Gonzales v. Pro Ambulance Service
Decision Date | 30 September 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 4-91-0180,4-91-0180 |
Citation | 219 Ill.App.3d 284,579 N.E.2d 1184,162 Ill.Dec. 370 |
Parties | , 162 Ill.Dec. 370 Julie GONZALES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRO AMBULANCE SERVICE, John W. Wood, Mark Griffith, and Mercy Hospital, n/k/a Covenant Medical Center, Respondents in Discovery-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Robert I. Auler, Auler Law Offices, P.C., Urbana, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael R. Cornyn, David A. Bailie, Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, Champaign, for respondents in discovery-appellees.
On November 28, 1990, plaintiff Gonzales filed a document labeled complaint in discovery against persons and entities described as respondents: Pro Ambulance Service, John W. Wood, Mark Griffith, and Mercy Hospital. Gonzales sought discovery against each respondent, to determine whether each should be named as a defendant "in the above-captioned cause of action." Gonzales also propounded interrogatories to the same parties.
On January 22, 1991, the respondents filed a motion to quash the interrogatories propounded and dismiss the complaint in discovery, "on the grounds that the Complaint is substantially insufficient in law." Respondents also claimed a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-619(a)(1)).
Respondents argued the complaint in discovery was legally insufficient because it failed to name a defendant. They argued section 2-402 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-402) allows the designation of respondents in discovery only in the context of an existing lawsuit with a named defendant. Plaintiff's failure to name a defendant rendered the pleading legally insufficient under section 2-615(a) of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-615(a)) and left the circuit court without subject-matter jurisdiction under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-619(a)(1)). Respondents claimed the proceedings were a nullity.
On February 6, 1991, the Champaign County circuit court concluded it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction.
Gonzales appeals from the circuit court's order dismissing her complaint in discovery. We affirm.
Section 2-402 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-402) states, in pertinent part:
On appeal, the plaintiff maintains the purpose of section 2-402 is to allow the filing of a complaint in discovery before naming defendants in the lawsuit. She relies on the historical and practice notes accompanying section 2-402 of the Code as support for the argument; these historical and practice notes state, in part: "The procedure * * * is designed to reduce the number of individuals actually made defendants in such actions by giving the plaintiff a mechanism for conducting efficient and effective discovery concerning a malpractice claim before he has to make a decision on whom to sue." Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, par. 2-402, Historical and Practice Notes, at 342 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
The wording of the statute, however, clearly indicates respondents in discovery may be included in a complaint which already names one or more defendants. The cases plaintiff cites support this interpretation. In Murphy v. Giardina (1980), 82 Ill.2d 529, 45 Ill.Dec. 921, 413 N.E.2d 399, the plaintiff sued Giardina alleging medical malpractice. The plaintiff subsequently filed a first-amended complaint naming Giardina as the defendant and Vento, Cortis, and St. Anne's Hospital as respondents in discovery. The respondents moved to dismiss the amended complaint alleging section 2-402 (formerly Ill.Rev.Stat., 1976 Supp., ch. 110, par. 21.1) applied prospectively only and was unconstitutional. The trial court held the statute invalid. The supreme court concluded the statute was inapplicable because it had prospective effect only. Thus, as to the first-amended complaint, the court stated:
" " (Emphasis added.) (Murphy, 82 Ill.2d at 533, 45 Ill.Dec. at 923, 413 N.E.2d at 401.)
Because both complaints therein named Giardina as the defendant, Murphy is distinguishable from the complaint filed by Gonzales in this case. We interpret the supreme court's opinion to mean the first-amended complaint in Murphy was a discovery device only as to the respondents in discovery. The complaint was a legally sufficient complaint at law as to Giardina, the named defendant. An extension of this reasoning leads to the conclusion that a complaint naming only respondents in discovery is not a complaint at law, as it does not charge actionable conduct or seek damages.
The plaintiff also cites Hugley v. Alcaraz (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 726, 98 Ill.Dec. 584, 494 N.E.2d 706. There, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action on February 6, 1981, naming Ilagan, Angulo, and Alcaraz as respondents in discovery. She obtained service of summons on Ilagan and Angulo but not Alcaraz. Ilagan and Angulo moved for dismissal from plaintiff's suit because she failed to comply with section 2-402 when she failed to name them as defendants within six months of naming them as respondents in discovery. The court granted the motions to dismiss. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action on December 9, 1983. On February 4, 1984, she refiled the suit naming Alcaraz as defendant. Alcaraz moved to dismiss for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion and Alcaraz appealed.
The appellate court concluded the naming of Alcaraz as a respondent in discovery did not toll the statute of limitations and, thus, the plaintiff was barred from filing a suit naming him as a defendant, as the limitations period had...
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