Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc.

• Citation: 89 F.3d 1523
• Decision Date: 02 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-8533,95-8533
• Parties: , 20 Employee Benefits Cas. 1601, 5 A.D. Cases 1202, 18 A.D.D. 329, 8 NDLR P 255, Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) P 23924C August GONZALES, as Administrator of the Estate of Timothy Bourgeois, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARNER FOOD SERVICES, INC.; Willis Corroon Administrative Services Corporation; Willis Corroon Corporation of Georgia, Defendants, Garner Fast Foods, Inc., Defendant-Appellee, American Association of Retired Persons (AARP); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); American Medical Association, American Public Health Association, American Foundation for AIDS Research, Gay Men's Health Crisis; American Civil Liberties Union, the ARC, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Inc., National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, National Association of People With AIDS, National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, National Minority AIDS Council, Equal Employment Advisory Council, Amici Curiae.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 1523

89 F.3d 1523

65 USLW 2110, 20 Employee Benefits Cas.

1601, 5 A.D. Cases 1202,

18 A.D.D. 329, 8 NDLR P 255,

Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) P 23924C

August GONZALES, as Administrator of the Estate of Timothy Bourgeois, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARNER FOOD SERVICES, INC.; Willis Corroon Administrative Services Corporation; Willis Corroon Corporation of Georgia, Defendants Garner Fast Foods, Inc., Defendant-Appellee American Association of Retired Persons (AARP); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); American Medical Association, American Public Health Association, American Foundation for AIDS Research, Gay Men's Health Crisis American Civil Liberties Union, the ARC, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Inc., National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, National Association of People With AIDS National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, National Minority AIDS Council, Equal Employment Advisory Council, Amici Curiae.

No. 95-8533.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 2, 1996.

Sharon Nelson Hill, Milton Dale Rowan, "Chip", Koval & Rowan, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for appellant.

Edward Copeland, NY Lawyers for the Public Interest, Inc., New York City, amici curiae for Am. Civil Liberties Union.

Sally Dunaway, Washington, DC, amicus curiae for Am. Assoc. of Retired Persons.

Carolyn L. Wheeler, Mary L. Clark, Office of the General Counsel, Washington, DC, amici curiae for EEOC.

Eric Brandt Reuss, Office of Eric Brandt Reuss, Atlanta, GA, for appellee Garner.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Appellant August Gonzales filed this action under Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), ¹ alleging that Defendants discriminated against a former employee, Timothy Bourgeois, by imposing a cap for AIDS-related treatment on health insurance benefit coverage Bourgeois elected to continue following his termination. The district court granted a motion to dismiss jointly filed by Garner Fast Foods, Inc. (GFF) and Garner Food Services, Inc. (GFS). Thereafter, Appellant dismissed claims against all Defendants other than GFF and moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. This motion was denied, and Appellant appeals. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND ²

Bourgeois was employed at a Hardee's restaurant, owned and operated by GFS. GFS sponsored and administered a group welfare benefit plan which provided health insurance coverage up to a $1 million lifetime limit. Bourgeois participated in the health insurance benefit plan through his employment.

Bourgeois was diagnosed with AIDS in February 1991, and GFS learned of his condition when he submitted health insurance claims for medical treatment. GFS discharged him in April 1991 to avoid paying future health insurance claims. Following his termination, Bourgeois paid the necessary premiums to continue his health insurance benefit coverage pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). ³

At least partly because of Bourgeois' continued participation in the health insurance benefit plan after his discharge, GFS amended the plan on October 1, 1991, to cap AIDS-related treatment to $10,000 annually with a lifetime maximum limit of $40,000. GFS ceased operations on March 31, 1992. Thereafter, GFF continued GFS' operations, and became the sponsor of Bourgeois' plan. ⁴ Before he died on September 6, 1992, Bourgeois had exhausted the benefits available to him under the AIDS cap limit and was denied payment for claims submitted in excess, totaling approximately $90,000.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court's denial of Appellant's motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S.Ct. 683, 126 L.Ed.2d 651 (1994). Since our review requires us to focus on conclusions of law made by the district court in granting the motion to dismiss, we review these questions of law de novo. See O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir.1990).

III. DISCUSSION

The ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990, but did not become effective until July 26, 1992. ⁵ Pub.L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990). Title I of the ADA addresses disability discrimination by employers. ⁶ As applied to private employers, Title I is not retroactive. See O'Bryant v. City of Midland, 9 F.3d 421, 422 (5th Cir.1993); see also 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601 (statement by President George Bush upon signing S. 933). Against this background, courts have concluded that Title I applies only to wrongful acts committed after the effective date of the ADA. See, e.g., O'Bryant, 9 F.3d at 422. Since the AIDS cap was implemented in October 1991, prior to the effective date of the ADA, GFF argues from the outset that Appellant's claim is barred.

Appellant counters that his claim is actionable on the basis that the AIDS cap "endured" after the effective date of the ADA, thereby making GFF's refusal to pay health benefits from then until Bourgeois' death a continuing violation of the Act. In determining whether maintenance of the AIDS cap after July 26, 1992, constituted a continuing violation of the ADA, this Court must distinguish between the present consequences of a one-time violation, which would not qualify as a continuing violation, and the continuation of the violation into the present, which would. See Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792, 796 (11th Cir.1992). As did the district court, we will assume for purposes of our analysis that the denial of AIDS-related health care benefits after the effective date of the ADA could constitute a continuing violation of the Act. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 3006, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986) ("A pattern or practice that would have constituted a violation of Title VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective, became a violation upon Title VII's effective date."); Beavers, 975 F.2d at 797-98 (holding that the continued maintenance of a pre-Title VII discriminatory benefits policy is actionable after the effective date of Title VII as a continuing violation of the statute).

GFF argues that even if maintaining the AIDS cap beyond the effective date of the ADA could constitute a continuing violation, Appellant fails to state a prima facie case of discrimination under Title I of the Act. The Title I general rule states: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis supplied). A "qualified individual with a disability" (QID) is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires...." ⁷ Id. § 12111(8) (emphasis supplied).

The parties do not dispute that AIDS is a disability recognized under the ADA. ⁸ It is further undisputed that fringe benefits, such as employer-provided health benefits, are one set of the "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" protected from unlawful discrimination under the ADA. ⁹ Thus, Appellant reasons, once Bourgeois took advantage of the opportunity to participate in the group health insurance plan, he was entitled to be provided with health insurance in a nondiscriminatory manner.

Bourgeois does not satisfy the QID requirement under the plain language of the ADA, however, because he neither held nor desired to hold a position with GFF at or subsequent to the time the alleged discriminatory conduct was committed. Rather, Bourgeois was a participant in the health benefit plan only by virtue of his status as a former employee. Appellant does not contest this conclusion, but argues that since the fruits of many fringe benefits are realized during the post-employment period, Congress must have intended former employees to be protected under the ADA as well.

Neither the QID definition nor the ADA's definitions of "employee" and "discriminate" provide support for Appellant's position. The ADA defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." ¹⁰ Id. § 12111(4) (emphasis supplied). Further, § 12112(b) provides:

As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term "discriminate" includes--

(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;

(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter ...;

....

(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee ... or

(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability ...;

(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity. ¹¹

Id. § 12112(b) (emphases supplied).

Moreover, the legislative history of the ADA specifically states that the purpose of including...