Goodenough, Judge Police Ct., v. Ky. Purchasing Co.

Decision Date13 November 1931
PartiesGoodenough, Judge of Police Court, v. Kentucky Purchasing Company et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

3. Criminal Law. — Police judge, having jurisdiction, had right to adjudicate on all questions growing out of jurisdiction (Criminal Code of Practice, sec. 71a-7; Ky. Stats., sec. 3147).

4. Criminal Law. — On charge of common-law conspiracy police judge had only examining jurisdiction (Criminal Code of Practice, sec. 71a-7; Ky. Stats., sec. 3147).

Police judge had jurisdiction to sit as examining court and to hear and determine facts at examining trial of defendants, and to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that defendants or either of them were probably guilty, and, if so, to make such orders and to enter such judgments as law permitted him to do as such examining court.

5. Prohibition. Circuit court held without jurisdiction to prohibit police judge from proceeding on common-law conspiracy charge, even if facts contained in affidavit before police judge were insufficient to charge crime; police judge having examining jurisdiction (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 479; Criminal Code of Practice, secs. 25, 71a-7; Ky. Stats., sec. 3147).

Circuit court judge's conclusion that facts as contained in affidavit filed before police judge were insufficient to lodge criminal charge against accused transgressed limits of circuit court's jurisdiction, since it proceeded to adjudicate on facts exclusively within province of police judge; he having jurisdiction of subject-matter.

6. Prohibition. Circuit courts have prohibitive jurisdiction against inferior courts only where latter are acting without jurisdiction (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 479; Criminal Code of Practice, sec. 25).

7. Courts. — If inferior courts are acting within jurisdiction, but erroneously, followed by great and irreparable injury to litigant, with no adequate remedy for relief, circuit court has no jurisdiction to prohibit action; such jurisdiction being exclusively in Court of Appeals (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 479; Criminal Code of Practice, sec. 25; Constitution, sec. 110).

8. Courts. Circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction to prohibit inferior court from acting without jurisdiction, not followed by great and irreparable injury with no adequate remedy (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 479; Criminal Code of Practice, sec. 25; Constitution, sec. 110).

9. Courts. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to prohibit circuit courts from acting without jurisdiction, if producing great and irreparable injury to litigant with no adequate remedy for relief Constitution, sec. 110).

10. Courts. Court having jurisdiction of subject-matter has right to determine whether developed facts authorize particular judgment rendered.

Appeal from Kenton Circuit Court.

DANIEL W. DAVIES, LAWRENCE J. DISKIN and RALPH RICH for appellant.

WILLIAM J. DUPREE for appellee.

Frank S. Graydon, Maxwell & Ramsey, J.P. Hamilton, H.T. Lively, Ashby M. Warren, J.J. Donohue, Gregory W. Hughes, John E. Shepard, Humphrey, Crawford & Middleton, and Anna Hubbuch Settle, amici curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE THOMAS.

Reversing.

J.H. Taylor, a resident of Atlanta, Ga., conducts a loan business in the city of Covington under the trade-name of "Kentucky Purchasing Company," and two of the local managers and operatives of that business are L.B. Hines and R.C. Reiger. The appellant and defendant below, Joseph P. Goodenough, was and is the duly elected, qualified, and acting police judge of the city of Covington. On September 15, 1930, there was filed with defendant, as police judge of the city of Covington, an affidavit charging Taylor and his two local managers with the common-law offense of criminal conspiracy, growing out of the way and manner that the business of the purchasing agency was managed and conducted, and which the affidavit set out with great detail, and, if true, was in violation of law in several particulars, but which, for reasons hereinafter appearing, we do not deem it necessary to set forth in this opinion. At the same time, or closely following it, an affidavit was filed before defendant to procure a search warrant to search the premises wherein the business of the purchasing agency was conducted to obtain evidence which the applicant for the warrant averred would establish the guilt of the crime charged in the affidavit filed before defendant. The latter issued a warrant of arrest for Taylor and his local managers, and also issued the search warrant asked for, and it was executed as directed therein. The two local managers were also arrested, but Taylor, being a nonresident, was not arrested.

Taylor, with his two local managers, as plaintiffs below, then filed his action in the Kenton circuit court against the appellant and defendant below, as such police judge seeking a writ of prohibition against him to prevent him from investigating the charge preferred against plaintiffs, and to also prohibit him from further proceeding under the search warrant and from considering any of the evidence that was revealed by its execution, all upon the alleged ground that he was proceeding and about to proceed, without jurisdiction. To more fully present the relief sought by the action, we insert the prayer of the petition, which says:

"Wherefore, plaintiffs pray that this court will issue its writ of prohibition or order addressed to the Police Court of the city of Covington, Hon. Joseph E. Goodenough, Judge of the said Court, prohibiting it from proceeding further in the matter of hearing and rendering judgment upon it against plaintiffs, J.H. Taylor, L.B. Hines and R.C. Reiger and directing and ordering that all of the commercial notes, papers, effects, furnishings and other personal property taken from the possession of plaintiffs be surrendered and delivered unto them, and that said Joseph Goodenough, acting as Judge be restrained and prevented from taking any steps or proceedings against plaintiffs, and that on final hearing it be adjudged that Joseph Goodenough as Judge of said Police Court aforesaid and said Court is proceeding beyond its jurisdiction and for all equitable relief to which in equity plaintiff is entitled."

Defendant filed some preliminary motions, including one to strike certain parts of the petition and also a general demurrer to it, the latter of which was overruled by the court, and, defendant declining to plead further, the prohibitive writ as prayed for in the petition was issued, and from that judgment defendant prosecutes this appeal. Before considering the merits of the case, it should be stated that preceding final judgment in the cause the court entered an order directing the return to plaintiffs of the papers and records discovered by the execution of the search warrant, and that question was therefore disposed of before final judgment in the cause.

As we view the record, there is primarily presented only one question for determination, and which is: Has the defendant, as police judge of the city of Covington, jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate upon the facts as preferred in the affidavits? Another question, however has received by far the greater portion of argument of counsel on both sides, and which is subdivided into two inquiries: (a) Whether the facts stated in the affidavit to procure the warrant of arrest, and upon which defendant issued it, constitute the common law offense of conspiracy to obstruct justice and to invade the public policy of the commonwealth; and (b) whether the affidavit for the search warrant was sufficient to create probable cause so as to authorize defendant to issue it? A possible third subdivision might be: Whether the evidence obtained from the execution of the search warrant would be competent against plaintiffs in their trial upon the warrant of arrest that issued for them, although the affidavit for the search warrant and the warrant itself were in conformity with the requirements of the law?

As stated, elaborate arguments are made in briefs upon questions (a) and (b), supra, but, since we have concluded that defendant had jurisdiction to entertain, investigate, and adjudicate upon the facts presented in the two affidavits filed before him, and because of which the Kenton circuit court had no authority to prohibit him from doing so, it becomes unnecessary to determine any of the other stated questions. Not only so, but our indicated conclusion would render it extremely doubtful if we possessed jurisdiction to determine the other questions argued, since the only jurisdiction we possess in this...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT