Goodell v. Tower

• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: TYLER, J.
• Citation: Goodell v. Tower, 77 Vt. 61, 58 A. 790, 107 Am.St.Rep. 745 (Vt. 1904)
• Decision Date: 31 August 1904
• Parties: GOODELL v. TOWER et al.

58 A. 790

77 Vt. 61

GOODELL

v. TOWER et al.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Rutland.

Aug. 31, 1904.

Exceptions from Rutland County Court; Munson, Judge.

Action by Horatio U. Goodell against William W. Tower and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants bring exceptions. Affirmed.

Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and TYLER, START, WATSON, STAFFORD, and HASELTON, JJ.

William W. Stickney, John G. Sargent, and Homer L. Skeels, for plaintiff.

Butler & Moloney, for defendants.

TYLER, J. This action is trespass for false imprisonment The question arises upon the complaint upon which the warrant was issued. V. S. 5001, reads: "Sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables, police officers, other prosecuting officers, and all officers of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, shall prosecute violations of the preceding sections of this chapter which come to their notice or knowledge." The complaint was made by William W. Tower, who described himself therein as "officer or agent of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals within and for the county of Rutland," and signed it "William W. Tower, Agent" and thereupon the Justice issued the warrant it could not be maintained, and it is not insisted, that Tower had authority under the statute to make the complaint as agent; therefore we are not called upon to decide whether a legally organized society of this kind might confer authority upon a certain officer to make complaint for a violation of this statute. That question does not arise.

1. As Tower had no legal authority to make the complaint, it follows that the justice had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and no authority to issue the warrant. And it is the law in England and in this country that where a justice of the peace, or other inferior magistrate, acts without his jurisdiction in issuing a warrant, to the injury of another person, the magistrate is personally liable. 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. 897, and cases cited; Morrill v. Thurston, 46 Vt. 732; Carleton v. Taylor, 50 Vt, at page 227; Vaughn v. Congdon, 56 Vt. 111, 48 Am. Rep. 758. The rule is again recognized in Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt 203, 23 Atl. 585, 15 L. R. A. 201.

2. It is contended in defendant Hastings' behalf that he did not restrain the plaintiff of his liberty. The trial court found that, having the complaint and warrant signed, respectively, by the other two defendants, he met the plaintiff, and stopped him by speaking to him as he was driving along on a business errand, read the paper to him, and told him he would have to go with him (Hastings); that the plaintiff told the officer that he would have to get some one to take his team; that the officer permitted him to do his errand, but directed him to return as soon as he could; that the plaintiff then drove along; that Hastings became impatient, and went to meet him, turned in behind the plaintiff's team, and followed him to the village; that he went to the place of trial with the plaintiff, delivered the paper to the justice, and informed him that the plaintiff was present; that this was all that Hastings did besides making his return upon the warrant; that he understood that the plaintiff was in his custody. The action of the officer constituted a false imprisonment of the plaintiff. It was not necessary that he should lay his hands on him. It was sufficient that the plaintiff was within his power and submitted to the arrest. Mowry et al. v. Chase, 100 Mass. 79. Every restraint upon a man's liberty is, in the eye of the law, an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever may be the manner in which the restraint is effected. 2 Kent's Comm. 26. And see Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 491, cited in the notes, where it was held that words may constitute an imprisonment, if they impose a restraint upon a person, and he is accordingly restrained and submits. The law is so well settled upon this subject that it is hardly necessary to cite authorities, but the notes in Bissell v. Gold, 1 Wend. 210, 19 Am. Dec. 480, are interesting, and clearly elucidate the rule that, to constitute an arrest, there must be some real or pretended legal authority for taking the party into custody; that he must be restrained of his liberty; that, if he submits, and is within the power of the officer, it is sufficient without an actual touching of his person. This is the rule laid down by Savage, C. J., in the main case, and it has not been departed from in recent authorities.

3. Defendant Hastings contends that it is within the jurisdiction of the...