Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of the N.Y. Harbor

Decision Date04 March 2014
Docket NumberNo. 13–2023.,13–2023.
Citation755 F.3d 176
PartiesAriel GONZALEZ, Appellant v. WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF the NEW YORK HARBOR.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Filed: June 17, 2014.

Michael A. Bukosky, Esq., Marcia J. Tapia, Esq., Loccke, Correia, Limsky & Bukosky, Hackensack, NJ, for Appellant.

Phoebe S. Sorial, Esq., Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, New York, N.Y., for Appellee.

Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Ariel Gonzalez filed this action against his former employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor (the “Commission”), seeking to enjoin disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Gonzalez's motion and ultimately stayed and administratively terminated this suit based on its conclusion that the Younger1 abstention doctrine precluded federal interference with the ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013), which provides clarity to the abstention inquiry and defines the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. Reviewing this appeal in light of Sprint, we conclude that the decision to abstain was appropriate. Accordingly, we will affirm.

I.

The Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor is a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and New York that was created in 1953 with a mission to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity in the Port of New York–New Jersey. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23–1 et seq. The Commission is a fully recognized law enforcement agency, and detectives of the agency are vested with all powers of a police officer in both states. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23–86(4).

Gonzalez began his employment as a detective with the Commission in 1999, and he remained in this position throughout the fourteen years preceding this litigation. In June 2012, a former coworker, Kimberly Zick, asked Gonzalez to assist her with a lawsuit she was bringing against the Commission that alleged employment discrimination under the ADA and Title VII. Gonzalez agreed and, on June 4, 2012, executed a sworn affidavit on Zick's behalf. On October 4, 2012, Zick's case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Zick v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, No. 11 CIV 5093, 2012 WL 4785703 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012).

Upon review of Gonzalez's affidavit, the Commission determined that it contained several materially false statements and that, under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the Commission and the Detectives' Endowment Association P.B.A. Local 195 (of which Gonzalez was a member), Gonzalez was subject to discipline for making these statements. On October 19, 2012, a few days after Zick's suit was dismissed, the Commission advised Gonzalez that he was the subject of an internal investigation related to the potentially false statements in his June 4, 2012 affidavit. As part of the investigation, on December 3, 2012, Gonzalez—represented by counsel—was questioned under oath by an internal affairs officer designated by the Commission. During the interrogation, Gonzalez maintained that the statements contained in the June 4, 2012 affidavit were true.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Commission concluded that Gonzalez had indeed made false statements in the affidavit. On February 7, 2013, the Commission served Gonzalez with a Statement of Charges, alleging that he demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth in making false statements in connection with Zick's case. Specifically, the Statement of Charges provided that “on or about June 4, 2012, [Gonzalez] executed a duly sworn affidavit, in which paragraphs 9, 16 and 17 contain false and inaccurate statements therein; and on December 3, 2012, [he] affirmed these false statements while testifying under oath during an administrative investigation into the false statements.” App. 53.

Under Section 17 of the CBA, a law enforcement officer with the Commission may not be removed from employment or subjected to disciplinary penalties unless the charges are sustained following a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Gonzalez was advised that a hearing would be held on February 20, 2013, and that he had the right to be represented by counsel and to present witnesses and evidence on his behalf. Gonzalez was also advised that establishment of the charges could result in termination of his employment. At Gonzalez's request, the hearing was postponed until March 14, 2013. As permitted by the CBA, Gonzalez was suspended without pay pending the determination of the charges by the ALJ.

On February 14, 2013, Gonzalez's counsel wrote to the Commission “requesting that Detective Gonzalez be immediately returned to active duty and that the charges be dismissed.” App. 88. Counsel argued that “both the disciplinary charges as well as the underlying investigation are retaliatory action under the ADA and Title VII and should not have occurred.” App. 87–88. The Commission responded in writing the same day, denying the request for reinstatement and dismissal of charges and contending that “Gonzalez's suspension is neither retaliatory nor discriminatory.” App. 91.

A few days later, on February 19, 2013, Gonzalez filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging violations under the ADA, Title VII, and the First Amendment. In his complaint, Gonzalez requested that the Court [p]reliminarily, temporarily and permanently enjoin[ ] the defendant from suspending [him] without pay” and “from prosecuting, scheduling or conducting any disciplinary hearing.” App. 19. Gonzalez also sought an order rescinding the charges and providing for compensatory damages.

On March 13, 2013, the District Court issued an order denying Gonzalez's requestfor a preliminary injunction. Applying the three-part test articulated in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), the Court concluded that the Younger abstention doctrine required dismissal of the federal suit because the state administrative hearing (1) was judicial in nature, (2) implicated important state interests, and (3) offered an adequate opportunity for Gonzalez to present his federal claims.

The hearing before the ALJ commenced the following day, March 14, 2013, and continued for two additional days on March 25 and 26, 2013. On the first day of the hearing, Gonzalez's counsel informed the ALJ about the District Court's order and asked whether Gonzalez would be permitted to prosecute his ADA and Title VII claims. The ALJ instructed that he would not entertain Gonzalez's retaliation claims:

I can tell you that I'm not [going to consider the ADA and Title VII claims.] I don't have the authority to do it [and] I'm not prepared to do it.... I am here as a Hearing Officer on the internal matter only, not the rest of it.

App. 99–100.

On April 10, 2013, Gonzalez filed a notice of appeal from the District Court's order dismissing his federal suit. On June 16, 2013, while Gonzalez's appeal with this Court was pending, the ALJ issued a Report and Recommendation to the Commission with detailed factual findings. The ALJ found that Gonzalez's June 4, 2012 affidavit was “replete with inaccurate statements of fact, most of which could have been verified beforehand with only a modest degree of diligence.” App. 134. Weighing the importance of a law enforcement officer's credibility and truthfulness, the ALJ concluded that “termination of [Gonzalez's] employment is the only appropriate disposition.” App. 135.

By decision dated July 15, 2013, the Commission followed the ALJ's recommendation and terminated Gonzalez's employment. On August 20, 2013, Gonzalez appealed his termination to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division (the State Appeal). See In the Matter of the Internal Disciplinary Hearing of Detective Ariel Gonzalez, No. A–6140–12 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.). In addition to challenging the Commission's decision to terminate his employment, Gonzalez filed a Case Information Statement that also listed his ADA, Title VII, and First Amendment claims. Gonzalez's State Appeal remains pending as of the date of this decision.

II.

The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, because it arises following a stay and administrative termination under Younger. See Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir.2004).

We exercise plenary review over whether the requirements for abstention have been met.” ACRA Turf, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir.2014) (quoting Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145–46 (3d Cir.2010)).

III.

It has long been said that [w]hen a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction.” Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co. of N.Y., 212 U.S. 19, 40, 29 S.Ct. 192, 53 L.Ed. 382 (1909); see also Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (stating that federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given”). As a “general rule,” this longstanding principle—that federal courts are obliged to hear and decide cases within the scope of their jurisdiction—is unimpeded by parallel state proceedings involving the same or similar subject matter. Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 588 ...

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