Gonzalez v. Point Logistics, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:19-CV-00027-HBB |
| Parties | MERCEDES GONZALEZ, individually, and as ADMINISTRATRIX of the ESTATE of GILBERTO GONZALEZ PLAINTIFF v. POINT LOGISTICS, INC., et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendant Point Logistics, Inc.'s motion is DN 61. Defendant Patrick Jean-Louis' motion is DN 62. Plaintiff Mercedes Gonzalez's motion is DN 88. Because the motions responses, and replies overlap, they are globally addressed in this order.[1]
Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for its motion and identifying that portion of the record that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Although the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
On August 27, 2018, Gilberto Gonzales, the husband of Plaintiff Mercedes Gonzalez, was operating a tractor-trailer traveling on Interstate 65, a three-lane highway at the location in question. Defendant Patrick Jean-Louis was operating a tractor-trailer for Point Logistics. The front of Gilberto's truck collided with the rear of the Point Logistics trailer. Both drivers were able to bring their vehicles to a stop, but after a few moments Gilberto's truck began to burn and he, tragically, died in the fire. The parties are in disagreement as to the facts surrounding the contact between the two vehicles. Gonzalez contends the collision happened when Jean-Louis pulled onto the highway from the shoulder. Point Logistics argues that Gilberto was traveling in the center lane, Jean-Louis was traveling in the right lane, and Gilberto collided with the trailer when he drifted from his lane.
The tractor unit, which Jean-Louis was driving at the time of the accident, was owned by BI KUL, LLC (DN 83-5 p. 4). BI KUL contracted with Point Logistics for the provision of the tractor unit and drivers. Point Logistics contends that under Kentucky law, while an employer may be held vicariously liable for the negligent act of an employee, the same is not true where the individual is an independent contractor (DN 61-1 p. 7) (citing Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599 606 (Ky. 2009)). To this end, Point Logistics directs the Court's attention to the contract with BI KUL, which expressly provides that BI KUL would provide drivers for the tractor unit, and BI KUL's drivers are not employees of Point Logistics (Id.) (citing DN 61-5 p. 12). Point Logistics further notes that the contract specifies that BI KUL has full control over the driver (Id. at p. 8) (citing DN 61-5 at p. 12 ¶18(a)).
Gonzalez contends that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations mandate that a motor carrier such as Point Logistics, which utilizes motor vehicles it does not own, is nonetheless deemed to have control of and responsibility for the operation of those vehicles in compliance with legally mandated safety requirements (DN 88-1 pp. 2, 4, 11-12) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1)). To this end, Gonzalez points to a provision in the contract between Point Logistics and BI KUL which provides that Point Logistics assumes complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the agreement (Id. at pp. 4-5 11-12) (citing DN 61-5 p. 10). These regulations, Gonzalez asserts, create a presumption that a leased driver is an agent or employee of the motor carrier (Id. at pp. 12-13) (citing Bays v. Summit Trucking, LLC, 691 F.Supp.2d 725, 732 (W.D. Ky. 2010)). Turning to Kentucky agency law, Gonzales argues that vicarious liability is premised on the right to control the agent or employee (Id. at p. 13) (citing Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Landmark Cmty Newspapers of Ky., 91 S.W.3d 575, 579-80 (Ky. 2002); Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599, 607 (Ky. 2009)). Gonzalez concludes that the “statutory employee doctrine does not supplant agency law, but instead the federal laws require motor carriers to retain control over their drivers, regardless of whether a driver is labeled as an ‘independent contractor' in the lease agreement” (Id.) (emphasis in original). As to Point Logistics' actual control over Jean-Louis, Gonzales notes that Point Logistics actively monitored his driving to ensure that he was not in violation of any regulations and that his driver's logbook was accurate (Id. at pp. 14-15) (citing DN 61-6 pp. 17, 18, 21, 22, 42, 43, 44). Gonzalez states that Jean-Louis testified that he applied for employment directly with Point Logistics (Id. at pp. 15-16) (citing DN 83-7 pp. 19-20) and characterizes Point Logistics' own documents as demonstrating that it “hired” him (Id. at p.16) (citing DN 88-5 Bates No. 00031, 00032, 00034, 00037-46, 00047-60).
Point Logistics confronts Gonzalez's reliance on the Federal Motor Carrier Regulations by highlighting a section, which follows the portion which Gonzales relies upon, which specifically addresses whether it should be interpreted as nullifying the possibility that a driver could be an independent contractor (DN 96 p. 3) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(4)). The section reads:
Nothing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section is intended to affect whether the lessor or driver provided by the lessor is an independent contractor or an employee of the authorized carrier lessee. An independent contractor relationship may exist when a carrier lessee complies with 49 U.S.C. 14102 and attendant administrative requirements.
Moreover, Point Logistics states that the regulations in issue relate to motor carrier leasing regulations designed to promote the enforcement of equipment regulations (DN 96 p. 2-3). To this end, Point Logistics notes that the regulation specifies that he lease provides it with “exclusive possession, control and use of the equipment for the duration of the lease” (Id. at p. 3) (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1) (emphasis added)). In compliance with this requirement, Point Logistics directs the Court's attention to a provision in the contract with BI KUL providing that certain provisions were incorporated to satisfy federal law, but in so doing, the contract was not to be interpreted as granting Point Logistics any discretionary control over BI KUL's performance under the agreement, and that Point Logistics was “interested only in the results of the contracted activity between INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR and CARRIER and not in the means and methods utilized by INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR to secure those results” (Id.) (quoting DN 61-5 pp. 12-13). To the extent the regulations create any rebuttable presumption, Point Logistics contends that the clear declaration in the contract with BI KUL that its drivers are not Point Logistics' employees rebuts any such presumption (Id. at pp. 3-4).
This Court has previously examined the operation and effect of 49 CFR § 376.12(c)(1) and (4) in Bays v. Summit Trucking, LLC, 691 F.Supp.2d 725 (W.D. Ky. 2010) and more recently in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Morrow, No. 1:16-CV-00180-GNS-HBB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130113 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2019).[2]The purpose of the regulation is to protect the public from tortious conduct by judgment-proof truck-lessor operators by requiring them to assume full direction and control of the vehicles as though they were the owners. Bays, 691 F.Supp.2d at 731. This has led some courts to construe the regulation as creating an irrebuttable presumption that the carrier was the statutory employer of the individual driving the leased vehicle. See id.; Morrow, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130113, at *16. However, the amendment to the regulation at 49 CFR §376(c)(4) lead the court in Morrow to conclude that the regulation “is neutral in its effect on the employer status of a covered carrier.” 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130113, at *17. Where a lease complies with the applicable regulations, there is only a rebuttable presumption of agency. Bays, 691 F.Supp.2d at 731.
Whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor is a question of law when it rests on facts that are substantially undisputed. Crunk v. Dean Milk Co., No 3:06-CV-609-DW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47076, at *13 (W.D. Ky. June 17, 2008) (citation omitted). It is a question of fact...
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