Goodall v. Clarke

• Decision Date: 22 February 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21cv534 (LO/IDD)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Thomas Americus Goodall, Petitioner, v. Harold Clarke, Respondent.

Thomas Americus Goodall, Petitioner, v. Harold Clarke, Respondent.

No. 1:21cv534 (LO/IDD)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division

February 22, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Liam O'Grady, United States District Judge.

Thomas Americus Goodall ("Goodall" or "Petitioner"), a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his six convictions in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, Virginia: four counts of distribution of a schedule I or II substance, third or subsequent offense; one count of driving while a habitual offender, second or subsequent offense, in violation of Virginia Code § 46.2-357; and one count of conspiracy to commit a third or subsequent distribution of a schedule I or II substance offense. [Dkt. No. 1]. Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss, with a supporting brief and exhibits. [Dkt. Nos. 8, 10]. Petitioner was notified of his right to respond after receiving the notice required by Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) [Dkt. No. 9] and has responded. [Dkt. Nos. 16]. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow respondent's Motion to Dismiss must be granted, and the petition will be dismissed.

I. Procedural History

On December 7, 2016, a jury sitting in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County found Goodall guilty of four counts of the distribution of a schedule I or II substance, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-248; one count of driving while a habitual offender, second or subsequent offense, in violation of Virginia Code § 46.2-357; and one count of conspiracy to commit a third or subsequent distribution of a schedule I or II substance offense, in violation of Virginia Code §§ 18.2-248 and 18.2-256. On March 23, 2017, he was sentenced to ten years on each of the distribution charges and the conspiracy charge, and one year on the driving while a habitual offender charge, for a total of 51 years. The sentencing order was entered April 10, 2017. Commonwealth v. Goodall. Case Nos. CR16F014280-01 through -04, CR16F014280-06 through -07.

Goodall appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, raising the following allegations of error:

I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to continue to obtain the presence of a witness;

II. The trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for a mistrial based on a juror's ex-parte communications with the prosecution;

III. The evidence was insufficient on the conspiracy charge;

IV. The trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on venue.

Goodall v. Commonwealth. Record No. 0725-17-2 ("CAV R. at "). The Court of Appeals denied his petition for appeal by order dated December 7, 2017, and the Supreme Court of Virginia refused his subsequent appeal on September 6, 2018. Goodall v. Commonwealth. Record No. 180031 ("VSCT R. at ___").

On August 28, 2019, Goodall filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, which raised the following claims:

14(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel did not properly prepare the defense for witnesses in the Petitioner's favor to properly confront other witnesses, and properly raise the issues on appeal "by design."

14(b) Petitioner's right to a fair and impartial judge under the Sixth Amendment was violated as the judge would not allow a continuance for a substantial witness.

14(c) Prosecutorial misconduct and a violation of the Fifth Amendment for fraud on the court by presenting insufficient evidence to the grand jury to obtain an indictment.

14(e) The evidence was insufficient to prove the conspiracy charge and the possession with intent to distribute charge.

14(f) The jury pool was tainted by the failure to remove a jury member who was biased.

(1) The trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for a continuance to obtain a material witness.

(2) The trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial.

(3) The trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner of conspiracy.

(4) The trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth's jury instruction regarding venue.

(5) The trial court failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

(6) The Commonwealth and trial court violated petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because petitioner had only been convicted of one prior similar offense.

(7) The jury erred in concluding that the evidence sufficiently established two prior distribution convictions.

(8) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the evidence and testimony admitted during the testimony of Detective Kline.

(9) The trial court erred when it admitted hearsay without giving petitioner a chance to cross examine or confront the accuser.

(10) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the trial court's instruction that petitioner had already been convicted of a third offense of distribution.

(11) The trial court erred when it allowed unsigned indictments to be used to convict petitioner.

(12) The trial court erred when it sentenced petitioner to conspiracy to distribute, third offense, and sentenced him to a mandatory 10-year incarceration term when petitioner was only charged with conspiracy to distribute, first offense.

Goodall v. Woodson. Case No. CL19HC-3168 (hereinafter "Hab. R. at "). The circuit court dismissed the petition by order dated December 19, 2019, and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied his petition for appeal on dated April 2, 2021. Goodall v. Woodson. Record No. 200434.

On April 16, 2021, Goodall filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which alleges the following grounds for federal habeas corpus relief:

(1) Ineffective assistance of counsel, as counsel failed to file a motion to have Detective Davis appear in court, Davis testified at the grand jury but never in court;

(2) Ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel did not file a motion to challenge the validity of the indictments;

(3) Ineffective assistance of counsel, as counsel failed to object during sentencing to the "third offense conspiracy charge conviction;"

(4) Ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel failed to object to trial court's bias, shown by the court's removing the prosecution's burden to show a hearsay exception;

(5) The trial court abused its discretion by denying petitioner's motion for a continuance to obtain the presence of a material witness;

(6) The trial court abused its discretion by denying petitioner's motion for a mistrial due to a juror's ex-parte communication with the prosecution;

(7) The trial court erred in holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove conspiracy;

(8) The evidence was insufficient to prove a third distribution offense;

(9) The evidence was insufficient to establish two prior convictions of distribution;

(10) The trial court erred by admitting into evidence a hearsay statement without giving petitioner a chance to confront the declarant;

(11) The court erred when it allowed unsigned indictments to be used which resulted in the court lacking subject matter jurisdiction;

(12) Ineffective assistance due to counsel's failure to create any defense and a lack of due diligence;

(13) Ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel did not object to Detective Kline's evidence and testimony;

(14) Ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel failed to investigate facts and failed to object to a video tape;

(15) Ineffective assistance of counsel as counsel failed to object to the jury instruction that petitioner had already been convicted of a third offense drug distribution charge;

(16) Lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

(17) The trial court violated Rule 3 A:24 of the Supreme Court of Virginia and petitioner's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering an order that contained no findings of fact or conclusions of law.

[Dkt. No. 1 at 5-33].

II. Exhaustion

"[A] federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner in state custody unless the petitioner has first exhausted his state remedies by presenting his claims to the highest state court." Baker v. Corcoran. 220 F.3d 276, 288 (4th Cir. 2000). Exhaustion requires that a petitioner must have presented '"both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles'" to the state's highest court. Kasi v. Aneelone. 300 F.3d 487, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matthews v. Evatt 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997)) see also Valentino v. Clarke, 972 F.3d 560, 575 (4th Cir. 2020) ("it would be unseemly" for federal court "to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity for the state courts to correct a constitutional violation") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if the petitioner presents new legal theories or factual claims for the first time in his federal habeas petition." Breard v. Pruett. 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998). Thus, in Virginia, a § 2254 petitioner must first have presented the same factual and legal claims to the Supreme Court of Virginia either by way of a direct appeal, a state habeas corpus petition, or an appeal from a circuit court's denial of a state habeas petition. Matthews, 105 F.3d at 910-11. The burden of proving that a claim is exhausted lies with the habeas petitioner." Pruett. 134 F.3d at 619; see also Mallory v. Smith. 27 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1994).

The inconsistent numbering scheme used by the petitioner in state habeas makes the exhaustion process more complex than necessary. Accordingly, for clarity, each federal claim will be discussed individually with regard to exhaustion, any applicable default, and its...