Gonzales v. People
| Decision Date | 14 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 19SC292 |
| Citation | 471 P.3d 1059 |
| Parties | Daniel J. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Jessica Sommer, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Melissa D. Allen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 After the victim's murder in this case, his sister-in-law discovered a peculiar microcassette among his belongings. On that cassette was a recording of a potentially incriminating voicemail message. A police detective later testified at trial that the message featured a voice like that of the defendant, Daniel J. Gonzales, whom the detective had interviewed while investigating the murder.
¶2 Over Gonzales's objection, the court admitted the recorded message into evidence at Gonzales's trial. It did so based in part on the detective's identification of Gonzales's voice. But the detective was not present when the recorded statements were made, and neither he nor anyone else testified about the reliability of the recording process. Even so, after considering the recording and other evidence, a jury found Gonzales guilty of, among other things, first degree murder.
¶3 We agreed to consider whether the trial court was right to admit the recording based on this type of voice authentication. In doing so, we have the benefit of two well-crafted but divergent opinions from two divisions of the court of appeals.
¶4 On the one hand, there is People v. Baca , 2015 COA 153, 378 P.3d 780. Starting with CRE 901 but then relying on precedent that predates this court's adoption of that rule, Baca holds that testimony by a percipient witness or a witness who can vouch for the reliability of the recording process is necessary to authenticate a voice recording. Id. at ¶¶ 26–27, 30, 378 P.3d at 786–87. Gonzales contends that the prosecution failed to comply with Baca , and consequently, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the voicemail.
¶5 On the other, there is the division below, which rejects this categorical rule in favor of a more versatile approach. People v. Gonzales , 2019 COA 30, ––– P.3d ––––. Gonzales concludes that CRE 901 ’s language, including its illustrations, contemplates a flexible, fact-specific inquiry and undercuts Baca ’s reliance on older precedent. Id. at ¶¶ 14–16, 19–21.
¶6 We agree with the Gonzales division. In the absence of evidence suggesting that a proffered voice recording has been altered or fabricated, we hold that a proponent may authenticate a recording by presenting evidence sufficient to support a finding that it is what the proponent claims. CRE 901(a). Once this prima facie burden is met, authenticity becomes a question for the factfinder, in this instance, the jury.
¶7 Applying this standard here, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the voicemail. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
¶8 In a recorded interview with two police detectives, Gonzales recounted the following events that culminated in his arrest and prosecution for the murder of the victim, F.C.
¶9 Gonzales once lived on the same street as F.C. When Gonzales was a teenager, he and a friend broke into F.C.’s house. Gonzales was attracted to F.C. and searched for clues that F.C. was gay. Along the way, he also stole some of F.C.’s electronics and clothing.
¶10 Gonzales later moved out of the neighborhood. But over a decade later, he broke into F.C.’s house again. This time, he grabbed a knife from F.C.’s kitchen and waited for F.C. to return home.
¶11 When F.C. returned, Gonzales stabbed him several times in the neck, killing him. He then sexually assaulted F.C.’s body, stole some of F.C.’s personal effects, and attempted to burn F.C.’s corpse and house. Then, he fled.
¶12 When law enforcement eventually caught up to him, they arrested and interviewed him. During this interview, Gonzales confessed to killing F.C.
¶13 Gonzales was charged with first degree murder (after deliberation), abuse of a corpse, stalking, first degree arson, first degree burglary, aggravated robbery, and first degree murder (felony murder).
¶14 Following F.C.’s death, his sister-in-law helped sift through his belongings. While going through F.C.’s office space, she came across a microcassette tape in a folded-up piece of cardboard. It was attached to some papers that seemed to be related to a prior burglary of F.C.’s home.
¶15 She later listened to the tape and discovered it was from a phone answering machine. The tape contained a few messages from F.C.’s friends. Then, she stumbled upon the voicemail at issue here. Because she thought it might have some evidentiary value, she turned the tape over to one of the detectives working on the case.
¶16 The case eventually proceeded to trial. At trial, the prosecution asked F.C.’s sister-in-law about the voicemail. She described how she found the microcassette tape in F.C.’s house and determined that it contained voicemail messages. She verified that the prosecution's copy of the voicemail was the same as the message she had listened to on the tape.
¶17 The prosecution also questioned one of the detectives who interviewed Gonzales. The detective explained that he converted the microcassette tape to a CD using a digital voice recorder. After watching the video interview with Gonzales, listening to Gonzales's voice, and listening to the voice on the voicemail, the detective concluded that the voice on the voicemail sounded "consistent or similar to Mr. Gonzales’[s] voice."
¶18 At this point, defense counsel objected based on improper expert opinion. Without squarely addressing that objection, the prosecutor responded that "voice authentication is an acceptable way to lay foundation for a voice recording." He also cited CRE 901. The trial court overruled the objection.
¶19 Before the prosecutor moved to admit the voicemail into evidence, the detective testified that the recording was a "phone message to [F.C.]." He also confirmed that the recording was the same as the voicemail on the microcassette tape. When the prosecution moved to admit the voicemail, defense counsel objected based on a lack of foundation and hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection, and the prosecution played the voicemail for the jury:
Hey [F.C.], um, it's me the guy who has your pajamas and the jeans that fit you. Uh, I suppose I am going to give you back your stuff. Only the pajamas and the jeans that fit you. Um. So I will give you a call tomorrow between eight-thirty and nine o'clock. And uh, that's pretty much all I can say until I talk to you over the phone. Good[ ]bye [F.C.].1
¶20 The jury found Gonzales guilty as charged, and the court sentenced Gonzales to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
¶21 Gonzales appealed, challenging, among other things, the trial court's admission of the voicemail. He contended that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the voicemail because the prosecution failed to authenticate the recording according to one of the methods required by Baca . In other words, he claimed that the prosecution did not establish an adequate foundation for the voicemail's admission.
¶22 A division of the court of appeals disagreed and declined to follow Baca . Gonzales , ¶ 2. It reasoned that Baca heavily relied on a decision of this court, Alonzi v. People , 198 Colo. 160, 597 P.2d 560 (1979), and other authorities, that predated this court's adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Gonzales , ¶¶ 11, 17. It further noted that the language and structure of CRE 901 do not support exclusive methods for authenticating voice recordings. Id. at ¶ 20. Although the division observed that the factors outlined in Baca could be relevant in some circumstances, "particularly when there is a colorable claim that a recording has been altered," it determined that CRE 901 contemplates a flexible, fact-specific inquiry in deciding whether a jury could reasonably determine that a proffered voice recording is what its proponent claims. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22. It therefore rejected Baca ’s categorical approach and concluded that courts "must consider all relevant circumstances that bear on whether a recording is what it purports to be." Id. at ¶ 30.
¶23 Applying this standard here, the division concluded that the prosecution presented enough evidence to support a finding that the voicemail was what the prosecution claimed—a voicemail from Gonzales to F.C. Id. at ¶ 31. Thus, the division determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the voicemail. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶24 Gonzales then petitioned this court for certiorari review. We granted his petition to resolve the division split between Gonzales and Baca .2
¶25 We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Campbell v. People , 2019 CO 66, ¶ 21, 443 P.3d 72, 76. "A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair." Id.
¶26 In deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the voicemail, we must first determine what CRE 901 requires before a voice recording may be admitted into evidence. The interpretation of a rule of evidence is a question of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Zhuk , 239 P.3d 437, 438 (Colo. 2010) ; People v. Reed , 216 P.3d 55, 56 (Colo. App. 2008). And we interpret rules of evidence consistent with principles of statutory construction. See Buell v. People , 2019 CO 27, ¶ 19, 439 P.3d 857, 861. We therefore give a rule's language its "commonly understood and accepted meaning." Id. ; see also Reed , 216 P.3d at 57. "If the rule is unambiguous, we apply it as written." Buell , ¶ 19, 439 P.3d at 861.
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