Gonzalez v. Del. Cnty.
| Decision Date | 04 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | 3:17-CV-373 (LEK/DEP) |
| Parties | AGUSTIN TORRES GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. DELAWARE COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Plaintiff Agustin Torres Gonzalez commenced this action on March 17, 2017, in New York Supreme Court, Delaware County, against the Margaretville Central School District ("MCSD") and Nancy Millen (collectively, the "MCSD Defendants"); the New York State Child Abuse and Maltreatment Register, Stephen Hahl, and Brian Dengler (collectively, the ); and Delaware County, the Commissioner of the Delaware County Division of Social Services, and Cynthia Bogdan-Cumpston (collectively, the "County Defendants"). Dkt. No. 3 ("Complaint"). On April 4, 2017, Defendants removed the case to this Court. Dkt. No. 1 ("Notice of Removal").
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and New York law, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they improperly and repeatedly interviewed his six-year-old niece, I.T., which eventually led to his arrest. Compl. On May 11, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in three separate motions. Dkt. Nos. 14 ("MCSD Motion"), 16 ("State Motion"), 17 ("County Motion") (collectively, the "Motions"). Plaintiff opposed the Motions on June 28, 2017, and also moved for leave to file an amended complaint. Dkt. Nos. 24 ("Cross-Motion"), 24-5 ("Proposed Amended Complaint"). Defendants opposed the Cross-Motion and offered further support for their Motions on July 24, 2017. Dkt. Nos. 27 ("MCSD Opposition"), 29 ("State Opposition"), 30 ("County Opposition").1 For the reasons stated below, the Cross-Motion is granted, the State Motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the MCSD and County Motions are granted.
On December 17, 2015, Plaintiff was a resident of Fleischmanns, New York, where he lived in a house with his extended family. PAC ¶¶ 14-15. This family included his sister, Cirila, and her six-year-old daughter, I.T. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff, Cirila, and I.T. shared the second floor of the house, and Plaintiff had his own bedroom. Id. The family speaks Spanish at home, though I.T. is bilingual and Plaintiff speaks "English well enough to get around." Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
The sequence of events leading to Plaintiff's arrest began on the morning of December 17th. First, I.T. was brought to the office of Nancy Millen, a guidance counselor at theMargaretville Central School. Id. ¶ 20. Millen asked to see I.T. because she had received an anonymous tip that I.T.'s brother hit I.T. when Cirila worked late. Id. ¶ 22. Millen interviewed I.T. without following recommended procedures and without asking for Cirila's consent. Id. ¶ 24. After the interview, Millen contacted the Delaware County Department of Social Services ("DSS"), reporting "a child being left alone." Id. ¶ 25.
Cynthia L. Bogdan-Cumpston, a caseworker employed by DSS's Child Protective Services unit, responded to Millen's report. Id. Bogdan-Cumpston traveled to Margaretville Central School on December 17th and interviewed I.T. Id. ¶ 26. Like Millen, Bogdan-Cumpston failed to follow recommended procedures while interviewing the child. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. Although I.T. denied that her brother hit her, Bogdan-Cumpston did not end the interview; she also asked I.T. about alcohol and drugs, misbehavior, and whether anyone had touched her "private parts." Id. ¶¶ 31-32. I.T. responded affirmatively that Plaintiff had touched her private parts. Id. ¶ 32. I.T. then received anatomical hand puppets to facilitate further discussion about this touching, but I.T. did not respond positively to additional questions. Id. ¶ 33.
On the advice of her supervisor, Bogdan-Cumpston contacted the New York State Police, which sent Investigators Brian Dengler and Steven Hahl and Trooper Adams to Margaretville Central School. Id. ¶ 35; Dkt. No. 24-3 ("Hearing Transcript") at 131.3 Bogdan-Cumpston, Millen, Dengler, Hahl, and Adams re-interviewed I.T. in the presence of Cirila. Id. ¶¶ 38-39. I.T. denied—by shaking her head negatively—that Plaintiff touched her. Id. ¶ 39. Dengler and Hahl described I.T.'s response as "negative results" in their report. Id. ¶ 40; see also Dkt. No. 24-2,Ex. C ("Police Report") at 2. Bogdan-Cumpston then asked I.T. if she would prefer to speak to her alone; I.T. responded, "Yes." Id. ¶ 42. Bogdan-Cumpston re-interviewed I.T., who said that Plaintiff inappropriately touched her sometime between 2014 and early 2015. Id. ¶ 45.
Bogdan-Cumpston, Dengler, and Hahl then visited I.T. and Plaintiff's house. Id. ¶ 48. Bogdan-Cumpston did not find anything unacceptable at the house. Id. ¶ 50. Nevertheless, Dengler and Hahl asked Plaintiff to accompany them to the police station in Margaretville to discuss the accusations against Cirila regarding I.T. being left alone. Id. ¶ 49. At the station, Dengler and Hall interrogated Plaintiff about touching I.T. Id. ¶ 51. Dengler and Hahl did not offer Plaintiff the assistance of an interpreter. Id. Dengler and Hahl allege that Plaintiff said that he accidentally touched I.T.'s private parts on at least one occasion. Id. ¶ 52; Police Report at 3. Plaintiff denies that he made this statement; instead, Plaintiff told the investigators that he accidentally touched I.T.'s leg after I.T. sat on top of Plaintiff's knee. PAC ¶ 52.
Following this interrogation, and upon the advice of Delaware County Acting District Attorney John Hubbard, Police Report at 3, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with felony sexual abuse in the first degree, PAC ¶ 54. Plaintiff was arraigned before a town justice and placed in custody for approximately one hour until his employer posted his bail. Id. ¶¶ 54-56. Due to the order of protection issued in connection with his arrest, Plaintiff could not return to his house, nor could he contact his family by phone. Id. ¶ 57.
On April 13, 2016, a felony hearing was held regarding the charges against Plaintiff in front of Town Justice John R. Fairbairn III. Hr'g Tr. 1. On September 21, 2016, Justice Fairbairn dismissed all charges against Plaintiff. PAC ¶ 63; Dkt. No. 24-2, Ex. D ("Amended Decision") at 1-3.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006). Plausibility, however, requires "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where a court is unable to infer more than the possibility of misconduct based on the pleaded facts, the pleader has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief, and the action is subject to dismissal. Id. at 678-79. Nevertheless, "[f]act-specific question[s] cannot be resolved on the pleadings." Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012) () (quoting Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 203 (2d Cir. 2001)). Presented with "two plausible inferences that may be drawn from factual allegations," a court "may not properly dismiss a complaint that states a plausible version of the events merely because the court finds a different version more plausible." Id.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to amend his complaint more than twenty-one days after service of a motion to dismiss "only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts "should freely give leave when justice so requires." Id. "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given.'" Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). A motion to amend under Rule 15(a) "should be denied only for such reasons as undue delay, bad faith, futility of the amendment, and perhaps most important, the resulting prejudice to the opposing party." Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 603-04 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Richardson Greenshields Securities, Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 653 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Dunn v. Albany Med. Coll., No. 09-CV-1031, 2010 WL 2326127, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. June 7, 2010) (Kahn, J.) ().
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to § 1983, which provides a cause of action for anyone subjected "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by a person acting under the color of state...
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