Gonzales v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 28 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 10962,10962
• Citation: 89 N.M. 337,552 P.2d 468,1976 NMSC 37
• Parties: , 94 A.L.R.3d 1086 John I. GONZALES and Nick Gonzales, Petitioners, v. Feliberto GARCIA, Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 468

552 P.2d 468

89 N.M. 337, 94 A.L.R.3d 1086

John I. GONZALES and Nick Gonzales, Petitioners, v. Feliberto GARCIA, Respondent.

No. 10962.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 28, 1976.

R. Howard Brandenburg, Taos, for petitioners

Peggy Nelson, Taos, for respondent.

OPINION

SOSA, Justice.

This case presents the issue of whether the trial court's conclusions of law may be attacked upon appeal if appellant failed to submit requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the issue as to the appropriate measure of damages if purchaser under executed contract for purchase of real property receives only part of the agreed-upon acreage.

In 1962 plaintiffs-appellees-petitioners John and Nick Gonzales entered into a contract to purchase 22.675 acres from respondent Feliberto Garcia. In 1969 petitioners discovered that Mr. Garcia did not own approximately 10.157 acres of that land, whereupon they purchased them from the owner, Mr. Joe Sanchez, for $7,109.90. Petitioners then brought suit against Mr. Garcia based upon fraud, misrepresentation, and the warranty covenants in the deed. Neither party submitted requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 10, 1975, the trial court issued its separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered judgment awarding petitioners $7,109.90 plus interest. Mr. Garcia appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Gonzales v. Garcia, No. 2078 (Ct.App., May 11, 1976). We granted certiorari.

Petitioners present the following issue for review in their petition for writ of certiorari: In the absence of requested findings of fact and conclusions of law by either party, may an appellate court review the trial court's conclusions of law? We hold that in this case we may review the conclusions of law since the trial court's separate findings of fact are before us.

The trial court issued its separate findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the stipulation of the facts which was entered into by both the petitioners and the respondent. Upon appeal respondent did not challenge any of the findings of fact but did challenge the conclusions of law based upon those findings of fact. Petitioners argue by analogy that since a party who fails to submit his own requested findings of fact is precluded from attacking the court's findings of fact, Wagner Land and Investment Co. v. Halderman, 83 N.M. 628, 495 P.2d 1075 (1972), Speechly v. Speechly, 76 N.M. 390, 415 P.2d 360 (1966), then similarly a person who fails to submit requested conclusions of law is precluded from attacking the court's conclusions of law.

We disagree. Findings of fact are determined by the factfinder(s), and upon appeal, our scope of review with respect to these findings is in general limited to an inquiry into whether they are supported by substantial evidence. However, in the first instance, the determination as to the applicable law is a function of the trial court, and this determination is reviewable by the appellate court. See generally Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Services Dept., 89 N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65 (1976). In Edens the findings of fact by the trial court were properly before the appellate court and they were sufficient for that court to determine the proper law to be applied to those findings. Speechly v. Speechly,supra, is distinguishable because there the trial court failed to make separate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and none were before the appellate court. Wagner Land, supra, is distinguishable because plaintiff-appellant wanted review of the court's findings of fact but did not submit his own requested findings of fact. Thus, in the case at bar the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the trial court's conclusions of law that flowed from the trial court's findings of fact.

The question then becomes whether the Court of Appeals, in determining the standard of damages to be the proportionate part of the purchase price, applied the appropriate measure of damages in this case. Mr. Garcia argued that the proper measure of damages for the deficient acreage is the proportionate part of the purchase price of the land that he failed to convey; petitioners argued that the proper measure of damages is at least the replacement cost of the deficient acreage. The trial court awarded the petitioners $7,109.90, the replacement cost, but it failed to elucidate the legal theory upon which it relied to reach this result.

Two of the trial court's findings have direct bearing upon the resolution of this problem. First, the court found that no fraud on Mr. Garcia's part was involved; rather, he made a mistake. Second, the court found that purchase of the deficient acreage was necessary in order to protect petitioners' improvements thereon, including the gravel pit, access to the new United States Highway 64, and the resultant increase in...