Gonzales v. Larson

• Decision Date: 01 July 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 5:13-CV-14491
• Parties: ARMANDO GONZALES, Petitioner, v. JEFF LARSON, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

ARMANDO GONZALES, Petitioner, v. JEFF LARSON, Respondent.

CASE NO. 5:13-CV-14491

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Date: July 1, 2014

HONORABLE JOHN CORBETT O'MEARA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Armando Gonzales, (Petitioner"), confined at the Central Michigan Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se application, petitioner challenges his conviction for felonious assault, M.C.L.A. 750.82; felon in possession of a firearm, M.C.L.A. 750.224f; two counts of felony-firearm, M.C.L.A. 750.227b; and being a third felony habitual offender, M.C.L.A. 769.11. For the reasons stated below, the application for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner's conviction arises out of a police standoff at his house in Saginaw, Michigan on July 30, 2009. Petitioner lived at his home with his wife and his disabled sister. Gonzales admitted, under oath at his guilty plea hearing, that he got intoan altercation with his wife, which caused her to call the police. (Plea Tr., pp. 7-8). Over ten police officers from the Saginaw Police Department responded and surrounded the house, leading to an eight hour standoff. (Sen. Tr., p. 17). Police did not fire at petitioner because they feared that they might hit petitioner's disabled sister. (Id., p. 17). When police tried to enter the house through the back door, petitioner fired his shotgun at them through the door. (Plea Tr., pp. 9-10). The shotgun blast narrowly missed hitting the police chief and several other officers. (Sen. Tr., p. 17).

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the felonious assault, felon in possession of a firearm, and the felony-firearm charges in the Saginaw County Circuit Court, in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to dismiss a charge of carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent and a charge of domestic violence, third offense. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years, four months to eight years for the felonious assault conviction and six years, eight months to ten years on the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Petitioner received a consecutive two year prison sentence for the felony-firearm convictions.

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Gonzales, No. 300302 (Mich.Ct.App. October 29, 2010); lv. den. 489 Mich. 897, 796 N.W.2d 74 (2011). Petitioner then filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. 6.500, et. Seq., which was denied. People v. Gonzales, No. 09-033063-FH (Saginaw County Circuit Court, October 21, 2011). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Gonzales, No. 308431 (Mich.Ct.App. June 19, 2012);lv. den. 493 Mich. 893, 822 N.W.2d 588 (2012).

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:

I. The trial court failed to provide a concise statement of reasons for the denial of Gonzales's motion for relief from judgment, in violation of Mich. Ct. R. 6.504(B)(2), where the trial court said only that his claims were a re-argument of what occurred at sentencing and that his issues were raised on appeal or without merit.

II. Gonzales has shown good cause and actual prejudice under Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D) by showing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court did not say why it found these claims to be without merit.

III. Gonzales's sentence is based on inaccurate information, in violation of due process.

IV. Gonzales's Presentence Investigation Report lacks information required by statute.

V. Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate the direction of the gunshot, for failing to object to all of the sentencing court's erroneous factual findings, and for failing to object to the deficiencies in the PSIR.

VI. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the foregoing claims on direct appeal.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists coulddisagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. ( citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.

"[I]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" the Supreme Court's precedents. Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979))(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Thus, a "readiness to attribute error [to a state court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24. Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federalcourt, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.

III. Discussion

A. Claims # 1 and # 2. The claims involving the state court's deficient adjudication of petitioner's post-conviction motion.

In his first claim, petitioner contends that the state trial court did not provide a concise statement of reasons for denying his post-conviction motion for relief from judgment, as required by M.C.R. 6.504(B)(2). As part of his second claim, petitioner contends that the trial court failed to state why his post-conviction claims lacked merit.

Petitioner's claims that the Michigan courts wrongfully denied him post-conviction relief are non-cognizable. This Court notes that "[t]he Sixth Circuit consistently held that errors in post-conviction proceedings are outside the scope of federal habeas corpus review." Cress v. Palmer, 484 F. 3d 844, 853 (6^th Cir. 2007). Thus, a federal habeas corpus petition cannot be used to mount a challenge to a state's scheme of post-conviction relief. See Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F. 3d 663, 681 (6^th Cir. 2001). The reason for this is that the states have no constitutional obligation to provide post-conviction remedies. Id. (citing to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987)). Challenges to state collateral post-conviction proceedings "cannot be brought under the federal habeas corpus provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2254," because "'the essence ofhabeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.'" Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F. 2d 245, 246 (6^th Cir. 1986)(quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). "A due process claim...