Gonzales v. Gonzales

• Decision Date: 20 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 13189,13189
• Citation: 867 P.2d 1220,1993 NMCA 159,116 N.M. 838
• Parties: Martin GONZALES, Lucille M. Gonzales and Angela Benavidez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Cipriano GONZALES and Celia Gonzales, his wife, and Kimball R. Udall, Conservator of the Estate of Gertrudes Gonzales, an Incompetent Person, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 1220

867 P.2d 1220

116 N.M. 838

Martin GONZALES, Lucille M. Gonzales and Angela Benavidez Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Cipriano GONZALES and Celia Gonzales, his wife, and Kimball R. Udall, Conservator of the Estate of Gertrudes Gonzales, an Incompetent Person Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13189.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Dec. 20, 1993.

[116 N.M. 840] Donaldo A. Martinez, Las Vegas, for plaintiffs-appellants.

John F. Kennedy, Simons, Cuddy & Friedman, Santa Fe, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

MINZNER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs originally brought an action in district court to partition lands located in both San Miguel County and Santa Fe County. They now appeal the district court's decision denying their claims to a tract of land located in San Miguel County (the La Cueva tract) and dismissing for lack of venue their claims to a tract located in Santa Fe County (the Rowe Mesa tract). We affirm the district court's decision granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the claims of Plaintiffs Martin and Lucille Gonzales to the La Cueva tract. We reverse the district court's decision regarding the claim of Plaintiff Angela Benavidez (Benavidez), daughter of Plaintiff Lucille Gonzales, to the La Cueva tract, and remand for further proceedings. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the order granting summary judgment. In addition, we affirm the district court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' claims to the Rowe Mesa tract.

We first address Plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record with records of two other judicial proceedings. Previously, on separate motions by the parties, we supplemented the record on appeal with copies of written arguments made to the district court. Attached to the written arguments made to the trial court were various documents, including copies of portions of records of the other judicial proceedings that Plaintiffs wish us to consider. These documents are treated as included within the copies of the written arguments, since both were before the district court when it ruled. To the extent that Plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record includes these documents, the motion is moot. Because it does not appear that any other portion of these records was before the district court, we otherwise deny Plaintiffs' motion.

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THE LA CUEVA TRACT)

The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of a 1987 deed to Defendants Cipriano and Celia Gonzales from Defendant Kimball R. Udall as conservator of the property of Gertrudes Gonzales, the mother of Plaintiffs Martin and Lucille Gonzales. Gertrudes and her husband, Tranquilino, who died in 1971, were named in a United States land patent issued on June 1, 1936, conveying the La Cueva tract. The patent grants the land to "Tranquilino Gonzales and Gertrudes R. Gonzales and to their heirs and assigns forever; with the proviso in said Act [Pueblo Lands Act, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636 (1924) ] expressed that this patent shall have the effect only of a relinquishment by the United States of America and the Indians of said Pueblo." Because Gertrudes and Tranquilino were married in 1928, and there is a statutory presumption that property acquired by either husband and wife or both is presumed to be community property, the district court apparently concluded that they acquired the land in 1936 as community property. See NMSA 1978, Sec. 40-3-12(A) (Repl.Pamp.1989); cf. NMSA 1929, Sec. 68-401. In that event, when Tranquilino died intestate, Gertrudes became sole owner. See NMSA 1953, Sec. 29-1-9 (Supp.1961).

Plaintiffs Martin and Lucille Gonzales claim title to the La Cueva tract on the basis that the title acquired by the patent actually had its inception prior to 1928, and thus under New Mexico law should have been characterized as separate property belonging to Tranquilino. See Lucas v. Lucas, 95 N.M. 283, 284, 621 P.2d 500, 501 (1980) ("Property in New Mexico takes its status as community or separate property at the time and by the manner of its acquisition."); see also Hollingsworth v. Hicks, 57 N.M. 336, 343-44, 258 P.2d 724, 729-30 (1953) (discussing inception of title). As children of Tranquilino and Gertrudes, they claim that Gertrudes inherited only a one-quarter interest, while they were entitled to a share of the remaining three-quarters. See NMSA 1953, Sec. 29-1-10. Defendants contend, and we agree, that Plaintiffs' argument that the La Cueva tract was Tranquilino's separate property requires us to "go behind [the patent] and look to the antecedent proceedings on which it is founded," contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Bustamante v. Sena, 92 N.M. 72, 74, 582 P.2d 1285, 1287 (1978).

Benavidez claims Gertrudes's interest in the La Cueva property on the basis of a 1981 deed from Gertrudes. Defendants contend, and the district court apparently agreed, that the deed was superseded by a 1984 deed, titled a correction deed, conveying a different parcel to Benavidez, her husband, and her daughter. Plaintiffs in effect contend that Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law under SCRA 1986, 1-056 (Repl.1992). We agree. We discuss each claim separately below.

A. Claim of Martin and Lucille Gonzales

In Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 390 (1952; 1971 rev.), he describes the Act as follows:

The Pueblo Lands Act established a "Pueblo Lands Board" consisting of the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, and a third member appointed by the President. This board was, by section 2 of the act, given the duty of determining "the exterior boundaries of any land granted or confirmed to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico by any authority of the United States of America, or any prior sovereignty, or acquired by said Indians as a community by purchase or otherwise," and to determine the status of all lands within such boundaries, subject to the requirement that a finding that Indian title had been extinguished required a unanimous vote of the board.

The Attorney General was directed, in section 3 of the Pueblo Lands Act, to bring suit to quiet title to all lands listed as pueblo lands by the Lands Board.

Section 4 of the act provided that non-Indian claimants, in order to substantiate their claims, must demonstrate either (a ) continuous adverse possession under color of title since January 6, 1902, supported by payment of taxes on the land, or (b ) continuous adverse possession since March 16, 1889, supported by payment of taxes, but without color of title.

The Act recognized that title to land within a land grant originally made to a pueblo could be established by a non-Indian claimant through adverse possession.¹ Plaintiffs argue that because the period of possession required by the Act to extinguish Indian title predated the year Gertrudes and Tranquilino were married, then the title that resulted from the patent must be characterized as having its inception prior to marriage and thus to be title to separate property. See Lucas, 95 N.M. at 284, 621 P.2d at 501. We disagree. We recognize that the Act required a showing of possession from either 1902 (with color of title) or from 1899 (without color of title) to the date of the Act (1924). 43 Stat. 636, 637 (ch. 331, Sec. 4(a), (b)). That is not to say, however, that a claimant was required to show his or her own possession from 1902 or 1899 to 1924. Rather, the statute permitted showings by claimants "in themselves, their ancestors, grantors, privies, or predecessors in interest." Id. at Sec. 4(a).

Plaintiffs provided no evidence that Tranquilino himself (as opposed to his family) had an ownership interest prior to his marriage to Gertrudes. As Defendants note, the survey made when the claim at issue in this case was investigated shows both Gertrudes and Tranquilino as claimants. This indicates that both of them asserted a right to succeed to the interest acquired by members of Tranquilino's family, as well as Tranquilino himself. That right might have been based on joint possession subsequent to marriage, a gift from Tranquilino's family to Tranquilino and Gertrudes, or a gift from Tranquilino to Gertrudes. Therefore, it is possible that Tranquilino acquired his interest after his marriage.

Even if there were evidence that Tranquilino had a pre-marriage ownership interest in the property, generally "a court cannot go behind [a patent] and look to the antecedent proceedings on which it is founded." Bustamante, 92 N.M. at 74, 582 P.2d at 1287 (following United States v. Price, 111 F.2d 206 (10th Cir.1940)). Barring an allegation of fraud, mistake, or that the patent is "not regular on its face," a patent is presumptive evidence that every prerequisite has been met to its proper issuance. Id., 92 N.M. at 73-74, 582 P.2d at 1286-87 (quoting Martinez v. Mundy, 61 N.M. 87, 89, 295 P.2d 209, 211 (1956), overruled on other grounds by Evans Fin. Corp. v. Strasser, 99 N.M. 788, 791, 664 P.2d 986, 989 (1983)).

Plaintiffs argue that the patent "is not 'regular on its face' " because it was "issued to a man and his wife, when only the man [was] entitled to it." We disagree. The only circumstance in which a patent is not regular on its face is when the patent does not conform, in form and substance, to the statutory requirements of the legislation that authorizes the agency to issue such a patent. Price, 111 F.2d at 208. Plaintiffs have not shown any limitation on the Board's ability to issue a patent in two names or to recognize the manner in which two people wished to acquire title. Plaintiffs concede this point.

Plaintiffs have argued that titles secured under the Pueblo Lands Act differ from those secured under other legislation. They suggest that the Act had limited effect because it was intended to relinquish only Indian claims. Bustamante, however, controls on this point. Just as in this case, Bustamante involved a 1936 patent to land...