Goodenow v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 27 April 1869
• Citation: 18 Mich. 298
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Walter Goodenow v. Thomas Curtis

18 Mich. 298

Walter Goodenow v. Thomas Curtis

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 27, 1869

Heard April 17, 1869; April 20, 1869; April 21, 1869 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Appeal in chancery from Calhoun circuit.

The bill was filed to compel the defendant to convey to complainant certain fractional lots in the village of Albion included in an agreement of purchase, but omitted by the defendant in his conveyances, such omission being at the time unknown to the complainant, he supposing they were embraced in the conveyances.

The premises were described in the bill as the "Knapp House property," and known as such.

The defendant, in his answer, denies that said fractional lots were included in said agreement.

A decree was granted as prayed for in the bill.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

T. G. Pray, for complainant:

1. The testimony clearly shows that all the fractional lots were included in the agreement of purchase of the hotel property known as the "Knapp House property," of which they were a portion, and were mainly inclosed as such.

Where the agreement is positively denied by the answer, and is proved only by the unsupported evidence of one witness, that will not be allowed to prevail, but where the one witness is corroborated in his statement by circumstances, the proof may prevail over the denial: Fry on Spec. Per., p. 268, § 422; East India Co. v. Donald, 9 Ves. 276; Morphett v Jones, 1 Sw. 172; Toole v. Medlicott, 1 Ball and B., 393.

2. A court of equity will enforce the specific performance of a parol contract for the conveyance of land, where the purchase money, or a part thereof, has been paid, possession taken under the contract, and valuable improvements made: Burtch v. Hogge, Har. Ch., 31; Bomier v. Caldwell, Id., 65; Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463; Norris v. Showerman, 2 Doug. 16.

3. The testimony clearly shows that defendant knew complainant treated for the entire Knapp House property. He must, therefore, be considered as having fraudulently withheld a conveyance of the parcel in question.

A vendor who fraudulently induces the vendee to believe that he is purchasing a parcel of land of a certain extent, while the conveyance is so drawn as not to include the whole, will be decreed to convey the residue: Wiswell v. Hall, 3 Paige 313.

Chas. Draper and Thos. Curtis, for defendant in error:

1. The bill is for specific performance of a verbal agreement to sell and convey land. The answer denies a sale or agreement to sell and convey. And on this state of the case, it has been held that the complainant must fail, on the ground of the statute of frauds, which requires the contract to be written. To this point we cite Story Eq. Plead., § 762, note 1, and cases cited; Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige 177, 181; Ontario Bank v. Root & Cogdon, Id., 473; 11 Id. 498; Haines v. Knickerbocker, 5 Wend. 638.

The agreement being denied by answer, complainant must show a written contract of sale, unless allegations of fraud are made, or payment and possession under it with improvements made, etc.

2. The complainant, however, in order to take the case without the statute, averred in his bill that fraud was practiced on him by the defendant Curtis, at the time the deeds were delivered; also, that he took possession of the lots he claims, and the defendant gave him that possession, and that he was cheated and deceived by Curtis, in consequence of the confidence he reposed in his (Curtis's) statements, as to what the deeds contained.

The complainant, to sustain his bill as to the frauds, must as clearly prove it. In this case we claim he has entirely failed.

The contradictory and confused statements of the complainant, as to the contract, and more especially as to the fraud alleged, by which he would avoid the statute of frauds, would seem to render it impossible to make any decree in the case: Fry on Spec. Per., §§ 164-5-6-9, note 9; Id., §§ 172, 203, 210, 211; Adams's Eq. Pl., 221.

As to possession: 1 Story Eq. Jur., 173, § 157.

Relief not granted when the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory, or when it is in its texture open to doubt, or apparent presumption: 1 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 158-9; Fry Spec. Per., § 418; Jones v. Tyler, 6 Mich. 368.

The evidence must be entirely satisfactory: 1 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 156, 180; Adams's Eq. Jur., 351.

"Sometimes, by mistake, the written instrument contains less than the parties intended; sometimes it contains more. In all such cases, if the mistake is clearly made out by proofs entirely satisfactory, equity will reform the contract:" 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 152.

This being a case not of mistake, but actual fraud, as claimed in the bill, the fraud must be clearly made out, by proofs entirely satisfactory, etc., and this rule applies to an omission as well as a mistake.

There must be a false statement in a matter in which one party places a known reliance on the other, and confidence in him: 1 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 197, 200.

The party must be misled by the false representation: Id., 202.

If the purchaser, choosing to judge for himself, does not avail himself of the means of knowledge open to him, or his agents, he can not be heard to say that he was deceived by the vendor's misrepresentations: 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 200; Fry on Spec. Perf., 277, 283.

3. As to the question of possession of the disputed property, it only becomes material in case the alleged contract is proved, and the fraud and misrepresentations of the defendant are clearly made out.

Complainant did not obtain it from the defendant Curtis. The delivery of the deeds, at most, only gave him possession of the land described in them, nothing more. As to the point we cite--Adams's Eq., 220, and notes.

OPINION

Graves J.:

The complainant filed his bill in the court below, to compel the defendant to convey to him certain premises in the village of Albion, and which he asserted to be a part of what was known as the "Knapp House property."

The circuit court decreed a conveyance as prayed by the bill, and the defendant appealed to this court. The testimony returned is very voluminous, and we deem it unnecessary to notice it in detail.

It appears that when the village of Albion was first platted, a parcel of land between Ionia and Superior streets, and running from the Kalamazoo river to an alley one rod in width along the south side of block thirty-three, was reserved by the proprietors, and set apart from sale for mill purposes; that afterwards, the northerly part, next to block thirty-three, was devoted to other uses, while the Michigan Central railroad was so laid as to cut off a corner of lot two in block thirty-three, and a large portion of the parcel which had been so reserved. This left the triangular piece marked seven, eight and nine, as on the second plat given in the record.

It also appears that from about 1858, when Gilbert Knapp purchased the triangular piece of one Chatfield, to the time of the bargain between complainant and defendant, in September 1865, the lots one, two, three and four, on block thirty-three, and the parcel in question were held and occupied together as one possession and establishment; that the lots three and four, and the piece in dispute, together with the alley between, were fenced as one inclosure, and used and enjoyed with the lots one...