Gonzalez v. Foy

Decision Date02 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 02-1075(JP).,CIV. 02-1075(JP).
Citation286 F.Supp.2d 223
PartiesBenito Galloza GONZALEZ, et al., Plaintiffs v. Norman E. FOY, et al., Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Nydia González-Ortiz, Esq., Santiago & González, Yauco, for Plaintiff.

Teresa M. Seda-Ramos, Esq., Sánchez Betances & Sifre, P.S.C., San Juan, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court has before it Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket No. 42), and Plaintiffs' opposition thereto. Plaintiffs have sued Defendants Norman E. Foy, Director of the Municipal Revenue Collection Center (hereinafter referred to as "CRIM", its acronym in Spanish), and Euclides Martínez, Regional Administrator of CRIM's Aguadilla Regional Office, in their personal capacity, alleging violations of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff Benito Galloza González was Regional Administrator of the Aguadilla office of CRIM and a member of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). He alleges that Defendant Foy asked him to resign and that he was then removed from his position and replaced by Co-Defendant Euclides González, a member of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"). He was then reinstated to the career position he occupied prior to the change in administration, and states that he suffered a reduction in pay in his new position. According to Plaintiff, Defendant took these actions because he was affiliated with the NPP, while Defendants were affiliated with the PDP.

Plaintiff Muñiz was Regional Administrator of the Mayaguez CRIM office. He alleges that Defendant Foy asked him to resign in February 2001. According to Defendant, he was transferred from his position and suffered a decrease in salary. He was then reinstated to the career position he occupied prior to the change in administration.

Plaintiff Galarza Pérez was Regional Administrator of the Arecibo Region for CRIM. He was told to resign from his position in February 2001. He was then reinstated to the career position he occupied prior to the change in administration.

Defendants now move for summary judgment, stating that Plaintiffs held trust positions as Regional Administrators for CRIM. Defendants state that, based on the confidential, trust nature of the position, the incoming administration requested the resignation of all CRIM regional administrators. Therefore, Defendants state that political affiliation was a proper motive for transferring Plaintiffs and that they were transferred to positions comparable to the previous career positions they occupied in accordance with Puerto Rico law. Defendants state that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. Finally, Defendants state that a parallel proceeding is underway in the Court of First Instance of Puerto Rico, San Juan Division, and that the Court should stay the instant case until the final resolution of the State Court proceedings.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On October 1, 1981, Benito Galloza González began to work as a public transitory employee and occupied the position of Valorization Technician I.

2. On July 19, 1994, Benito Galloza González was appointed as Specialist of Valorization I.

3. On January 8, 1997, Benito Galloza González approved his probation period as Specialist of Valorization III and his status was changed to that of a regular career employee.

4. On February 25, 1997, Benito Galloza González was informed, through a letter, of this appointment as Regional Administrator of Aguadilla, effective March 1, 1997. The letter was signed by Eduardo Burgos Lebrón and advised Benito Galloza González of his right to removal to a career position because said position was a trust position.

5. On March 29, 2001, Benito Galloza González was informed, through a letter, of his removal to the last position he occupied as a career employee, Specialist of Valorization III, effective April 1, 2001. The letter was signed by Norman E. Foy, Executive Director of CRIM.

6. On February 13, 2002, Benito Galloza González was cited to an informal Administrative Hearing that would be held on February 27, 2002, to consider the facts of his suspension of salary and employment. The letter was signed by Victoria Gómez Castro, Human Resources Director.

7. On November 18, 2002, Benito Galloza González was informed, through a letter, of an intent of demotion because he approved the concession of Article 3.30 of CRIM, in violation of CRIM regulation and violated sections number 18, 21, 27, 28, 35 and 46 pursuant to the Administrative order 94-01 of CRIM.

8. On September 1, 1983, Luis A. Galarza Pérez began to work as a regular public employee.

9. On February 16, 1988, Luis A. Galarza Pérez requested a license with salary because he was elected as candidate in the Elections of the year 1988.

10. On July 16, 1994, Luis Galarza Pérez was informed, through a letter, of his appointment as Regional Administrator of Arecibo, since July 16, 1993. The letter was signed by Eduardo Burgos Lebrón and advised Luis A. Galarza Pérez of his right to removal to a career position because said appointment is a trust appointment.

11. On March 8, 2001, Luis A. Galarza Pérez was informed through a letter of removal to the last position he occupied as a career employee, Valorization Technician II, effective March 12, 2001. This letter was signed by Norman E. Foy, Executive Director of CRIM.

12. On September 16, 1983 Plaintiff Orlando Mas Muñiz began to work as Valorization Technician I.

13. On September 1, 1995, Orlando Mas Muñiz was appointed Regional Administrator of Mayaguez, a named trust position.

14. On June 24, 1999, the State Insurance Fund upheld that Orlando Mas Muñiz suffered from an emotional condition, related to his job.

15. On April 30, 2001, Orlando Mas Muñiz was informed, through a letter, of his removal to the last position he occupied as a career employee, Specialist of Valorization IV, effective on March 1st, 2001. The letter was signed by Norman E. Foy, Executive Director of CRIM.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 894 (1st Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate where, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248; Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). A material issue is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989).

The party filing a motion for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proof to show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute [exists] to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of truth at trial." See First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must affirmatively show, through filing of supporting affidavits or otherwise, that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id.; see also Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993). On issues where the non-movant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. at 2514.

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In general, a public employee may not be fired solely because of his political affiliation. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 2003 WL 1989231 at *4 (1st Cir. May 1, 2003). Dismissal based on political patronage is permissible, however, if "the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." Jiménez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 240 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc) (quoting Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1287). Political discharge is permitted to give a new administration an opportunity to fulfill expectations by surrounding itself with "agency leaders and top subordinates responsive to the elected officials' goals." Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.1998). Whether or not a position is subject to political discharge is a legal question for the courts. Id. at 44.

Party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for a public position if (1) "the discharging agency's functions entail `decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation,'" and (2) "`the particular responsibilities of the plaintiff's position resemble those of a policymaker, privy to confidential information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose function is such that party affiliation...

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  • Galloza v. Foy
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • November 10, 2004
    ...a thoughtful rescript, the district court accepted the defendants' arguments and granted summary judgment accordingly. Gonzalez v. Foy, 286 F.Supp.2d 223 (D.P.R.2003). This appeal We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, taking all disputed facts in the light most hospitable to the ......

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