Gonzales v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. CV 15–03301 MMM (PJWx)
• Citation: 142 F.Supp.3d 961
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Mary Gonzales, Plaintiff, v. Marriott International, Inc., Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., d/b/a Los Angeles Airport Marriott, Defendants.

142 F.Supp.3d 961

Mary Gonzales, Plaintiff,

v.Marriott International, Inc., Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., d/b/a Los Angeles Airport Marriott, Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 15–03301 MMM (PJWx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Filed November 4, 2015

Signed November 5, 2015

Hillary Benham–Baker, Julia Campins, Campins Benham–Baker LLP, Lafayette, CA, Meghan Boone, Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Alexis A. Sohrakoff, Constance E. Norton, Littler Mendelson PC, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

MARGARET M. MORROW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Mary Gonzales filed this action on May 1, 2015, against Marriott International, Inc., and Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., doing business as Los Angeles Airport Marriott (collectively "Marriott").¹ Gonzales received notice of her right to sue from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on January 30 and April 2, 2015, respectively,² after filing an administrative complaint with the DFEH on August 22, 2014, and an amended administrative complaint on August 21, 2014.³ On June 19, 2015, Marriott filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.⁴ On June 30, 2015, the case was transferred from the calendar of Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick to this court.⁵ Gonzales opposes the motion.⁶

I. BACKGROUND

Gonzales is a full-time general accountant and cashier at the Los Angeles Airport Marriott ("LAX Marriott"), a hotel branch of Marriott International, Inc., that is operated by Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., in Los Angeles, California.⁷ She works forty hours per week (from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Monday through Friday) at an hourly wage of $17.⁸ She is allowed one unpaid thirty-minute lunch break and two paid ten-minute rest breaks per day.⁹

After entering into a gestational surrogacy agreement, Gonzales became pregnant in August 2013 and gave birth to a healthy female child on April 22, 2014.¹⁰ Following the birth, Gonzales began to express milk several times a day for the child's family.¹¹ On June 9, 2014, during her approved maternity leave, Gonzales allegedly emailed her manager, Bill Dea, to inform him that she would need to express breast milk twice a day when she returned to work.¹² On June 13, 2014, when Gonzales returned to work, she expressed milk twice a day in her office for approximately ten days; each session lasted approximately twenty-five to thirty minutes.¹³ Gonzales asserts that because her office was equipped with video surveillance cameras, in late 2014, she began lactating in a "lactation room" set up in an empty office space. Two to three other female LAX Marriott employees also used the room.¹⁴ Gonzales used her mid-morning and afternoon breaks to express milk in this room for approximately two weeks.¹⁵

By the end of June 2014, Gonzales's obligation to send breast milk to the child's parents had ended, given logistical concerns about the safety of the shipments. She alleges that she continued to express breast milk, however, due to the personal health benefits of the practice and so that she could donate breast milk to women who were unable to produce sufficient milk for their children.¹⁶ Gonzales asserts she donated her breast milk to such women and also donated milk to Preemies Milk Bank, a charitable organization that provides milk to infants in need.¹⁷

Gonzales contends that, on June 30, 2014, she was informed by her manager, Dea, that she could take breaks to express milk for another thirty days and that thereafter, she would no longer be accorded the time necessary to do so.¹⁸ On July 1, 2014, Gonzales purportedly emailed the LAX Marriott Market Director of Human Resources, John G. Masamori, and asked to meet with him concerning the matter.¹⁹ On July 18, 2014, Gonzales, Masamori, and other Marriott representatives met; Gonzales told Masamori she had a right to lactation breaks and showed him regulations regarding lactation accommodations, including the Fair Employment and Housing Act.²⁰ Gonzales asserts that Masamori said, in an allegedly "angry and dismissive" tone, that she did not qualify for accommodation, and that "if [she] had rights, [they would] be talking to [her] lawyer." Nonetheless, he told Gonzales he would check and get back to her.²¹

On August 1, 2014, Gonzales and Masamori met again. Masamori purportedly confirmed his denial of Gonzales's request for a lactation accommodation, stating that she was "not disabled" and was not feeding "a child at home."²² He told her she could only use her lunch break to express milk.²³ Gonzales alleges that she offered to bring Masamori a doctor's note; he purportedly told her not to bother.²⁴ On September 11, 2014, Gonzales allegedly stopped taking lactation breaks, and until January 20, 2015, pumped once a day at work during her thirty-minute lunch break.²⁵

Gonzales purportedly suffered clogged ducts, severe breast pain and soreness, blisters, and loss of sleep from expressing milk at night because she could not do so during the workday.²⁶ She asserts she was excluded from company social events at lunch, and suffered "a severe emotional toll" as a result of being treated unfairly, denied her legal rights, and discriminated against due to her "childbearing capacity."²⁷ Gonzales alleges, on information and belief, that Marriott accommodates other female employees because they are nursing children at home and pays similarly-situated women their normal hourly rate for lactation breaks.²⁸

Gonzales pleads the following claims: (1) failure to make reasonable accommodation for a condition related to pregnancy under California Government Code § 12945 ;²⁹ (2) failure to make reasonable accommodation for a pregnancy-related condition under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) ;³⁰ (3) discrimination on the basis of sex under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 ;³¹ (4) discrimination on the basis of sex under California Government Code § 12945.³²

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true, and construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.1996) ; Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1995). It need not, however, accept as true unreasonable inferences or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ("While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)" (citations omitted)). Thus, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ... A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)" (citations omitted)); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.2009) ("[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief," citing Iqbal and Twombly ).

As the Ninth Circuit has explained: "First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir.2011).

B. Defendants' Requests for Judicial Notice

Marriott asks the court take judicial notice of two documents: (1) copies of the legislative analysis and amendments to Assembly Bill 1025 from the 2001/2002 Session of the California Senate and Assembly;³³ and (2) a notice released by the United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, titled "Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers," 75 Fed.Reg. 80078 (Dec. 21, 2010).³⁴

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally looks only to the face of the complaint and documents attached thereto. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc ., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2002) ; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). A court must normally convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment if it "considers evidence outside the pleadings.... A...