Gooden v. Walton
| Decision Date | 13 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-190 |
| Parties | WARREN E. GOODEN, Plaintiff, v. AARON WALTON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Warren Gooden, a tenured chemistry professor at Cheyney University a state institution, alleges he was unable to teach his organic chemistry class or access his valuable personal research when the university, without notice to Gooden leased his research lab to Epcot Crenshaw Inc.-a science and technology company headquartered at Cheyney. According to Gooden, Cheyney's president, Aaron Walton, defamed Gooden by telling his students it was his fault their lab was canceled.
Gooden initially filed his lawsuit pro se, subsequently obtained counsel and in total has submitted four complaints.[1] He asserts claims under the U.S Constitution, federal and state statutes and state common law against two sets of Defendants: Cheyney, Walton and other university and education officials (“Commonwealth Defendants”), and Epcot and its CEO, Charles Smith (“Epcot Defendants”). Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss all claims against them, and the Court grants them in part and denies them in part. Most of Gooden's claims are either barred by sovereign immunity or fail on the merits. Gooden, however, has plausibly alleged Walton deprived him of due process, that Walton committed negligence and that Epcot, through Smith, intentionally interfered with Gooden's contract with Cheyney to teach and conduct research in its lab space.
In the fall 2019 semester, Gooden taught his Organic Chemistry I lab in room 308.[2] (Pl's Third Am. Compl. ¶ 28, ECF 23-2.) On January 21, 2020, Gooden's Organic Chemistry II lab (which comprised the same students) gathered outside room 308 for its first meeting of the spring 2020 semester. (Id.) Gooden couldn't open the door, however, because his key did not work. (Id. at ¶ 29.) No one told Gooden he would be teaching his Organic Chemistry II lab in a different classroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 38.)
In fact, Walton had leased Epcot room 308, among other university lab space that Gooden was contractually entitled to use. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-54.) As a result, Epcot became “completely in charge” of the science building. (Id. at ¶¶ 85, 108.) Room 308's lock was changed, and Smith had a key-but Gooden did not. (Id. at ¶ 57.)
Gooden's students, however, expected the chemicals, equipment and data they left in room 308 the prior semester would remain in place and available for their next lab. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Room 308 also contained Gooden's personal research. See (id. at ¶¶ 58, 64, 86).
Specifically, Gooden claims he discovered a plant that has killed the herpes virus in lab tests and is considered a possible cancer treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 21, 87-88.) In the fall of 2019, Gooden told Walton about his research in room 308 and its potential financial benefit to Cheyney, and Walton told Gooden he wasn't interested. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-24.) Later in the semester, Epcot asked Gooden if it could finance the production of his product, and Gooden said no. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) Moreover, Gooden has researched antiviral drugs, and a “major pharmaceutical company” asked him to consult on an antiviral COVID-19 treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 91.) Gooden couldn't accept the offer because he lacked access to his personal data. (Id. at ¶¶ 63, 91.)
When Gooden's students asked him why they were locked out of room 308 for their first Organic Chemistry II lab, he said he didn't know and suggested they ask Walton. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.) Walton told the two students who spoke with him in his office that it was Gooden's fault class was canceled. (Id. at ¶¶ 36, 40.) Walton also reprimanded Gooden in writing and placed the document in his personnel file. (Id. at ¶ 46.)
The Organic Chemistry II lab room was reassigned from 308 to 208-a “ghost” lab lacking organic chemistry supplies. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.) Gooden aggravated a prior hernia injury while gathering materials for and setting up room 208. (Id. at ¶¶ 43, 61.) Gooden is also receiving care for distress and anxiety caused by Defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct. (Id. at ¶ 128.)
Gooden filed grievances with the state faculty union over his denial of access to room 308 and loss of supplies and his research, but they were not timely processed and his rights not protected. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 50, 74, 126, 132.) Epcot returned some of the supplies during the spring 2020 semester, but most of them were not replaced. (Id. at ¶¶ 78-80.) Gooden also never received his valuable personal data. (Id. at ¶ 86.)
On October 5, 2021, Gooden filed his Third Amended Complaint. (ECF 23-2.) Gooden's document is confusing, scattershot and pretty much all over the place, but he asserts claims for a procedural due process violation against all Defendants in count one, negligence (apparently) against all Defendants in count two, constructive discharge against Cheyney and Walton in count three, an Americans with Disabilities Act violation against all Defendants in count four, defamation against Walton in count five and intentional interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage against Epcot and Smith in count six. (Pl's Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 133-177.)
On June 27, 2021, the Commonwealth Defendants moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. (ECF 29). The Epcot Defendants filed a separate motion for dismissal. (ECF 28.)
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual content to state a claim that is facially “plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the facts pleaded permit a court to make the reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. If the court can infer only the possibility of misconduct from the “well-pleaded” facts-those supported by sufficient factual content to make them facially plausible-the complaint has not shown the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016).
Determining plausibility is a “context-specific task” requiring a court to use its judicial “experience and common sense.” Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). The court disregards a complaint's legal conclusions, assumes well-pleaded facts are true and then determines whether those facts plausibly entitle the pleader to relief. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347. In doing so, the court construes well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws reasonable inferences from them. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 790.
To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To act under color of state law, a defendant must have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011). Personal involvement of each defendant is a required element under § 1983, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.'”) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
While Gooden's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim in count one is formally against all Defendants, he essentially contends Walton and Cheyney deprived him of due process by leasing Epcot room 308 without notifying Gooden or providing an alternative workspace. (Pl's Third Am Compl. ¶ 136.)
To state a § 1983 procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) he was deprived of a personal interest encompassed in the life, liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) a lack of procedures that provide due process. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006). There are many types of property interests and they are defined by an “independent source” like state law. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972). A plaintiff asserting a property interest in a benefit must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to it. Id. at 577. Additionally, due process's “fundamental” requirement is an opportunity to be heard in a “meaningful” time and manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
Gooden has not adequately pleaded his procedural due process claim against the Defendants-with the exception of Walton. To begin, as a member of Pennsylvania's State System of Higher Education, Cheyney is an “arm of the state” protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Bradley v. West Chester Univ. of Pennsylvania State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880 F.3d 643, 654 (3d Cir. 2018). Actions against state officials, such as Walton, in their official capacities are treated as actions against the state. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
Gooden has, however, adequately shown that Walton, in his individual capacity, deprived Gooden of his property and denied him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. Gooden contends Walton...
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