Good Lance v. Black Hills Dialysis, LLC

• Citation: 871 N.W.2d 639
• Decision Date: 04 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 27298.,27298.
• Parties: Vera GOOD LANCE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BLACK HILLS DIALYSIS, LLC, and Leetta Brewer, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

871 N.W.2d 639

Vera GOOD LANCE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.BLACK HILLS DIALYSIS, LLC, and Leetta Brewer, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 27298.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued Oct. 6, 2015.

Decided Nov. 4, 2015.

Jon J. Lafleur, Charles Abourezk of Abourezk & Zephier, PC, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.

Gregory J. Bernard, Catherine L.Z. Chicoine of Thomas Braun Bernard & Burke, LLP, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants and appellees.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Vera Good Lance sued Black Hills Dialysis, LLC and LeEtta Brewer (collectively, BHD) for negligence after suffering an injury from a fall while at BHD's facility in Shannon County on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.¹ A dispute arose between the parties about whether the circuit court should summon jurors from Shannon County or neighboring Fall River County. A 2009 standing order issued by the Seventh Circuit Presiding Judge required that all cases filed in Shannon County be venued in Fall River County. In accordance with this order, the circuit court ruled that it would summon Fall River County jurors. Good Lance, through her estate's administrator Hilda Kills Small, requested this intermediate appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Background

[¶ 2.] Good Lance was a resident of Shannon County, South Dakota. Shannon County is located completely within the boundaries of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.

Good Lance was a regular patient at BHD's facility in Shannon County. During one of her regular dialysis treatments, Good Lance fell and suffered injuries that generated substantial medical expenses and required a nursing home stay. At the time of her fall, Good Lance was being assisted by BHD's employee, LeEtta Brewer. Good Lance commenced this action against BHD in Shannon County. Shortly after BHD deposed Good Lance, Good Lance died. Hilda Kills Small, the special administrator for Good Lance's estate, continued this action on behalf of the estate.

[¶ 3.] Good Lance sued BHD in Shannon County for her injuries. However, Shannon County has no physical state court facilities. It contracts with neighboring Fall River County for its governmental services. Thus, all Shannon County legal proceedings are held at the Fall River County Courthouse in Hot Springs, South Dakota. Accordingly, all hearings in this matter took place at the Fall River County Courthouse.

[¶ 4.] At a pre-trial hearing, the parties disputed whether the circuit court should summon jurors from Shannon County or Fall River County. The circuit court advised the parties that it intended to empanel Fall River County jurors, due to a standing order issued in 2009 by the Presiding Judge of the Seventh Circuit (hereafter, the standing order). The standing order stated that all Shannon County matters would be tried in Fall River County.² The standing order was issued in response to an executive order issued by the President of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. The executive order stated that any service of process issued by a state court could not be enforced within the boundaries of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Good Lance made a motion to summon Shannon County jurors and the parties briefed the issue.

[¶ 5.] At a subsequent hearing on the motion, BHD argued that a state court does not have jurisdiction over Indians within the boundaries of the reservation; therefore, the court would not have any method of compelling jurors to attend the trial. Thus, BHD argued that the court had no alternative but to use Fall River County jurors. Conversely, Good Lance argued that the issue was one of venue, and that venue was proper in Shannon County because the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Shannon County. Good Lance also argued that juror attendance could be successfully compelled under the United States Supreme Court's holding in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001). Lastly, Good Lance argued that the standing order was unconstitutional under both the South Dakota Constitution and the United States Constitution.

[¶ 6.] The circuit court ruled that it would summon Fall River County jurors. The circuit court reasoned that under our interpretation of Hicks, the language in Hicks that indicates a state court could compel juror attendance was mere dicta, therefore not controlling. See State v. Cummings, 2004 S.D. 56, ¶ 16, 679 N.W.2d 484, 489.³ The circuit court further held that the standing order supported its resolution of the issue. The circuit court concluded that neither state nor federal case law would support it asserting the jurisdiction required to compel jurors from Shannon County. Good Lance appeals.

[¶ 7.] The following issues are discussed in this appeal:

1. Whether Good Lance has standing to contest the validity of the standing order.

2. Whether the standing order violated South Dakota statutes or case law regarding venue.

3. Whether the standing order violated the right to a fair and impartial jury under the South Dakota and United States Constitutions.

4. Whether the circuit court would be able to compel juror attendance of Shannon County residents.

Standard of Review

[¶ 8.] Good Lance argues that the standing order and the circuit court's interpretation of applicable case law replacing the Shannon County jury panel with a panel summoned from Fall River County violated her constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Good Lance also argues that the standing order was an unconstitutional judicial encroachment on the Legislature. We review alleged violations of constitutional rights de novo. Stehly v. Davison Cty., 2011 S.D. 49, ¶ 7, 802 N.W.2d 897, 899 (citing W. Two Rivers Ranch v. Pennington Cty., 2002 S.D. 107, ¶ 8, 650 N.W.2d 825, 827 ).

[¶ 9.] Good Lance also argues that the standing order violates South Dakota statutes governing venue and jury empaneling. The de novo standard of review also applies to issues of statutory construction. See Apland v. Bd. of Equalization for Butte Cty., S.D., 2013 S.D. 33, ¶ 7, 830 N.W.2d 93, 97. (applying de novo standard of review to both questions of constitutional rights deprivations and issues of statutory interpretation). Under the de novo standard of review, no deference is given to the circuit court's conclusions of law. Stehly, 2011 S.D. 49, ¶ 7, 802 N.W.2d at 899.

Decision

[¶ 10.] 1. Whether Good Lance has standing to contest the validity of the standing order.

[¶ 11.] BHD alleges that Good Lance does not have standing to contest the standing order because she did not employ the proper legal procedures for vacating the order. BHD argues that instead of seeking an intermediate appeal of the circuit court's order that Fall River County jurors would be summoned, Good Lance should have sought a writ of certiorari seeking to vacate the standing order. BHD also argues that Good Lance should have named then Presiding Judge Davis as a party to the lawsuit to have standing to contest his standing order. We disagree.

[¶ 12.] There are five requirements to establish standing. The party must allege:

(1) a personal injury in fact, (2) a violation of his or her own, not a third-party's rights, (3) that the injury falls within the zone of interests protected by the constitutional guarantee involved, (4) that the injury is traceable to the challenged act, and (5) that the courts can grant redress for the injury.

Sioux Falls Argus Leader v. Miller, 2000 S.D. 63, ¶ 6, 610 N.W.2d 76, 80 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472–74, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758–59, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) ). A judge's action need not directly harm litigants for them to have suffered an injury recognized for standing analysis. See id. ¶ 8, 610 N.W.2d at 81 (holding that a judge's gag order on court members was a cognizable injury to the press for standing purposes even though the order was not directed at the press). Additionally, even if a party has not sustained an injury, the party may still have standing if an injury is imminent and concrete. See Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange Cty., Fla., 368 U.S. 278, 282–83, 82 S.Ct. 275, 278, 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961) ; Doremus v. Bd. of Ed. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434–35, 72 S.Ct. 394, 397, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952).

[¶ 13.] Good Lance clearly satisfied all five requirements for standing. The injury, not having a fair and impartial jury of her peers, is clear and imminent, as the circuit court's decision denied her from having a jury comprised of a cross section of her community. See SDCL 16–13–10.1 (stating that it is the policy of South Dakota that all litigants are entitled to have juries selected from a fair cross section of the community). The injury is personal to her, not a third party, and it is not a generalized grievance of the population. Her injury is also clearly within the zone of interests protected by the right to a fair and impartial jury guaranteed by the South Dakota Constitution. See S.D. Const. art. VI, § 6. The injury is clearly the result of the standing order, as the standing order was crucial to the circuit court's decision to use Fall River County jurors. We are also able to redress the alleged injury by reversing the circuit court's decision and remanding with instructions to disregard the standing order. Thus, Good Lance satisfies all five elements of standing.

[¶ 14.] BHD argues that Good Lance should have sought a writ of certiorari under SDCL 21–31–1 (authorizing writ) and SDCL 21–31–2 (delineating application procedure) if she wanted to vacate the standing order. However, a writ of certiorari is an equitable remedy, and an equitable remedy is only available when there is no remedy at law that could address the problem. Ridley v. Lawrence Cty. Comm'n, 2000 S.D. 143, ¶ 6, 619 N.W.2d 254, 257. We have already granted Good Lance's petition for intermediate appeal under SDCL 15–26A–13, so Good Lance has an adequate remedy at law. Additionally, ...