Gooch v. Oregon Short Line Co 13 16, 1922

• Decision Date: 27 February 1922
• Docket Number: No. 90,90
• Parties: GOOCH v. OREGON SHORT LINE R. CO. Argued Jan. 13-16, 1922
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

258 U.S. 22

42 S.Ct. 192

66 L.Ed. 443

GOOCH

v OREGON SHORT LINE R. CO.

No. 90.

Argued Jan. 13-16, 1922.

Decided Feb. 27, 1922.

Mr. J. H. Peterson, of Pocatello, Idaho, for petitioner.

Mr. George H. Smith, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for respondent.

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action for personal injuries caused by a collision on the defendant's road. The plaintiff, the petitioner, shipped some cattle from Bancroft in Idaho to Omaha in Nebraska and got a drover's pass to go with them as caretaker, free from charge other than that made for carrying the cattle. In consideration of the pass the plaintiff agreed that the carrier should not be liable for any injury to him upon the trip unless he or his personal representative should within thirty days after the injury give notice in writing of his claim to the general manager of the carrier on which line the accident occurred. This agreement was required in pursuance of a regulation that was part of the defendant's tariff duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The collision happened on November 24, 1917, and the plaintiff was in a hospital for about thirty days under the care of a doctor employed by the defendant, but was not disabled from giving the notice. He failed to give it, however. The District Court directed a nonsuit and its judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 264 Fed. 664. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 254 U. S. 623, 41 Sup. Ct. 8, 65 L. Ed. 444.

The only question is whether the requirement of notice in writing was valid. The railroad company does not contend that it could have exonerated itself altogether from liability for negligence (Norfolk Southern R. R. Co. v. Chatman, 244 U. S. 276, 37 Sup. Ct. 499, 61 L. Ed. 1131, L. R. A. 1917F, 1128) but argues that a stipulation for written notice within a reasonable time stands on a different footing, and of this there is no doubt. Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 248 U. S. 446, 449, 450, 39 Sup. Ct. 139, 63 L. Ed. 350; St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592, 602, 37 Sup. Ct. 462, 61 L. Ed. 917, et seq. We perceive nothing in the form of the notice required to invalidate the requirement. It would have been sufficiently complied with if addressed to the railroad company, or to the General Manager, care of the railroad company. Of course too, actual knowledge on the part of employees of the company was not an excuse for omitting the notice in writing. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592, 37 Sup. Ct. 462, 61 L. Ed. 917. The doubt that led to the granting of the writ of certiorari was whether the prohibition of a requirement fixing less than ninety days for giving notice of claims in respect of goods established a public policy that would affect the present case. Act of March 4, 1915, c. 176, § 1, 38 Stat. 1196 (Comp. St. § 8604a). For although courts sometimes have been slow to extend the effect of statutes modifying the common law beyond the direct operation of the words, it is obvious that a statute may indicate a change in the policy of the law, although it expresses that change only in the specific cases most likely to occur to the mind. Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32, 89 C. C. A. 508, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1194.

We are satisfied, however, that in this case the requirement was valid and that the statute referred to should not affect what in our opinion would be the law apart from it. The decisions that we have cited show that the time would have been sufficient, but for the statute, in respect of damage to goods, and the reasons are stronger to uphold it as adequate for personal injuries. A record is kept of goods, yet even as to them reasonably prompt notice is necessary as a check upon fraud. There is no record of passengers, and the practice of fraud is too common to be ignored. Less time reasonably may be allowed for a notice of claims for personal injuries than is deemed proper for goods although very probably an exception might be implied if the accident made notice within the time impracticable. The statut cannot be taken to indicate a different view. On the contrary it is impossible to suppose that Congress when it was dealing with notices of claims, and even with the claims of passengers for baggage, Act of August 9 1916, c. 301, 39 Stat, 441, 442 (Comp. St. § 8604a), should not have thought of their claims for personal injuries, and as it passed them by, we must suppose that it was satisfied to leave them to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the common law. See Galveston Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S. 357, 359, 41 Sup. Ct. 114, 65 L. Ed. 301; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Maucher, 248 U. S. 359, 363, 39 Sup. Ct. 108, 63 L. Ed. 294. The fact that the form prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1921 is silent upon the subject cannot affect the result.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice PITNEY was absent and took no part in the decision.

Mr. Justice CLARKE dissenting.

On November 24, 1917, petitioner, Gooch, when a passenger in the caboose attached to the train in which respondent company was carrying a carload of cattle for him, was seriously injured by a collision with another train. Gooch was traveling on what has long been known as a 'drover's pass,' which it is admitted in the answer, as it must be (Norfolk & Southern Railroad Co. v. Chatman, 244 U. S. 276, 37 Sup. Ct. 499, 61 L. Ed. 1131, L. R. A. 1917F, 1128), entitled him to the rights and protection of a passenger for hire. It is also either admitted, or not denied, that Gooch was so injured that in about an hour and a half after he was hurt agents of the company took him to a hospital about 40 miles from the scene of the accident, where he was under the care of a physician employed by respondent for about 30 days, until he left the hospital, but he returned for two treatments by the company physician and was finally discharged by him on January 15, 1918 (52 days after the accident). Five days after Gooch entered the hospital, and while he was still in bed under the care of the company's physician, the claim adjuster of the company called upon him and asked him 'if he was ready for a settlement.' To this Gooch replied that 'he was not in a condition to talk with him; that he was not ready for a settlement.' About 10 days later, the claim agent called on him again at the hospital and found him sitting up in a wheeled chair and a conversation 'similar to the first one was held.' But his case was dismissed below and that judgment is affirmed by this court because be did not notify the company in writing within 30 days of the accident that he would claim damages for his injuries thus negligently caused.

The company alleged in its answer, and it is not denied, that pursuant to the provisions of an effective tariff, when he delivered his cattle for transportation, Gooch signed a written stipulation that no claim for personal injury caused by its negligence should be valid or enforceable against the company unless notice in writing was given to the general manager thereof within 30 days after injury occurred.

It was admitted that the petitioner did not give the required notice in writing and the judgment of this court is that the rule requiring it was a valid and reasonable rule and that it must be enforced by affirmance of the judgment of the court below, notwithstanding the intimate knowledge which the company so certainly had of Gooch's injuries from an hour and a half after the accident, when it sent him to a hospital.

From this conclusion of the court I dissent: (1) Because such a rule, as to property claims, has twice within 6 years been specifically declared by acts of Congress to be contrary to a public policy which I think it is the duty of this court to recognize and accept with respect to injuries to passengers; and (2) because in practice the rule is gravely unjust and discriminatory and therefore unreasonable.

Of these in the order stated.

First. The petitioner claims the rule is unreasonable and void under Boston & Maine Railroad v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, 38 Sup. Ct. 354, 62 L. Ed. 820, Ann. Cas. 1918E. 469, but the court holds it reasonable on two grounds: (1) Because the decisions of this court show that...