Gonzalez v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 17 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14CV317-LG-RHW |
| Parties | DEBRA D. GONZALEZ PLAINTIFF v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Debra D. Gonzalez filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income alleging disability beginning March 1, 2011, based on a combination of mental and physical impairments. Doc. [12] at 14, 164-78. Ultimately, her application was denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ). Id. at 14-23. Gonzalez filed the instant lawsuit appealing the decision of the ALJ. Doc. [1]. Pending before the Court is Gonzalez's motion for summary judgment raising the following issues: (1) whether the ALJ erred in finding that Gonzalez's mental impairments did not meet the severity standard at step 2; (2) whether the ALJ failed to include in the residual functional capacity (RFC) limitations in Gonzalez's social function and concentration, persistence and pace; (3) whether the ALJ erred in finding that Gonzalez was able to perform past relevant work as a security guard and telemarketer "as generally" performed by a person with her limitations; (4) whether the ALJ erred in finding that Gonzalez's neuropathy, bowel and bladder incontinence, and headaches did not meet the severity standard at step 2; and (5) whether the ALJ failed to provide adequate reasons for not giving controlling weight to the treating physician's opinion. Doc. [13].
The ALJ concluded that Gonzalez had severe impairments of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and asthma. Doc. [12] at 17. The ALJ also considered Gonzalez's medically determinable mental impairments of depression and anxiety disorder but concluded that they did not qualify as severe impairments. Id. at 18-19. The ALJ assigned to Gonzalez a residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work, except that she can stand and walk for six hours of an eight hour day; sit for six hours; cannot climb ladders, ramps, or scaffolds; can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; must use a cane to ambulate; and cannot work around dust fumes, gases, noxious odors or extreme heat or cold due to COPD and asthma.1 Id. at 19. Significant to the issues on appeal, the ALJ did not assign any limitations based on mental impairments. With the assistance of a vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ determined that Gonzalez is capable of performing past relevant work as a security guard and telemarketer.2 Id. at 23. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Gonzalez is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id.
The federal district court reviews the Commissioner's decision only to determine whether the final decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence. Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999); Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995). If the court determines the Commissioner's decision to be supported by substantial evidence, then the findings are conclusive and the court must affirm the decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This standard requires supporting evidence that is " " Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court is not permitted to "reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try any issues de novo, nor substitute our judgment for the judgment of the [Commissioner], even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner's] decision." Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988). "'Conflicts in the evidence are for the [Commissioner] and not the courts to resolve.'" Brown, 192 F.3d at 496 (quoting Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990)). While the court may alter the Commissioner's decision if based upon faulty legal analysis, the court should defer to the Commissioner's legal conclusions if they are within a permissible meaning of the statutory or regulatory language. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
A claimant bears the burden of proving the existence of a medically determinable impairment that has prevented the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful employment. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(5). The Social Security Administration (SSA) utilizes a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a), § 404.920(a). Under this analysis, the ALJ may decide a claimant is disabled if he finds that (1) the claimant is not employed in substantial gainful activity; (2) the claimant has a severe, medically determinable impairment; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the listings in appendix 1 to subpart P of § 404; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from performing any past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant's ability to adjust to performing any other work. Id.
The claimant initially bears the burden of proving disability under the first four steps, butthe burden shifts to the SSA for the fifth step. Chapparo v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if the claimant proves that he is unable to perform past relevant work, the SSA must demonstrate that the claimant can perform another occupation that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The burden then shifts back to the claimant to establish that he cannot perform this alternative employment. Id.
Gonzalez argues that the ALJ's finding that her mental impairments did not satisfy the de minimis severity standard at step 2 was contrary to every single medical opinion of record, including those from the Social Security Administration's own psychologists. Gonzalez further argues that the ALJ used Gonzalez's financial condition against her when concluding that her mental condition was not severe and that the ALJ substituted his lay judgment for that of mental health professionals. Ultimately at issue is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Gonzalez did not have a severe mental impairment.
As an initial matter, the undersigned agrees with Gonzalez that with respect to severity analysis, it is irrelevant whether her depression was caused by physical impairments or had some other origin. The relevant question is simply whether Gonzalez has a mental impairment and whether it is severe. The cause of Gonzalez's mental impairment does not make the condition any more or less severe as an impairment. To the extent that the ALJ relied on this finding, it was in error.
Gonzalez also argues that she is poor and has difficulty affording the treatments that might help her mental condition. She asserts that the ALJ held this financial hardship against her, in violation of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82-59. See Social Security Ruling 82-59; 1982WL 31384. The undersigned finds that Gonzalez's reliance on SSR 82-59 is misplaced. It is true that the ALJ relied, at least in part, on the absence of a history mental health treatment to find that Gonzalez's mental condition did not qualify as severe. However, Gonzalez's record citations do not indicate that she failed to obtain mental health treatment as a result of a financial hardship. See Doc. [12] at 65, 71, 141, 143, 156, 371, 375, 649. A review of these record citations reveals that Gonzalez's inability to pay for treatment relates almost exclusively to her neuropathy and COPD rather than treatment for mental health conditions. Moreover, it is unclear to what to extent, if any, SSR 82-59 applies to Gonzalez's case. Social Security Rule 82-59 is the agency's policy statement regarding a claimant's failure to follow a prescribed course of treatment. The procedures mandated by SSR 82-59 only apply to claimants who would otherwise be disabled within the meaning of the Act but who fail without justifiable cause to follow treatment prescribed by a treating source. See Holley v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1088, 1092 (8th Cir. 2001); Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 183 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no indication in the record that Gonzalez's mental impairment is attributable to a failure to follow a course of treatment prescribed by a treating source.
Having dispensed with these side issues, the central question now before the undersigned is whether the ALJ erred in determining that Gonzalez's mental impairments did not qualify as severe impairments. A severe impairment is defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). In Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit held that an ALJ must reference Stone or the correct severity standard, which provides that "an impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormalityhaving such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." Stone, 752 F.2d at 1011. In this case the ALJ did cite to Stone v. Heckler and recited the appropriate standard of severity. Doc. [12] at 18.
The Commissioner determines the severity of a claimant's mental impairments under four broad functional areas: Activities of daily living; social functioning, concentration, persistence or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(c)(3), 416.920(c)(3). When the ALJ finds no or only mild limitation in these four areas of mental functioning, the claimant's impairment generally is not found to be severe unless the evidence otherwise indicates more than minimal limitations in the claimant's ability to do basic...
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