Good v. Firstenergy Corp.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:13cv149,3:13cv149 |
| Parties | CONNIE GOOD, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of C.G., Plaintiff v. FIRSTENERGY CORP., Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Munley)
This state law negligence case involves injuries Plaintiff Connie Good's (hereinafter "plaintiff") daughter, C.G., sustained after gaining access to the Birchwood Lakes high voltage electrical substation.1 Plaintiff asserts Defendant FirstEnergy Corp.'s (hereinafter "FirstEnergy Corp.") negligence caused her injuries. Before the court for disposition is FirstEnergy Corp.'s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court will deny this motion.
Background
On May 22, 2012, eleven (11) year old C.G. played with her nine (9) year old brother and a friend near the Birchwood Lakes high voltage electricalsubstation (hereinafter "the substation"). (Doc. 78-5, Dep. of C.G. II. (hereinafter "C.G. Dep. II") at 1-3).2 The children were familiar with the substation because they walked past it on their way to and from their school bus stop everyday. (Doc. 77-2, Def.'s Concise Stmt. of Facts (hereinafter "SOF") ¶¶ 16-17).
While playing with her friend and brother on May 22, 2012, C.G. climbed to the top of the substation's front gate, pulled down the barbed wire, and jumped into the interior of the substation. (Id. ¶ 27). Once inside the substation, C.G. climbed eight feet up an A-frame structure, which had an energized power line traversing through its center. (Id. ¶ 28). Shortly thereafter, C.G. jumped down off the A-frame structure. (Id.) While jumping down, C.G. made contact with the energized power line. (Id.) C.G.'s contact with the power line caused her to catch on fire, resulting in serious injuries. (Id. ¶ 29; Doc. 79-2, Ex. F, Carol Good Dep. I at 100; Doc. 79-3, Ex. F, Carol Good Dep. II. at 110). Specifically, C.G. received second and third degree electrical burns over 40.5% of her body including her neck, chest, back and arms, which caused her treating physicians to place her in a medically inducedcoma for seven (7) weeks. (Doc. 79-2, Ex. F, Carol Good Dep. I at 100; Doc. 79-3, Ex. F, Carol Good Dep. II. at 110). The parties dispute how C.G. received her injuries.
On January 22, 2013, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint seeking over $75,000 in damages on each count. (Doc. 1, Compl.). Count I alleges FirstEnergy Corp. negligently installed, maintained and inspected the security fencing surrounding the substation. (Id. ¶¶ 15-25). Count II claims the substation is an attractive nuisance. (Id. ¶¶ 26-39). After discovery, FirstEnergy Corp. moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 77). The parties have briefed their respective positions and the matter is ripe for disposition.
Jurisdiction
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania. . FirstEnergy Corp. is incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio with its principal place of business in Ohio. (Id. ¶ 6). Because complete diversity of citizenship exists among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the court has jurisdiction over the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (). As a federal court sitting in diversity, the substantive law of Pennsylvania shall apply to the instant case. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
Legal Standard
Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Int'l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that areasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by establishing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond its pleadings, and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Discussion
FirstEnergy Corp. moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's negligence and punitive damages claims. Plaintiff counters that she can state a prima facie negligence cause of action and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on punitive damages. The court will address these issues in order, beginning with plaintiff's negligence claim.
Plaintiff contends FirstEnergy Corp.'s negligence caused C.G.'s injuries. In Pennsylvania, the elements necessary to plead a negligence action are: (1) the existence of a duty or obligation requiring a certain standard of conduct; (2) a failure to conform to that duty, or a breach thereof; (3) a causal connection between the breach and the harm; and (4) actual loss or damage suffered. Cavanagh v. Electrolux Home Prods., 904 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1222 (Pa. 2002)).
FirstEnergy Corp. raises the following three issues pertaining to plaintiff's negligence claim: 1) Is FirstEnergy Corp. entitled to summary judgment because it owed C.G. no duty? 2) Does C.G.'s trespass into the substations excuse any duty FirstEnergy Corp. owed to C.G.? 3) Should judgment be granted to FirstEnergy Corp. because any alleged negligence did not cause C.G.'s injuries? The court will address these issues in seriatim.
Initially, FirstEnergy Corp. challenges the existence of a duty. Pennsylvania law defines a legal duty in negligence cases as "an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particularstandard of conduct toward another." Atcovitz, 812 A.2d at 1222. In Pennsylvania, a supplier of electricity or the possessor of a land site owes a duty of care to an entrant on land with high-voltage electrical transmission lines. Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc., 130 A.2d 123, 128-31 (Pa. 1957); Yoffee v. P.P.&L., 123 A.2d 636, 645 (Pa. 1956); Bailey v. Pa. Elec. Co., 598 A.2d 41, 47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); see also Estate of Zimmerman v. SEPTA, 168 F.3d 680, 685 (3d Cir. 1999) (). Thus, Pennsylvania law provides that FirstEnergy Corp. owes C.G. a legal duty if it supplied electricity to the substation. Likewise, FirstEnergy Corp. owes C.G. a legal duty if it possessed, owned and operated the substation.
FirstEnergy Corp. argues that it owed no duty to plaintiff for two reasons: (1) FirstEnergy Corp. did not supply electricity to the substation; and (2) FirstEnergy Corp. did not possess, own and operate the substation. Plaintiff counters that FirstEnergy Corp. may owe a duty to plaintiff as the supplier of electricity to the substation or possessor of a land site with high-voltage electrical transmission lines and genuine issues of material fact require a jury to determine these issues. After careful consideration, the court agrees withplaintiff.
FirstEnergy Corp. argues that no evidence exists establishing that it generates, transmits or distributes electricity to anyone. FirstEnergy Corp.'s corporate designee testified that FirstEnergy Corp. formed in 1996 and holds all the stock of its subsidiaries, including Met-Ed. (Doc. 92, Ex. A, Dep. of John Marconi (hereinafter "Marconi Dep.") at 20-22). FirstEnergy Corp. does not have any employees. (Id.) Additionally, FirstEnergy Service Company, notFirstEnergy Corp., provides FirstEnergy Corp. subsidiaries with legal, account and engineering services. (Id. at 20-23). FirstEnergy Service Company, not FirstEnergy Corp., represents FirstEnergy Corp. subsidiaries before the Pennsylvania Utility Commission. (Id. at 22). Finally, FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., not FirstEnergy Corp., is a wholesale marketer of electricity. (Id. at 24). Accordingly, the burden shifts to plaintiff, who must go beyond her pleadings, and designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Here, plaintiff argues FirstEnergy Corp.'s 2013 annual report stands in direct contrast to FirstEnergy Corp.'s assertion that it does nothing.4 FirstEnergy Corp.'s annual report states ...
To continue reading
Request your trial