Goode v. D.C.
| Decision Date | 29 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-7038 |
| Parties | Jesse P. Goode, Appellant v. District of Columbia, et al., Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:20-cv-01332)
Before: Pillard, Wilkins and Walker, Circuit Judges
This appeal was considered on the record, briefs, and oral arguments of the parties. The Court has accorded the issues full consideration and determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See Fed R. App. P. 36; D.C. Cir R. 36(d). For the reasons set out below, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED.
Appellant Jesse Goode is a former Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in the Office of Administrative Hearings in Washington, D.C. Goode alleges that the Commission on Selection and Tenure of Administrative Law Judges of the Office of Administrative Hearings ("COST" or the "Commission") unlawfully denied his request for reappointment as an ALJ. Goode contends that the Commission denied him reappointment because he supported an ethics investigation into the Chief ALJ, led an effort to unionize the ALJs, and engaged in other union activities. Goode filed this Section 1983 suit against the District of Columbia (his employer), and the individual commissioners involved in his reappointment decision in their official and individual capacities (collectively "Defendants") for violating his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process (count one) and First Amendment right to freedom of association (count two).
Defendants moved to dismiss Goode's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The District Court dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim because Goode's factual allegations demonstrated that Goode received all the process he was due.
The District Court also held that Goode failed to state a First Amendment claim because Goode's conclusory allegations were insufficient to establish that anti-union sentiment was a substantial or motivating factor in COST's decision not to reappoint him. Moreover, the District Court reasoned that a prior proceeding before the Public Employee Relations Board resolved the question of whether anti-union animus affected COST's denial of reappointment, and thus, Goode was collaterally estopped from arguing that it did. Next, the District Court concluded that Goode failed to state a claim for municipal liability, which provided an independent ground for dismissal of Goode's claims against the District of Columbia. Finally, the District Court determined that the individual commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity which provided an independent ground for dismissal of Goode's claims against them. Goode timely appealed, and we affirm.
"This court reviews de novo a district court decision granting a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2018). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
First, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Fifth Amendment claim. "In order to determine whether there has been a violation of due process rights, we undertake a two-part inquiry: first, we must determine whether the claimant was deprived of a protected interest; and second, if the claimant was so deprived, we then consider what process the claimant was due." Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Importantly, "when a statute leaves a benefit to the discretion of a government official, no protected property interest in that benefit can arise." Bloch v. Powell, 348 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we look to the statute and regulations governing Goode's reappointment to determine whether they constrain COST's discretion sufficiently to grant him a protected property interest in his reappointment. "To create a protected property interest, [the statute and] regulations must limit [COST's] discretion by '"explicitly mandatory language," i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the [statute's or] regulations' substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow.'" Id. (quoting Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989)).
Fortunately for us, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently construed the relevant statute and regulations. See Williams v. Johnson, 776 F.3d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("[W]e defer to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' interpretation of the D.C.[]Code."). In Barber v. Commission on Selection & Tenure of Administrative Law Judges, the court reviewed Goode's legal challenge to COST's decision denying him reappointment and noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings Establishment Act of 2001 ("Establishment Act") confers "'final authority'" on COST "'to appoint, reappoint, discipline, and remove Administrative Law Judges.'" 259 A.3d 62, 69-70 (D.C. 2021) (quoting D.C. Code § 2-1831.06(b)). The court noted that like the Establishment Act, "the National Labor Relations Act provides that the general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board 'shall have final authority . . . in respect of the investigation of charges[, ] . . . issuance of complaints . . . and . . . prosecution of such complaints before the Board." Id. at 70 & n.49 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)) (emphasis and alterations in original). Consistent with the Supreme Court's construction of "final authority" in the National Labor Relations Act to mean "unreviewable authority[, ]" NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975), and "unreviewable discretion," NLRB v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 125 (1987), the court construed "final authority" in the Establishment Act to mean unreviewable authority or discretion as well. Barber, 259 A.3d at 70 & nn. 50-51 (). Significantly, the court also rejected a claim that COST failed to abide by its own regulations (which also state that COST's reappointment decision "shall be final," see D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 6B § 3705.23), because there is "clear and convincing evidence" that the D.C. Council "intended to entirely preclude judicial review." See Barber, 259 A.3d at 73-74.
Accordingly, in light of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' determination that the Establishment Act and its implementing regulations confer unreviewable discretion on the Commission akin to the unreviewable discretion afforded prosecutors in deciding whether to file charges, we hold that Goode had no constitutionally protected property interest in reappointment as an ALJ. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (); see also Russell v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1976) (same).[1]For that reason, the District Court's dismissal of the procedural due process claim was proper.
Further and in the alternative, even assuming that Goode had some protected property interest in reappointment, we also hold that he received all the process he was due. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In considering his reappointment, COST provided Goode both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard-opportunities that were commensurate with the asserted interests at stake. Between April and June 2017, well in...
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