Goode v. Nobles, S99A0191.
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
| Citation | 518 S.E.2d 122,271 Ga. 30 |
| Docket Number | No. S99A0191.,S99A0191. |
| Parties | GOODE v. NOBLES. |
| Decision Date | 03 May 1999 |
518 S.E.2d 122
271 Ga. 30
v.
NOBLES
No. S99A0191.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 3, 1999.
Leaphart & Johnson, J. Alvin Leaphart, Jesup, for appellant.
Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney, James S. Archer, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
BENHAM, Chief Justice.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea of guilty to one count each of "menacing" and assault in Colorado, Ronnie Eugene Goode was sentenced to four years of probation. Upon his request, he was permitted to serve that probation in Georgia. Shortly after Goode returned to Georgia, his wife, the victim of the Colorado offenses, demanded that he move out of the marital home, which he did. Although his Georgia probation officer instructed Goode to avoid contact with his wife after moving out, Goode returned at her invitation, but then had an altercation with her. That altercation ultimately served as the basis for a complaint for revocation of his probation and the issuance of an arrest warrant, both in Colorado. After Goode's arrest in Georgia on that warrant, a Governor's warrant was issued in response to a request from Colorado. Goode filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Following a hearing at which Goode stipulated that the Governor's warrant was in order and that he was the person sought, the trial court denied the petition and
Among the findings made by the trial court in its order denying Goode's petition for habeas corpus is that Goode had waived extradition to Colorado. Support for that finding is found in a document signed by Goode in which he requested that he be permitted to be supervised as a probationer in Georgia. In that document appears the following sentence: "I hereby waive extradition to the sending state from any state of the United States and also agree that I will not contest any effort by any jurisdiction to return me to the sending state." Goode does not contest the fact that he signed the waiver of extradition, but contends the waiver is ineffective because it was not voluntary in that the alternative to signing the waiver was to be held hostage by the State of Colorado.
Goode was not a hostage held by the State of Colorado, but was instead a person convicted of a crime in that State who was permitted as a matter of the grace of that State to serve his sentence on probation rather than in prison. Gehl v. People, 161 Colo. 535, 539, 423 P.2d 332 (1967). Georgia, too, views probation as a matter of grace, upon the granting of which conditions may be imposed.
"[A] person occupies a special status while on probation, during which time his private life and behavior may be regulated by the State to...
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Rutledge v. State
...State to an extent that would be completely untenable under ordinary circumstances." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Goode v. Nobles , 271 Ga. 30, 31, 518 S.E.2d 122 (1999). As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[i]nherent in the very nature of probation is that probationer......
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Rutledge v. State
...State to an extent that would be completely untenable under ordinary circumstances." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Goode v. Nobles, 271 Ga. 30, 31 (518 S.E.2d 122) (1999). As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[i]nherent in the very nature of probation is that probationer......
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Johnson v. State , 71A04–1103–CR–194.
...jurisdictions have addressed the issue, however, and generally have held that such waivers are enforceable. See, e.g., Goode v. Nobles, 271 Ga. 30, 518 S.E.2d 122, 123–24 (1999); People v. Velarde, 739 P.2d 845, 849 (Colo.1987); State v. Maglio, 189 N.J.Super. 257, 459 A.2d 1209, 1212 (1983......
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Clark v. State, S99A0117.
...of involuntary manslaughter by the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner was also a correct statement of law. OCGA § 16-5-3(b). [271 Ga. 30] 518 S.E.2d 120 The trial court charged on both self-defense and accident, and was in fact under no obligation to charge on involuntary mans......