Gonzales v. State

• Decision Date: 01 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 78152-COA,78152-COA
• Citation: 476 P.3d 84
• Parties: Melvin Leroy GONZALES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Court of Appeals

476 P.3d 84

Melvin Leroy GONZALES, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 78152-COA

Court of Appeals of Nevada.

FILED OCTOBER 01, 2020

Karla K. Butko, Verdi, for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Michael Macdonald, District Attorney, and Anthony R. Gordon, Deputy District Attorney, Humboldt County, for Respondent.

BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and BULLA, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

NRS 34.810(1)(a) requires a district court to dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction arising from a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, unless it is based on allegations that the plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered or it was entered without the effective assistance of counsel. In this opinion, we outline the types of ineffective-assistance claims that are permitted by NRS 34.810(1)(a) and conclude that the plain language of the statute permits only ineffective-assistance claims that challenge the validity of the guilty plea. Thus, the statute excludes claims of ineffective assistance that do not allege a deficiency affecting the validity of the guilty plea, as well as claims that allege deficiencies that occur only after the entry of the guilty plea, such as those related to sentencing. Therefore, for the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm the district court's decision denying appellant's postconviction habeas petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Melvin Gonzales was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of three counts of aggravated stalking for sending threatening text messages to his ex-wife and her family. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Gonzales's conviction on direct appeal. Gonzalez v. State, Docket No. 65768, 2014 WL 6090812 (Order of Affirmance, Nov. 12, 2014). Gonzales filed a timely postconviction habeas petition, and postconviction counsel filed two supplements. The district court denied the petition. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

In his petition, Gonzales raised several claims of ineffective assistance of trial-level and appellate counsel. The district court dismissed nearly all of Gonzales's claims on the ground that they fell outside the scope of postconviction habeas claims allowed by NRS 34.810(1)(a). Gonzales contends this was error.

Postconviction habeas review at the state level is a creation of state law. See Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 870 n.11, 34 P.3d 519, 526 n.11 (2001) ("The Federal Constitution provides no right to post-conviction habeas review by state courts."), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.12 (2018). Thus, resolution of this issue turns on the meaning of NRS 34.810(1)(a), which provides the scope of claims that may be presented in a postconviction habeas petition that challenges a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea. This issue is a matter of statutory interpretation, which, as a question of law, is subject to de novo review. See Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute in question. State v. Lucero , 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). The goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Hobbs , 127 Nev. at 237, 251 P.3d at 179. When the language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that intent without looking beyond the plain language. Coleman v. State , 134 Nev. 218, 219, 416 P.3d 238, 240 (2018) ; Sheriff v. Burcham , 124 Nev. 1247, 1253, 198 P.3d 326, 329 (2008). In giving effect to a statute's plain meaning, statutes "must be construed as a whole " Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 892, 102 P.3d 71, 81 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Pellegrini , 117 Nev. at 873-74, 34 P.3d at 528-29.

NRS 34.810(1) states

The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.¹

Plain language

The plain language of NRS 34.810(1)(a), as a whole, limits cognizable claims to two types, both of which challenge the validity of the guilty plea. See Harris v. State , 130 Nev. 435, 438-39, 329 P.3d 619, 621-22 (2014) (citing NRS 34.810(1)(a) for the proposition that "the validity of a guilty plea may be challenged in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus" and for the proposition that the issues that may be raised are limited). The first acceptable challenge is a direct attack against the validity of a guilty plea on the basis that the plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) ("A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’ " (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) )); State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1105, 13 P.3d 442, 448 (2000) ("This court will not invalidate a plea as long as ... the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made ...."). The second acceptable challenge is an indirect attack against the validity of a guilty plea on the basis that "the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel." It is the meaning of this passage that is at the crux of the issue in this appeal.

By its plain meaning, "the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel" permits a petitioner to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are related to the entry of the plea. This means that, contrary to Gonzales's suggestion, not all claims of ineffective assistance may be raised. Rather, to be cognizable, the ineffective-assistance claims that may be raised are limited to those that challenge the validity of the guilty plea. See Nollette v. State , 118 Nev. 341, 348-49, 46 P.3d 87, 92 (2002) ("A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may attack the validity of the guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution."). Any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims relating to events that do not affect the validity of the guilty plea fall outside the scope of claims permitted.

Statutory and legislative history

Because NRS 34.810(1)(a) is not ambiguous, "this court does not look beyond its plain language in interpreting it." Coleman , 134 Nev. at 219, 416 P.3d at 240. We nevertheless explore the statutory and legislative history of the statute to aid the parties in understanding how the Legislature came to limit the scope of postconviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.

Beginning in 1967, offenders could collaterally challenge their convictions through either the postconviction relief provisions of NRS Chapter 177 or the habeas corpus provisions of NRS Chapter 34. See Pellegrini , 117 Nev. at 870-73, 34 P.3d at 526-28 (setting forth an in-depth history of the evolution of Nevada's postconviction remedies). Although this dual-remedy system lasted for more than 20 years, "the Legislature incrementally amended Chapters 34 and 177 to curtail the ability to alternatively use the two remedies and to limit the filing of successive or delayed applications for post-conviction or habeas relief." Id. at 871, 34 P.3d at 527.

Initially, neither Chapter 34 nor Chapter 177 contained any specific limitation regarding the claims that could be raised when the petitioner's conviction was the result of a guilty plea. This changed in 1973 when Chapter 177 was amended in an effort to limit the relief available in all postconviction petitions to those instances where "the court finds that there has been a specific denial of the petitioner's constitutional rights with respect to his conviction or sentence. " 1973 Nev. Stat., ch. 349, § 8, at 439. For petitioners convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, NRS 177.375(1) limited the available claims even further: "If the petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty, all claims for post-conviction relief are waived except the claim that the plea was involuntarily entered." 1973 Nev. Stat., ch. 349, § 7(1), at 438. With this amendment, it is clear that the Legislature intended to limit the scope of cognizable claims to those that challenged the validity of a guilty plea.

It was not until 1985 that Chapter 34 was also amended to include a similar limitation on the scope of claims that could be raised when the petitioner's conviction was the result of a guilty plea. See 1985 Nev. Stat., ch. 435, § 10(1), at 1232. This amendment was codified as NRS 34.810(1)(a). As enacted, NRS 34.810(1) stated the following:

The court shall dismiss a petition if the court determines that:

(a) The petitioner's conviction was upon a plea of guilty and the petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel.

NRS 34.810(1)(a) has been in substantially the same form since its enactment.

The legislative history for the 1985 amendments to Chapter 34 is silent as to why the language in the newly enacted NRS 34.810(1)(a) was different than the language used in NRS 177.375(1). We do know, however, that the 1985 amendments to Chapter 34 were intended to consolidate procedures between the habeas corpus provisions in Chapter 34 and the postconviction relief provisions in Chapter 177. See Hearing on A.B, 517 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 63d Leg. (Nev., May 7, 1985). Decisions of the United States and Nevada Supreme Courts leading up to the amendment offers further insight into understanding the change in language.

Prior to the amendment of NRS 177.375(1), "it was the law [in Nevada] that when a guilty plea is not...