married to the decedent at the time of his retirement. ⁸

The plaintiff contends that the trial court misconstrued the act's definition of the term "widow." Under the construction urged by the plaintiff, a surviving wife of a department member would be entitled to benefits upon proof either that (1) she was living with the decedent at the time of his death, or (2) if not so living with him, was absent by reason of his fault, and was married to him prior to his retirement. The plaintiff claims that because she is a surviving wife of the decedent who was living with him at the time of his death, she satisfies the first prong of the test and, accordingly, is entitled to widow's benefits. We conclude that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff is not a "widow" as defined by the act.

Our analysis of the plaintiff's claim is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. " 'Our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.' " (Citation omitted.) Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91-92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); see also Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 231 Conn. 355, 362, 650 A.2d 147 (1994).

The plaintiff relies primarily on the language of the act's definition of "widow" to support her claim that she is entitled to benefits. The definition, however, read in the light of the ordinary rules of English grammar and sentence structure, compels a contrary conclusion. See Glastonbury Volunteer Ambulance Assn., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 848, 852, 633 A.2d 305 (1993).

Under the act, the term "widow" is "limited in its meaning to the surviving wife of [a department] member who was living with him at the time of his death, or, if not so living with him, was absent by reason of his fault, and who, if such member was retired, was married to him prior to his retirement from [the] department." The parties' disagreement over the proper construction of the definition centers upon their differing views as to which phrases and clauses ⁹ are connected by the coordinating conjunctions "and" and "or." The defendants contend that "and" connects a restrictive clause containing two predicate phrases ("who was living with him at the time of his death, or, if not so living with him, was absent by reason of his fault") with a second restrictive clause ("who, if such member was retired, was married to him prior to his retirement from such department"). This construction is consistent with the general rule of grammar that coordinating conjunctions are used to connect sentence elements of the same class. ¹⁰ Under the construction urged by the plaintiff, however, this grammatical rule is violated, because "and" would connect a clause ("who was living with him at the time of his death") and a phrase ("if not so living with him, was absent by reason of his fault") with a clause ("who, if such member was retired, was married to him prior to his retirement from such department").

Similarly, under the defendants' construction, "or" connects sentence elements of the same class, namely, two predicate phrases ("was living with him at the time of his death" and "if not so living with him, was absent by reason of his fault"). Under the plaintiff's construction, however, "or" connects a clause ("who was living with him at the time of his death") with a phrase and a clause ("if not so living with him, was absent by reason of his fault" and "who, if such member was retired, was married to him prior to his retirement from such department"). Here again, the defendants' construction, in contrast to that urged by the plaintiff, comports with the rules of grammar.

The plaintiff does not disagree with the general rule that coordinating conjunctions are used to connect sentence elements of equal grammatical rank, but claims, rather, that her construction of the act is consistent with the rule. Specifically, she contends that the sequence "or, if not so living with him, was absent by reason of his fault," is a clause, not a phrase, and that the subject of the clause, "who," is implied or understood. The plaintiff, however, cites nothing in the act or in its history to support this assertion. Because we will not supply language to change the clear meaning of a statute in the absence of any indication that the legislature intended such a construction; see, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Board of Education, 206 Conn. 25, 28-29, 535 A.2d 1311 (1988); McPadden v. Morris, 126 Conn. 654, 13 A.2d 679 (1940); we reject the plaintiff's argument.

The plaintiff also contends that her interpretation finds support in the legislature's 1961 rephrasing of the definition of "widow," which, she argues, changed the meaning of the term. ¹¹ We are not persuaded.

The plaintiff acknowledges that she would not have been entitled to benefits under the act's definition of the term "widow" prior to the enactment of the 1961 amendment. She claims, however, that the 1961 revision of the definition necessarily reflects a legislative intent to change the meaning of the term "widow." Although it is generally true that when the legislature amends the language of a statute, we presume "that it intended to change the meaning of the statute and to accomplish some purpose"; State v. Johnson, 227 Conn. 534, 543, 630 A.2d 1059 (1993); we have recognized also that the legislature may modify the phrasing of a statute solely to simplify or condense the statutory language, and not to effect a substantive change. See Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 511, 624 A.2d 876 (1993); Norwalk v. Daniele, 143 Conn. 85, 87-89, 119 A.2d 732 (1955); Bassett v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 Conn. 393, 400-401, 161 A. 852 (1932). In revising the phraseology of the act's definition of the term "widow," the 1961 amendment made no material changes to its wording. Moreover, there is no indication in the amendment's legislative history that any change in the meaning of the term "widow" was intended. Indeed, there was no mention of the term or its definition in the committee hearings on the amendment; Conn....