Gonzalez Prod. Sys., Inc. v. Martinrea Int'l Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 13-cv-11544
• Parties: GONZALEZ PRODUCTION SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. MARTINREA INTERNATIONAL INC., Defendant, MARTINREA HEAVY STAMPINGS INC., Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

GONZALEZ PRODUCTION SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. MARTINREA INTERNATIONAL INC., Defendant, MARTINREA HEAVY STAMPINGS INC., Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.

Case No. 13-cv-11544

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

August 13, 2015

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE R. STEVEN WHALEN

OPINION AND ORDER RESOLVING "EVIDENTIARY ISSUE" ONE AND TWO IN GONZALEZ'S MOTION IN LIMINE [184], GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MARTINREA'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE [186, 190], AND DENYING MARTINREA'S MOTION IN LIMINE [188]

I. INTRODUCTION

Gonzalez Production Systems, Inc. ("Gonzalez" or "Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant"), commenced this action on April 4, 2013 against Martinrea International Inc. ("Martinrea International" or "Defendant"). See Dkt. No. 1. On May 17, 2013, Gonzalez filed an Amended Complaint adding Martinrea Heavy Stampings, Inc. ("Martinrea Stampings" or "Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff") as an additional Defendant in this dispute. See Dkt. No. 8. In the Amended Complaint, Gonzalez contends that both Martinrea International and Martinrea Stampings (collectively "Martinrea" or "Defendants") are liable for breach of contract, or, in the alternative, liable in equity under the theory of promissory estoppel. Id.

On June 17, 2013, Martinrea Stampings filed a counterclaim against Gonzalez for breach of contract. See Dkt. No. 201. On November 17, 2014, this Court entered an Order DenyingMartinrea's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Gonzalez's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Gonzalez Prod. Sys., Inc. v. Martinrea Int'l Inc., No. 13-cv-11544, 2014 WL 6455592, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2014). On January 26, 2015, less than a month before trial was originally set to begin, and after a contentious dispute regarding the admissibility of the parties' expert reports, this Court amended the scheduling order and postponed the trial to quell concerns about prejudice to the parties. See Dkt. No. 155 (moving trial to August 11, 2015); see also Dkt. No. 161 (moving trial to September 22, 2015 at the request of the parties).

Martinrea has now filed ten Motions in Limine in preparation for trial [168, 170, 174, 180, 181, 182, 186, 188, 190], while Gonzalez filed one Motion in Limine [184] covering five distinct "Evidentiary Issues." The Motions are fully briefed. Given the extensive disputes the parties have had regarding expert testimony in this case, the Court held a Daubert hearing for the proposed experts on August 10, 2015. After reviewing the briefs and arguments of the parties, and listening to the experts' testimony, the Court will resolve Gonzalez's "Evidentiary Issues Numbers One and Two" per the stipulation of the parties, GRANT in part and DENY in part Martinrea's Motions in Limine [186, 190], and DENY Martinrea's Motion in Limine [188]. The Court's Opinion and Order addressing the admissibility of the expert testimony is set forth in detail below. The remaining Motions in Limine [168, 170, 174, 180, 181, 182, 184] will be addressed in a separate and forthcoming Opinion and Order.

II. Legal Standard

The admissibility of testimony from expert witnesses is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Pursuant to Rule 702, a "witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion" if the following criteria are met:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702. The Supreme Court has indicated that Rule 702 places a special obligation on the trial court to serve as a gatekeeper, ensuring that "any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The "gatekeeping obligation" is not limited to "scientific" expert testimony, but applies to all expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The proponent of the expert must establish admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 2001).

In Daubert, the Supreme Court provided a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to consult when evaluating the reliability of expert testimony. 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469. In doing so, "Daubert attempt[ed] to strike a balance between a liberal admissibility standard for relevant evidence on the one hand and the need to exclude misleading 'junk science' on the other." Best v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 176-177 (6th Cir. 2009). District courts must determine whether the expert's testimony meets three requirements: (1) the expert witness must be qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education," (2) the proffered testimony must be relevant and "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," and (3) the testimony must be reliable in that it is based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. See In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 529 (6th Cir. 2008).

As to the third requirement, the Supreme Court set forth three additional factors to be considered in determining whether to admit expert testimony as reliable: (1) whether the expert's theory has been tested; (2) whether the expert's theory "has been subjected to peer review and publication;" and (3) whether there is a "known or potential rate of error" and "standards controlling" the particular technique and whether it has been generally accepted within the pertinent community. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469; see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238.

The above factors are neither definitive nor exhaustive, and may or may not be pertinent to the assessment in any particular case. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238; see also In re Scrap Metal, 527 F.3d at 529 (noting that the factors "may be tailored to the facts of a particular case," and "should be applied only where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.") (citations omitted). The trial court has broad latitude to determine whether the factors are reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238; see also In re Scrap Metal, 527 F.3d at 529 (noting the test for reliability is "'flexible,' and the Daubert factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test and may not be dispositive in every case.").

In fulfilling its "gatekeeping" duties the Court must make a determination of proposed experts' qualifications and an assessment of the relevance and reliability of the proffered testimony. See Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1999); Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 667 (6th Cir. 2000); Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 151 F.3d 500, 516 (6th Cir. 1998); cf., Kumho Tire Co, 526 U.S. at 152, 19 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (noting abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court's decision as to whether a hearing is needed to determine reliability of an expert).

Ultimately, "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." GE v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the "rejection of expert testimony is the exception, rather than the rule[.]" In re Scrap Metal, 527 F.3d at 530.

III. DISCUSSION

As discussed, the Court held a Daubert hearing in order to address the admissibility of expert testimony. The Court will first address Gonzalez's Motion in Limine [184] with respect "Evidentiary Issues Numbers One and Two"—the exclusion of certain testimony from Martinrea's expert witnesses Joseph Cyrek and Mark Robinson. The Court will then address Martinrea's three Motions in Limine addressing the exclusion of Gonzalez's proposed experts Clark J. Radcliffe [186], Michael J. Tracy [188], and Lawrence A. Simon [190].

A. Gonzalez's Motion [184]

Gonzalez submitted one Motion seeking five different orders in limine. See Dkt. No. 184. The Court will now address Gonzalez's first two "Evidentiary Issues" covering the scope of Martinrea's expert testimony from Joseph Cyrek and Mark Robinson ("Evidentiary Issues Numbers One and Two") given a stipulation between the parties at the Daubert hearing. However, the Court will cover the last three evidentiary issues—the testimony of Martinrea's fact witnesses ("Evidentiary Issue Number Three"), the "law of the case" doctrine ("Evidentiary Issue Number Four"), and the form of witness testimony at trial ("Evidentiary Issue Number Five")—in the forthcoming Opinion and Order.

Prior to the Daubert hearing, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order concerning "Evidentiary Issues Numbers One and Two" only. The Court had the parties read the relevantterms of the stipulation into the record. The parties subsequently sent the following written stipulation to the Court to clearly express the parameters of the stipulation:

Martinrea's testifying industry expert, Joseph Cyrek, is prohibited from presenting testimony in the form of legal conclusions at trial, as follows:

1. Cyrek will not testify regarding whether either party met the contractual milestones, including but not

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