Gonzalez v. Christianson
| Decision Date | 17 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14 C 3465 |
| Parties | Juan Gonzalez, Petitioner, v. Tim Christianson, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Juan Gonzalez brings a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") [1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to twelve years of imprisonment. Ex. A. For the following reasons, this Court denies the Petition, and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
Federal review of state court decisions under Section 2254 is limited. With respect to a state court's determination of an issue on the merits, habeas relief can be granted only if the decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State courtproceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). The Court presumes that the state court's account of the facts is correct, and Petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Coleman v. Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2012).
The Court begins by summarizing the facts and procedural history from the state court record [13] (attaching Exhibits A to F4). Because Petitioner does not point to any clear and convincing evidence that the state court's factual determinations were incorrect, the Court will rely on those facts here. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Petitioner here was charged with two counts: (1) possession of a controlled substance; and (2) possession with intent to distribute. Ex. B at 5. On July 20, 2011, Petitioner was convicted of cocaine possession, but acquitted of possession with intent to distribute. Ex. F4 at A-11; Ex. A at 1. Petitioner was originally sentenced to 14 years, but that sentence was reduced to 12 years upon reconsideration. Ex. A at ¶ 2. Petitioner's conviction arose from his involvement in the sale of cocaine to an undercover police officer, and his possession of the cocaine during that exchange. Id.
Petitioner was arrested on June 25, 2009, when an undercover Chicago police officer ("Undercover Officer") initiated a drug sale of 502 grams of cocaine. Id.Petitioner was a passenger in a pick-up truck driven by Nicanor Coronado who, according to the Undercover Officer's testimony, arranged to sell half a kilogram of cocaine to the Undercover Officer. Id. The State presented unrebutted testimony that Petitioner told the Undercover Officer, who had been waiting to receive the drugs, that Petitioner's friend would be bringing the drugs shortly. Id. Officer Gonzalez (no relation to Petitioner) was conducting surveillance of the arranged purchase and testified that he observed an unknown man hand a red and yellow paper box to Coronado. Id. Although Gonzalez did not observe Coronado give the box to Petitioner, he observed Petitioner exit the truck holding what appeared to be the same box, and place the box in the bed of the truck. Id. The evidence showed the box contained 502 grams of cocaine. Id. Based on this evidence, the trial court found Petitioner guilty of possession of more than 400 grams but less than 900 grams of cocaine. Id.
On direct appeal, Petitioner's appellate counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See Ex. A at ¶ 3; Ex. B. Counsel argued that no issues of merit existed warranting argument on appeal. Ex. A at ¶ 3. Petitioner filed a response to counsel's Anders motion raising two claims: (1) that the State presented insufficient evidence that he possessed the cocaine; and (2) that his sentence was excessive under Illinois law. Ex. A at ¶ 4; Ex. C. The Illinois Appellate Court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. Ex. A. Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal ("PLA") in the Illinois Supreme Court raising the same two claims he argued before the appellate court. Ex. D. On September 25, 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the PLA. Ex. E.
Petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition on May 12, 2014, raising the same claims as below: (1) that the State presented insufficient evidence that he possessed the cocaine; and (2) that his sentence was excessive under Illinois law. See [1], [5]. Under Section 2254, a federal court "deferentially reviews the decision of the last state court to address [Petitioner's] claims on the merits." Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, this Court will review the decision of the Illinois State Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that the state presented insufficient evidence that he possessed cocaine, and therefore failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under the 14th Amendment. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court may review a claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court only if that adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or "(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state courtproceeding." Id.; Jensen v. Clements, 800 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir. 2015), reh'g denied (Oct. 9, 2015). The Court will address each element of this test in turn.
Petitioner argues that the Illinois Appellate Court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). Jackson holds that an applicant can win habeas corpus relief under § 2254 if "upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' federal law if it applies the wrong standard or 'decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Morgan v. Calderone, 355 Fed. App'x 53, 55 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). Petitioner has not demonstrated that this is true here. First, the Illinois Appellate Court identified the correct legal standard for analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence: whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Exh. A at 3. Second, the Petitioner has not cited any Supreme Court case addressing a set of materially indistinguishable facts that was decided differently, and the Court has likewise found none in its own review. Thus, the state appellate court's decision was not "contrary to" federal law, and Petitioner's claim fails under that prong of Section 2254. See Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) ().
The test for a "reasonable application" challenge under Section 2254 is whether the state court's application of federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 495 (2011) (). Under the Due Process Clause, a defendant cannot be "convicted unless the state proves all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Mitchell v. Williams, No. 12-CV-1592, 2015 WL 5722447, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2015). The appellate court reviewing a trial court for sufficiency of the evidence considers "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. However, the "Court's role in reviewing such a claim is limited, and it may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact." United States ex rel. Navarro v. Atchison, 69 F. Supp. 3d 810, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Ford v. Ahitow, 104 F.3d 926, 939 (7th Cir. 1997)). As such, a "defendant who attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction faces a nearly insurmountable burden" because great "deference is given" to the fact finder. United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001). Under this standard, the Court finds that the state appellate court's decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law.
To sustain a charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance in this particular case, the State must prove that the defendant knew of the presence of the substance and that the substance was in the defendant's immediate and exclusive control. People v. McCoy, 295 Ill. App. 3d 988, 995 (4th Dist. 1998). Here, the appellate court's decision that a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" was not objectively unreasonable. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
The state appellate court accurately summarized the unrebutted testimony of the police officers involved in the sale. Petitioner told the Undercover Officer that Petitioner's friend would bring the drugs, the drugs were delivered to the truck, and Officer Gonzalez saw Petitioner place the box containing the drugs in Coronado's truck. Thus, Petitioner had possession of the box of drugs both...
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