Gonzales v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 14 May 1986
• Citation: 226 Cal.Rptr. 164,180 Cal.App.3d 1116
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ray GONZALES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Ventura, Respondent. CITY OF SANTA PAULA, et al., Real Parties in Interest. B018903.

Page 164

226 Cal.Rptr. 164

180 Cal.App.3d 1116

Ray GONZALES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Ventura, Respondent CITY OF SANTA PAULA, et al., Real Parties in Interest.

B018903.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 6, California.

May 14, 1986.

Richard A. Weinstock, Ventura, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Phillip H. Romney, Santa Paula, for real parties in interest.

ABBE, Associate Justice.

Petitioner filed this writ of mandate action seeking relief from the denial of his request on constitutional grounds to enjoin the enforcement of the City of Santa Paula's (City) "sign" ordinance, enacted on November 5, 1985. ¹ He challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance, both on its face and as applied to him. The City confiscated four signs, critical of city government, petitioner had placed on his private vehicle and had legally parked on a state highway in the City.

Petitioner asserts that he and his fellow citizens are deprived of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, assembly and petition for redress of grievances under article I, sections 2 and 3 of the California Constitution and parallel provisions in the United States Constitution. He further alleges the ordinance deprives him and the public of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution in that the ordinance arbitrarily and capriciously discriminates against those people displaying certain temporary signs as opposed to permanent ones. Moreover, he claims the ordinance impermissibly prohibits certain political signs, and other noncommercial opinions, while permitting similar commercial signs.

Petitioner contends the superior court erred in denying his request for a preliminary injunction to halt the enforcement of this ordinance. We agree.

We find this Santa Paula sign ordinance to be unconstitutional on its face. This holding makes it unnecessary to consider some of appellant's other contentions.

The ordinance impermissibly bans certain temporary, noncommercial signs, announcing or pertaining to specific events, while allowing permanent signs and various commercial signs. By opening a traditional public forum to the display of some signs, the City cannot justify its purported interests in aesthetics and traffic safety by banning certain other, noncommercial ones. No adequate alternative forums exist.

Furthermore, the City has improperly attempted to restrain the liberty and property rights of individuals to display certain noncommercial messages in the manner they see fit on their private property.

Other infirmities of the ordinance include, its prior restraint on banners, and its failure to accord prior notice of violation.

This ordinance is riddled with constitutional infirmities on its face. It is impossible to ferret out any valid, severable aspects of it and, therefore, no part of it can be saved. (Fort v. Civil Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 339-340, 38 Cal.Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385.)

Propriety of Proceeding by Writ

Speedy resolution by means of a petition for writ of mandate is appropriate where, as here, denial of injunctive relief threatens immediate infringement on the exercise of First Amendment rights to free speech. Unnecessarily protracted litigation restricts the exercise of these rights. (Reader's-Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 251, 208 Cal.Rptr. 137, 690 P.2d 610, citing Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 672, 150 Cal.Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572, (cert. den. (1979) 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066); and Dombrowski v. Pfister (1965) 380 U.S. 479, 486-487, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1120-1121, 14 L.Ed.2d 22.) In such situations, a writ proceeding is warranted at the pleading stage. (Environmental Planning & Information Council v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 188, 190, 203 Cal.Rptr. 127, 680 P.2d 1086.)

We note this is an election year. (Evid.Code, § 452.) Threatened enforcement of this ordinance creates an ominous, chilling effect on the free exercise of political speech by petitioner and the public. (Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652, 656, 661, 119 Cal.Rptr. 468, 532 P.2d 116.) Under these circumstances, we view petitioner's remedy by way of appeal to be inadequate and find this petition for writ of mandate to be appropriate. (Duran v. Cassidy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 578-579, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793.)

Rules Governing Analysis of Free Speech Cases

There are basic rules governing the analysis of cases involving the right to free exercise of speech. One of them is that the Court of Appeal independently evaluates these actions on a case-by-case basis. (Sussli v. City of San Mateo (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 1, 9, 173 Cal.Rptr. 781, cert. den. (1981) 454 U.S. 1085, 102 S.Ct. 643, 70 L.Ed.2d 621.) The significance, if any, of purported governmental interests as a justification for infringement upon the right to free expression varies in light of the nature and function of the particular forum in which it occurs, the specific regulations attached to its exercise and the particular facts of the case.

For example, governmental concern for aesthetics, safety or convenience which might be legitimate interest to support some restriction concerning speech under certain circumstances, such as in a fairgrounds, may be totally insufficient to justify the restriction in a forum such as a street or sidewalk. (Heffron v. Int'l. Soc. for Krishna Consc. (1981) 452 U.S. 640, 650-51, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2565, 69 L.Ed.2d 298.)

We must make a "... particularized inquiry into the nature of the conflicting interests at stake here, beginning with a precise appraisal of the character of the ordinance as it affects communication." (Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490, 503, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2890, 69 L.Ed.2d 800; also see 453 U.S. at p. 517, 101 S.Ct. at p. 2897.) "The relative significance of these interests, and the importance of the challenged regulations to their realization must be considered in determining the validity of the particular regulations...." (Baldwin v. Redwood City (9th Cir.1976) 540 F.2d 1360, 1366-1367, cert. den. (1977) 431 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223.) Mere legislative preferences or beliefs regarding matters of public convenience may not support the diminution of such vital rights as the exercise of free speech in our democracy. (Id., at p. 1367, citing Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155.)

Another rule of analysis is that where state law affords greater protection to expression of free speech than federal law, state law prevails.

The California Constitution, and California cases construing it, accords greater protection to the expression of free speech than does the United States Constitution. (Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 903, 907-910, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341, rehg. den. (May 23, 1979), affd. (1980) 447 U.S. 74, 81, 82, 88-89, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 2041, 2044, 64 L.Ed.2d 741; accord People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 351-352, 161 Cal.Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401; U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1163, 201 Cal.Rptr. 837.)

Although the "free speech" provisions of the California and federal Constitutions are similar, they are not the same. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." But, article I, section 2 of the California Constitution reads, in pertinent part: "(a) Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." And, article I, section 3 of the California Constitution reads: "The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good."

These provisions of the California Constitution are construed as more protective, definitive and inclusive of rights to expression of speech than their federal counterparts. (Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 908, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341, rehg. den. (May 23, 1979), affd. (1980) 447 U.S. at p. 81, 100 S.Ct. at p. 2040; U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1163, 201 Cal.Rptr. 837.) The Robins court specifically stated that, "[p]ast decisions on speech and private property testify to the strength of 'liberty of speech' in this state."

California law is more solicitous of the right to express oneself, particularly when private property interests and "opened" or private forums are involved. (Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 908, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341, see also Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist. (1967) 68 Cal.2d 51, 54-55, 59, 64 Cal.Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982, and cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights (1974) 418 U.S. 298, 302-303, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2716-2717, 41 L.Ed.2d 770.) However, because California courts take an independent and broader view of an individual's rights to free expression, under the California Constitution, does not mean that federal principles are irrelevant. Federal law can provide guidance, even though it is not controlling in this area. California principles will prevail, though, as long as federal rights are protected. (Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 907-910, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341, rehg. den. (May 23, 1979), affd. (1980) 447 U.S. at p. 81, 100 S.Ct. at p. 2040; People v....