Gonzalez-Bermudez v. Abbott Labs. PR Inc.

Decision Date30 October 2018
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. 14-1620 (PG)
Parties Luz GONZALEZ-BERMUDEZ, Plaintiff, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES PR INC., et. al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Carlos M. Vergne-Vargas, Carlos M. Vergne Law Office, Juan C. Nieves-Gonzalez, Gonzalez Munoz Law Offices, Juan R. Gonzalez-Munoz, Gonzalez Munoz Law Offices, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Alberto Jose Bayouth-Montes, Jose F. Benitez-Mier, O'Neill & Borges, Ricardo F. Casellas, Casellas, Alcover & Burgos PSC, San Juan, PR, Carla S. Loubriel, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNE, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Luz Gonzalez-Bermudez (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Gonzalez") filed this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA" or "the Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 - 634, against her employer Abbott Laboratories PR Inc. ("Abbott" or "the Company") and her supervisor Kim Perez (hereinafter "Perez"). Plaintiff also raised supplemental state law claims of age discrimination under Puerto Rico's antidiscrimination statute, Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 ("Law No. 100"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146, et seq., as well as claims of retaliation under Puerto Rico's anti-retaliation statute, Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991 ("Law No. 115"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 194a. After denying defendants' motion for summary judgment, a jury trial was held. At the end of Plaintiff's case in chief, and again before the case went to the jury, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On both occasions, the court kept the motions under advisement. After deliberating, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded her $4,000,000.00 ($3,000,000.00 against Abbott; $1,000,000.00 against Perez) in compensatory damages and $250,000.00 in back pay. See Docket No. 138. Pursuant to the doubling provisions of the applicable statutes, the court entered judgment in the amount of $8,250,000 in both back-pay and emotional damages, plus $250,000 in liquidated damages. See Docket No. 150.

Defendants filed several post-judgment motions seeking various remedies, namely: (1) a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Docket No. 163); (2) a motion for new trial or alternatively for remittitur, under Rules 50(b), 59(a) and 59(e) (Docket No. 164); (3) a motion for relief from judgment or order under Rule 60 and/or motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) (Docket No. 165). Below, the court will address the arguments defendants raised in their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). For the reasons that follow, the court DENIES defendants' request.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 50(b)Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, an opposing party may file a motion for judgment as a matter of law at any time before the case is submitted to the jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Rule 50(b) provides that, if the court does not grant the motion, a party may renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law "[n]o later than 28 days after the entry of judgment — or if the motion addresses a jury issue not decided by a verdict, no later than 28 days after the jury was discharged." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The movant may file the renewed Rule 50(b) motion and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. "In ruling on the renewed motion, the court may: (1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law." Id. As a procedural matter, the party renewing a motion for judgement as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b)"is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence." Ginorio v. Contreras, No. CV 03-2317 (PG), 2008 WL 11424136, at *2 (D.P.R. June 13, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 758 (1st Cir. 1994) ). "In addition, this motion must include every claim upon which the party bases its request for judgment as a matter of law. Failure to do so is a ‘fatal omission.’ " Ginorio, 2008 WL 11424136 at *2 (citing Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Company, 37 F.3d 712, 723 (1st Cir. 1994) ).1

In examining a Rule 50 motion, "[o]ur review is weighted toward preservation of the jury verdict ...." N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2005). "[A] jury's verdict must be upheld unless the facts and inferences, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that a reasonable jury could not have [returned the verdict]." Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted)(citing Borges Colon v. Roman–Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2006) ). "[W]e view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, deferring ‘to the jury's discernible resolution of disputed factual issues.’ " Ciolino v. Gikas, 861 F.3d 296, 299 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2010) ). "[W]hen a party challenges a jury verdict, it is not our position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence." Long v. Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 701 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir.2006) ).

II. DISCUSSION

As follows, the court will discuss each of the arguments defendants raised in their renewed motion pursuant to Rule 50(b) in turn.

1. Age Discrimination – Demotion of March 2013

Plaintiff filed age discrimination claims under both ADEA and Law No. 100. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Velez v. Thermo King de Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 446 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) ). A plaintiff must "establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's adverse action." Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). "Law 100 bans employment age discrimination. ... [O]n the merits, claims under both statutes ‘are coterminous.’ " Morales-Guadalupe v. Oriental Bank & Tr., No. 16-1535 (GAG), 2018 WL 1116544, at *8 (D.P.R. Feb. 26, 2018) (citing Davila v. Corporacion De Puerto Rico Para La Difusion Publica, 498 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) ).

Plaintiff's age discrimination claim stems from a demotion she suffered in March of 2013. As follows, the court will summarize some relevant background information for context.

Gonzalez began to work at Abbott in November of 1984 as a medical sales representative with a specialty in nutrition in a Level 122 position. See Docket No. 129 at p. 4. Within fifteen years, she moved up the ranks to a Level 14 position and eventually became a Senior Sales Rep. See id. at pp. 5-6. On or about 2005, she became a Product Manager (Level 15). See id. at pp. 6-7. She subsequently became a District Manager, then a Pediatric Unit Manager (Level 17), and then a National Sales Manager (Level 17-18). See id. at pp. 8-10. As the latter, she supervised twenty-eight (28) employees, among them other supervisors and sales reps. See id. at p. 10. Before 2011, Plaintiff had always obtained ratings of Achieved Expectations ("AE") or Exceeded Expectations ("EE") in her performance evaluations. See id. at pp. 11-12.

In November of 2010, Abbott underwent a reorganization ("the Reorganization"), as a result of which the Company eliminated the positions of three employees in its Nutrition Division, namely: Plaintiff, Rocio Oliver ("Oliver") and Dennis Torres ("Torres"). See Docket No. 125 at pp. 46-48. At the time of the Reorganization, Plaintiff was a National Sales Manager (Level 18) and supervised both Oliver and Torres. See Docket No. 129 at pp. 9-10, 12. Instead of terminating their employment, the Company placed these three employees in lower-level positions.3 See Docket No. 125 at pp. 47-48. Notwithstanding, these employees were notified that they would continue to receive the compensation of the positions they held prior to the Reorganization for an interim period of two years. See id. at p. 48.

As a result of the Reorganization, co-defendant Kim Perez became Plaintiff's supervisor as of January 10, 2011, see Docket No. 129 at p. 14, and Gonzalez was named HCP Institutional Marketing Manager, which was a Level 17 position, see id. at pp. 15-16. Towards the end of 2011, Gonzalez filed a workplace harassment complaint against Kim Perez. Abbott's Human Resources department investigated in accordance with the Company's policies. See Docket No. 125 at pp. 9-11. After investigating Plaintiff's allegations, the Company determined that Kim Perez had not engaged in any wrongdoing, with which Plaintiff disagreed. See Docket No. 130 at pp. 124-125. On December 8, 2011, Plaintiff left on sick leave until June 8, 2012. See Docket No. 155 at p. 60.

After the two-year interim period ended in March of 2013, Gonzalez was informed that going forward, she would occupy a Product Manager Level 15 position. See Docket No. 125 at p. 58. That is, between the time of the Reorganization up until March of 2013, the Company decreased Gonzalez's positions three grade levels. Her income was reduced and because she was placed at the upper end of the Level 15 salary range, her salary was capped ("frozen") and despite a good performance, she was unable to receive any salary increases or raises. See Docket No. 129 at...

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