Gooden v. Mississippi State University

• Decision Date: 16 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-2108.,73-2108.
• Parties: Bennie Stone GOODEN, Jr., etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants, v. MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

499 F.2d 441 (1974)

Bennie Stone GOODEN, Jr., etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants, v. MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees.

No. 73-2108.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

August 19, 1974.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied October 16, 1974.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., Wm. A. Allain, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Ed Davis Noble, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for defendants-appellants.

Melvyn R. Leventhal, Jackson, Miss., Jack Greenberg, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before BELL, DYER and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied October 16, 1974.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs, three black students attending public school in Clarksdale, Mississippi, sued on behalf of a class comprised of "students throughout the State of Mississippi who are aggrieved by the policies and practices of the defendants complained of herein." The complaint, filed February 14, 1972, alleged that "numerous private racially segregated schools and academies," as members of the Academy Athletic Conference, had been granted permission by Mississippi State University to use the University's gymnasium and facilities to hold basketball games on February 21-26, 1972. It was further asserted that this action provided state aid and encouragement to such member schools and thereby impeded the achievement of racially integrated public schools. Preliminary injunctive relief was sought to stop Mississippi State from allowing the tournament, and permanent injunctive relief was requested denying the Academy Athletic Conference the use of all facilities controlled by the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning, which oversees the eight public four-year collegiate institutions in the state. The defendants were the president of Mississippi State University and the Trustees of the Institutions of Higher Learning. They answered admitting that permission had been given for the use of Mississippi State's facilities on February 21-26, but alleged that on the same day the complaint had been filed the Academy Athletic Conference withdrew its request, and the games had not been played on state property. A hearing consisting solely of statements and arguments of counsel, was held in February of the following year. The district judge made no findings of fact but issued this injunction on April 4, 1973:

Defendant, Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning, is permanently enjoined from allowing or permitting gymnasiums, athletic fields, and other school facilities of all colleges and universities subject to its control or jurisdiction to be used for the holding of contests, activities and programs sponsored by Academy Athletic Conference (also known as Academy Activities Commission of the Mississippi Private School Association), or its member schools, or any other private school which does not enroll black students; provided, however, that this shall not preclude any student, or group of students attending any private school from access to such facilities under defendants\' control when such facilities are open to the general public on a nonexclusive, communal basis. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (CA 5, 1973) 1973.

Both parties appeal. Defendants seek to vacate the injunction. Plaintiffs protest the court's failure to award them attorneys fees. Defendants protest the issuance of the injunction as an imprudent exercise of the court's equitable power because (1) none of the circumstances present in Gilmore was shown to be present in this case, (2) no threat of similar requests or approvals in the future was shown, and (3) at the time of issuance the cause was moot. Plaintiffs contend that the court's action must be judged in light of its knowledge of the existence of a widespread network of private schools that pose a threat to the success of public school integration — knowledge which was gained from taking judicial notice of its own records in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973). They reason from this that it was permissible for the court to conclude that the Board of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning had an affirmative duty to adopt a negative policy forbidding use of all facilities under their supervision in the manner enjoined. Plaintiffs' cross-appeal claims that Section 718 of Title VII, 20 U.S.C. § 1617,¹ applies and, coupled with the decisions in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) and Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972), mandates the award of attorneys' fees in this case.

Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gilmore, supra, 414 U.S. 907, 94 S.Ct. 215, 38 L.Ed.2d 145 (1973), and Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 412 U.S. 937, 93 S.Ct. 2773, 37 L.Ed.2d 396 (1973), the latter case relating to the applicability of Section 718, we withheld the disposition of the instant appeal pending its decisions in those cases, which have now been handed down. Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 94 S.Ct. 2416, 41 L.Ed.2d ___ (1974); Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974). Even with the guidance provided, the central issue in this cause continues to be whether a controversy which would support injunctive relief remained after the withdrawal of the single private school request for use of public facilities.

Although the question for resolution on this appeal might be posed in terms of standing, i. e., did plaintiffs show an injury to themselves resulting from defendants' action;² or in terms of ripeness, i. e., did plaintiffs demonstrate a realistic possibility that the actions of defendants would injure them;³ or in terms of abuse of discretion, i. e., was the injunction unsupported or overbroad,⁴ the issue here is most properly classified as raising the question of mootness, i. e., does the cause lack the concrete adverseness necessary to an Article III case or controversy?

This court has on several occasions this year held causes moot — when the allegedly offending action was rescinded, see Barron v. Bellairs, 5 Cir., 496 F.2d 1187 1974 (new Georgia welfare statute enacted prior to entry of injunctive relief), — when the proof failed to show the complaining party was or would be injured by the challenged actions of the defendant, see National Lawyers Guild v. Board of Regents, 5 Cir., 490 F.2d 97 (injunction requiring use of college facility for meeting...