Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United State, GONZALEZ-GONZALE

• Citation: 257 F.3d 31
• Decision Date: 04 June 2001
• Docket Number: GONZALEZ-GONZALE,PETITIONE,APPELLANT,No. 00-1564,00-1564
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2001) MANUEL, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT, APPELLEE. Heard
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Page 31

257 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2001)

MANUEL GONZALEZ-GONZALEZ, PETITIONER, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT, APPELLEE.

No. 00-1564

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard June 4, 2001

Decided July 23, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge] Judith H. Mizner for appellant.

Lena Watkins, Trial Attorney, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, for appellee.

Before Torruella, Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Selya, Circuit Judge.

Challenging the constitutional sufficiency of the process employed by the government in forfeiting two motor vehicles, petitioner-appellant Manuel Gonzaalez-Gonzaalez (Gonzaalez) moved in the district court for recovery of the seized property. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e). The district court properly treated Gonzaalez's Rule 41(e) motion as a civil complaint and summarily dismissed it. Gonzaalez appeals. Sua sponte dismissals are strong medicine, and should be dispensed sparingly. Given the circumstances of this case, a sua sponte dismissal cannot be justified. Consequently, we vacate the lower court's order and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

The record is sketchy, and we paste together the facts surrounding the forfeitures as best we can. We take the controverted facts - at least, those controverted facts that are neither inherently incredible nor flatly contradicted by the record - in the light most favorable to Gonzaalez's theory of the case. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99 (1976); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989).

A decade ago, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) mounted a full-court press in an endeavor to dismantle an extensive drug-smuggling operation headquartered in Puerto Rico. See United States v. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 136 F.3d 6, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1998) (providing an account of the ring's illegal activities and the government's response). On September 29, 1993, a federal grand jury handed up a sealed indictment that charged Gonzalez and fifteen other individuals with a myriad of offenses, including importation of large quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well as conspiracy to possess and distribute both drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §§§§ 841, 846, 952. The indictment also charged Gonzalez with several counts of money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956. The government based four such counts, in part, on the testimony of a cooperating witness who said that Gonzalez had dipped into drug proceeds to fund the purchase of four motor vehicles (two Mitsubishi Monteros and two Toyota Corollas). He added that one of Gonzalez's confederates had provided false names and addresses for use in registering the vehicles.

On October 5, 1993, the district court unsealed the indictment. The FBI promptly arrested eleven of the sixteen defendants and seized the two cars at issue here - a 1993 Montero and a 1993 Corolla - from individuals residing in Trujillo Alto. The agents furnished each of these individuals with a notice that outlined the basis for the seizure and the procedure for contesting forfeiture. Subsequent appraisals indicate that, when seized, the Montero was worth approximately $25,300 and the Corolla approximately $13,900. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.74 (providing for post-seizure appraisals of property slated for forfeiture).

Despite the indictment, Gonzalez eluded arrest. That was not surprising; in 1980, he had been indicted for narcotics offenses, but not apprehended, in the Southern District of Florida. He remained a fugitive and was convicted in absentia in the Florida case. Gonzalez was still at large when the government proceeded, in the winter of 1993-1994, to effect an administrative forfeiture of the confiscated automobiles. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881.

As a first step, the United States sent notice by certified mail to the persons named on the vehicles' registrations, at the addresses specified thereon. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607(a) (directing, in relevant part, that "[w]ritten notice of seizure together with information on the applicable procedures [for contesting forfeiture] shall be sent to each party who appears to have an interest in the seized article"). Each notice explained the reasons for both the seizure and the planned forfeiture, detailed the appropriate procedure for contesting forfeiture, and designated March 14, 1994 as the deadline for taking preventative action. These letters were mailed on January 26, 1994, but there is nothing in the record to indicate whether they reached their intended destinations.

On February 13, 20, and 27, the government published a notice of the forfeiture proceedings in consecutive Sunday editions of the New York Times. See id. (requiring such publication in a newspaper of general circulation). The notice allowed thirty days from the date of the first publication within which to request relief from the planned forfeiture.¹ See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.79. On April 20, 1994, both cars were declared forfeit to the United States. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1609(a); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.77(b).

The government acknowledges that it gave no personal notice to Gonzalez, but asserts that FBI agents were unable to locate him until August 10, 1994 (when they finally arrested him in Miami). Gonzalez demurs, alleging that the government knew all along where he was living (or, alternatively, where notice by mail could efficaciously be given to him). Moreover, testimony at Gonzalez's bail hearing indicates that the government may have known his whereabouts but eschewed an arrest for some time in order to avoid compromising a related investigation.

On November 2, 1994, the government obtained a superseding indictment which, despite other modifications, left the four money laundering counts intact. On January 17, 1995, Gonzalez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that forfeiture of the two cars constituted punishment for the offenses charged (and, therefore, that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred prosecution). The district court denied the motion. After a nineteen-day trial, a jury found Gonzalez guilty on all counts and the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment. We affirmed the conviction and sentence. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 136 F.3d at 7.

Nearly six years after the initial seizure of the two vehicles and more than five years after the administrative forfeiture proceedings had been completed, Gonzalez filed a pro se motion for return of the automobiles or, in lieu thereof, their cash value when seized. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) (authorizing "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful . . . seizure or by the deprivation of property" to move "for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of [it]"). In this motion (filed on July 19, 1999), he argued that the notices of forfeiture were constitutionally defective since the government knew his whereabouts at the time and failed to make any real effort to notify him by mail or otherwise. On August 18, 1999, the district court, acting sua sponte, rejected Gonzalez's entreaty without comment. Gonzalez now appeals from the court's summary denial of both his original motion for return of property and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.

II. DISCUSSION

In the pages that follow, we limn the nature of administrative forfeiture proceedings, elaborate the notice required to satisfy due process, and verify the posture in which this appeal arises. We then resolve the instant dispute.

A. Administrative Forfeiture Proceedings.

Congress has provided for the civil forfeiture of money or property traceable to the avails of drug trafficking. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6). To facilitate such forfeitures, Congress incorporated by explicit reference the venerable procedures for civil forfeiture set out in the customs laws. Id. §§ 881(d). Under this regimen, the government may forfeit property worth $500,000 or less administratively. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607. If the government chooses to travel this path, it must publish notice of its intent to forfeit the property for three successive weeks and supplement that publication by sending written notice to any party known to have an interest in the property. Id. §§ 1607(a); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.75.

The giving of notice shifts the burden of going forward to those persons who persist in claiming an interest in the property. Claimants have twenty days from the first published notice within which to file claims. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1608. A timely claim, accompanied by a cost bond, aborts the administrative process and forces the government to proceed in court. See id.; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.76(b). If no interested party files such a claim, however, the government can proceed to declare the property forfeit without judicial intervention. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1609.

Despite Congress's erection of this framework for administrative forfeitures, the judiciary continues to play a limited role in such matters. Pertinently, district courts retain the authority to entertain constitutional challenges to administrative forfeitures. See United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also United States v. Mosquera, 845 F.2d 1122, 1126 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (noting that district courts have federal question jurisdiction over due process challenges to administrative forfeitures). The fact that a claimant cloaks his constitutional challenge in the garb of a Rule 41(e) motion does not alter this reality; in that event, the court simply will treat such a motion as a civil complaint. Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 511.

B. Reasonable Notice.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. These words require "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise...