González-Santiago v. Baxter Healthcare S.A.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 16-2929 (PAD) |
| Parties | LESTER I. GONZÁLEZ-SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. BAXTER HEALTHCARE S.A., ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Baxter Healthcare S.A. terminated the employment of Lester I. González-Santiago for having intentionally used the corporate credit card to purchase tires for his personal vehicle in violation of company policy and lying during the ensuing investigation in an attempt to cover up the misconduct. Disagreeing with the decision, he initiated this action against Baxter and his former supervisor, José Rodríguez, claiming entitlement to recovery of emotional, economic, punitive, and liquidated damages, severance pay, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. ("USERRA"), and Puerto Rico law.1 Upon conclusion of discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 40 and 42). On September 30, 2018, the court granted defendants' motion and denied plaintiff's motion (Docket No. 62). Following are the grounds for the court's decision.2Based on those grounds, the case must be, and is hereby DISMISSED. To facilitate review, a table of contents is included in Appendix I.3
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could returned a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is "material" if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.
All reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See, Shafmaster v. U.S., 707 F.3d 130, 135 (1st Cir. 2013)(so noting). To resist summary judgment, however, the nonmovant must do more than show some metaphysical doubt as to a material fact. See, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)(articulating proposition). Conclusory allegations, empty rhetoric, unsupported speculation, or evidence which, in the aggregate, is less than significantly probative, do "not suffice to ward off a properly supported summary judgment motion." Nieves-Romero v. U.S., 715 F.3d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 2013).
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the summary judgment standard, "but instead simply require [the court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on the facts that are not disputed." Wells Real Estate Inv. Trust II v. Chardon/HatoRey Partnership, S.E., 615 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2010). Although each motion for summary judgment must be decided on its own merits, each motion need not be considered in a vacuum. Id. Where, as here, cross-motions for summary judgment are filed simultaneously, or nearly so, the court ordinarily should consider the two motions at the same time, applying the same standards to each motion. Id. Applying these parameters, careful record review shows absence of genuine factual dispute as to the facts identified in the following section.
Except as otherwise noted, the facts included in this Section are drawn from the parties' Local Civil Rule 56 submissions, namely, Defendants' "Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 40-2) (32 pages); "González's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 42-1) (10 pages); "Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 44-1) (32 pages); "Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Proposed Statement of Uncontested Material Facts" (Docket No. 47) (86 pages); "Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Opposing Statement of Facts to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 56-1) (181 pages); and "Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 58-1) (45 pages), and the exhibits attached to these materials.
Local Civil Rule 56 is designed to "relieve the district court of any responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely in dispute." CMI Capital Market Investment, LLC v. González-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008). In this manner, it requires a party moving for summary judgment to accompany its motion with a brief statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs and supported by specific citations to the record, that the movant contends are uncontested and material. See, Local Civil Rule 56(b) (laying down requirement). The opposing party must admit, deny, or qualify those facts, with record support, paragraph by paragraph, and may present, in a separate section, additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs. See, Local Rule 56(c) (describing procedure). If a party improperly controverts adequately supported factual statements, the court may treat those facts as uncontroverted. See, Natal Pérez v. Oriental Bank & Trust, 291 F.Supp.3d 215, 219 (D.P.R. 2018) (examining proposition). Here, the court reviewed every factual statement and counterstatement the parties submitted and included in this Opinion and Order, those facts that are relevant to the case and were incorporated in statements that comport with summary judgment principles.
Plaintiff requests that defendants' "Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" ("SUMF")(Docket No. 40-2) be stricken because in his view, "it is replete with non-compliance with the requirements of Local Rule 56 and other principles governing dispositive motions procedure" (Docket No. 46, pp. 1-2, 5). Defendants' reply to plaintiff's opposing statement of facts persuasively demonstrates why plaintiff cannot succeed on this score. See, "Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Opposing Statement of Facts to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" (Docket No. 56-1, pp. 1-150).
Plaintiff alleges that a number of statements in defendants' SUMF (Docket No. 40-2) infringe Local Civil Rule 56(b) because, to his way of thinking, they are not concise or short, and are unduly compound, argumentative, unsupported, and vague. See, Docket No. 47 at pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 40, 42, 44, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, and 76, so asserting as to ¶¶ 12, 17, 18, 21, 21, 32, 41, 43, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61, 68, 69, 70, 83, 84, 86, 88, 93, 96, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 108, 109, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 130, 133, 134, 137, and 140 of defendants' SUMF (Docket No. 40-2). In context, those statements are not vague or unsupported, and are sufficiently short, concise, and non-argumentative to be admitted and considered at this juncture.
Plaintiff argues that several statements in defendants' SUMF (Docket No. 40-2) are contrary to deposition testimony. See, Docket No. 47 at pp. 5, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, and 59, so arguing in connection with ¶¶ 12, 21, 22, 23, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 67, 68, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, and 101 of defendants' SUMF (Docket No. 40-2). The record, however, shows that these statements are not materially inconsistent with, or in conflict with the evidence that defendants alluded to as support for the statements.
Plaintiff characterizes the declarations under penalty of perjury that defendants submitted in support of their request for summary judgment as "self-serving." See, Docket No. 47, pp. 13, 14, 23 (characterizing Sandra Muñoz's statement as "self-serving"); p. 16 (characterizing Eduardo Haddock's statement as "self-serving"); pp. 16, 21, 56, 57 (characterizing Elizabeth Centeno's statement as "self-serving"); p. 22 (characterizing Enrique Morán's statement as "self-serving"). He contends that those types of affidavits are often "suspicious" (Docket No. 47, at p. 6, n. 1; p. 8, n. 2; p. 16, n. 3; p. 22, n. 4).
The contention overlooks the fact that a declaration under penalty of perjury is not to be excluded as "self-serving" even if it supports a party's position in the litigation. See, 11 Moore's Federal Practice (3d Ed.), Sec. 56.94[3], p. 56-226 (). Thus, an affidavit may be self-serving, but if it contains relevant information of which the affiant has first-hand knowledge, "it is competent to support or defeat summary judgment." Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2000). Personal knowledge within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Fed.R.Evid. 602 includes reasonable "inferences from sense data as well as the sense data themselves." Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir. 1989). The statements under penalty of perjury that defendants submitted satisfy this standard.
Shifting lenses to plaintiff's request for partial summary judgment (Docket No. 42), he alleges that "many" of his statements of material facts were not properly contested and should be considered admitted (Docket No....
To continue reading
Request your trial