Gonzalez v. State
| Decision Date | 03 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. SC04-225.,SC04-225. |
| Citation | 990 So.2d 1017 |
| Parties | Ricardo GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Todd G. Scher of the Law Office of Todd G. Scher, P.L., Miami Beach, FL, and Jeffrey E. Feiler of Jeffrey E. Feiler, P.A., Miami, FL, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Appellee.
Ricardo Gonzalez appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the circuit court's order denying postconviction relief.
On February 14, 1992, Ricardo Gonzalez along with codefendants Pablo San Martin, Leonardo Franqui, Fernando Fernandez, and Pablo Abreu, were charged with committing first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer; armed robbery; aggravated assault; two counts of grand theft; and two counts of burglary in connection with a January 3, 1992, bank robbery. Gonzalez was tried jointly with Franqui and San Martin. Gonzalez was convicted on all counts and sentenced to death for the murder.
The record reflects that the Kislak National Bank in North Miami, Florida, was robbed by four gunmen on January 3, 1992. The perpetrators made their getaway in two stolen grey Chevrolet Caprice cars after taking a cash box from one of the drive-in tellers. During the robbery, police officer Steven Bauer was shot and killed. Shortly after the robbery, the vehicles were found abandoned two blocks west of the bank. On January 18, 1992, Gonzalez was stopped by police after leaving his residence. He subsequently made unrecorded and recorded confessions in which he told police that Franqui planned the robbery, involved the other participants including himself in the scheme, and chose the location and date for the crime. He said that Franqui procured the two stolen Chevrolets, drove one of the cars, and supplied the gun Gonzalez used during the robbery. He further stated that Franqui was the first shooter and shot at the victim three or four times, while he shot only once. Gonzalez indicated that he shot low and believed he had only wounded the victim in the leg. Gonzalez was subsequently reinterviewed by police and, among other things, he described how Franqui had shouted at the victim not to move before shooting him.
Franqui was also questioned by police on January 18, 1992, in a series of unrecorded and recorded sessions. Franqui initially denied any involvement in the Kislak Bank robbery, but when confronted with the fact that his accomplices were in custody and had implicated him, he ultimately confessed. Franqui stated that Fernandez hatched the idea for the robbery after talking to a black male, and he had accompanied the two men to the bank a week before the robbery actually took place. He maintained that the black male friend of Fernandez had suggested the use of the two stolen cars, but denied any involvement in the theft of the vehicles. According to Franqui, San Martin, Fernandez, and Abreu stole the vehicles. Franqui admitted that he and Gonzalez were armed during the robbery, but he stated that it was Gonzalez who yelled at the victim to "freeze" when they saw him pulling out his gun. Franqui denied firing the first shot and maintained that he fired only one shot after Gonzalez had initiated gunfire.
At trial, over Gonzalez's objection, the confessions of codefendants San Martin and Franqui were introduced without deletion of their references to Gonzalez after the trial court found that their confessions "interlocked" with Gonzalez's own confession. Gonzalez was convicted on all counts, and after a penalty phase trial, the jury recommended death by a vote of seven to five. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Gonzalez to death. On direct appeal, Gonzalez raised four issues.1 This Court affirmed Gonzalez's conviction, but vacated his death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase. Gonzalez v. State, 700 So.2d 1217, 1217-18 (Fla.1997).2
The new penalty phase was held on August 10, 1998. Several witnesses testified for the State, including the tellers who were with Officer Bauer the morning of his murder; officers who arrived at the scene after the shooting to gather evidence and render emergency assistance to the victim; detectives who questioned the suspects and obtained both oral and taped statements from Gonzalez describing his role in the crimes; and doctors who, after examining Officer Bauer, determined that the fatal heart injury he had sustained was inflicted by the .38 revolver that Gonzalez admitted to possessing during the crime.
Gonzalez presented the testimony of several witnesses to substantiate his claims for mitigation. Family members testified that Gonzalez has a history of migraine headaches; has always been law-abiding; is a member of a loving, supportive household; and is well educated and religious. The testimony of three doctors was also presented. The prior testimony of Dr. Alan Wagschul, a board certified neurologist, was read to the jury. Dr. Wagschul testified concerning head injuries Gonzalez received, including injuries during boxing. As a result of his examination and the information received, Dr. Wagschul diagnosed Gonzalez as suffering from pugilistic encephalopathy. However, on cross-examination Dr. Wagschul stated Gonzalez performed normally on all the neurological tests. The trial court also allowed the testimony of Dr. Brad Fisher, who has done research and a thesis on future dangerousness. Dr. Fisher indicated Gonzalez was not psychotic, had no major mental disturbance, was not retarded, did not use drugs or alcohol, and did not show signs of suffering damage as a result of boxing. Dr. Fisher said Gonzalez would make a good adjustment to prison. Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist, opined that Gonzalez was under extreme mental or emotional distress at the time he committed the offenses and that he committed the crimes to get money to make his wife happy.
The jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four. The trial court followed the jurys recommendation and sentenced Gonzalez to death, finding six aggravating factors, which were merged into three factors. The three merged aggravators were: (1) prior violent felonies based on the contemporaneous convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault; (2) murder committed during a robbery/murder committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) murder committed to avoid a lawful arrest/victim a law enforcement officer performing his duties/murder committed to hinder enforcement of laws.
These aggravating circumstances were found to outweigh the following mitigating circumstances: no significant prior criminal history; brain damage; learning disability and below-average intelligence; remorse; cooperation with authorities; life sentences given to two codefendants; and good conduct while incarcerated and potential for rehabilitation. The trial court considered but rejected the statutory mental health mitigators, the minor participation mitigator, and the nonstatutory mitigator of family background.
On direct appeal, Gonzalez raised five issues.3 This Court rejected Gonzalez's arguments, and affirmed his conviction and sentence of death. Gonzalez v. State, 786 So.2d 559, 562-63 (Fla.2001).
In March 2003, Gonzalez filed a consolidated amended motion for postconviction relief raising seven claims. After a Huff4 hearing, the circuit court denied an evidentiary hearing on all claims except one. The claim on which an evidentiary hearing was granted concerned counsel's presentation of the testimony of the mental health experts during the new penalty phase. The circuit court found that none of the other claims warranted an evidentiary hearing because they did not require further factual determination and could be decided based upon the existing record. After an evidentiary hearing on the one claim, on January 2, 2004, the circuit court issued an order denying all of Gonzalez's claims.
Gonzalez has appealed the denial of postconviction relief to this Court, raising eight issues. He contends (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the new penalty phase; (3) the circuit court erred in summarily denying Gonzalez's claim that newly discovered evidence of a life sentence imposed on Fernando Fernandez requires that Gonzalez receive a life sentence; (4) the circuit court erred in failing to disclose records allegedly exempt from production under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852; (5) the circuit court erred in striking Gonzalez's original postconviction motion without permitting him leave to amend; (6) the application of the new rule 3.851 to Gonzalez violates his rights to due process and equal protection; (7) Florida's capital sentencing procedures violates Gonzalez's Sixth Amendment right to have a unanimous jury return a verdict addressing guilt of all the elements necessary for the crime of first-degree murder, in violation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and (8) his constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated as he may be incompetent at the time of execution.
Gonzalez argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80...
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