Goodgeon v. Stuart
| Decision Date | 28 January 1929 |
| Docket Number | No. 848.,848. |
| Citation | 144 A. 670 |
| Parties | GOODGEON v. STUART et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Case Certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties.
Bill by William H. Goodgeon against Elizabeth A. Stuart for partition of real property. Certified from Superior Court under Gen. Laws 1923, c. 339, § 35. Decree in accordance with opinion.
Edward A. Stockwell, of Providence, R. I., for complainant.
Edwards & Angell, Edward DeV. O'Connor and Edward G. O'Connor, both of Providence, R. I., for respondent Eaton.
Edward P. Jastram and Gurney Edwards, both of Providence, R. I., for other respondents.
This is a bill for partition of real estate. The property has been sold, and the proceeds are held in the registry of the superior court pending the determination of the respective shares of the parties. Such determination involves the construction of the will of the late Charles H. Childs. The superior court in accordance with provisions of section 35, c. 339, G. L. 1923, certified the cause to this court for determination.
By said will Charles H. Childs devised an undivided one-half interest in said real estate in trust to pay the income therefrom to his widow, Abigail G. Childs, during her lifetime, and upon her death equally to his four children, Charles H. Childs, Jr., Arvedina H. Childs, Clara T. Childs, and William H. Childs, during their respective lives, and upon their respective deaths to divide the principal of their shares among such of their respective children, if more than one, as should survive the testator, and his, her, and their heirs and assigns forever, and, in case any of the said children should die without leaving children or issue living at his or her decease, then to hold his or her share original as well as accruing upon the trusts declared concerning the other shares, and, "in case of the failure of all the limitations and objects of the preceding trusts In Trust for my own right heirs forever."
The widow has deceased, and all four children died intestate, unmarried, and without issue. There being a failure "of all the limitations and objects of the preceding trusts," the estate belongs to the testator's "right heirs."
The question is whether by the limitation, "own right heirs forever," the testator intended to designate (1) the persons who were his legal heirs at the time of his death, namely, his four children; or (2) the persons who would have been his heirs had he deceased at the time of the death of his last surviving child.
If it was the testator's intention that his "heirs" should be determined as of the date of his death, his four children took vested interests, which were subject to being divested. If his "heirs" are to be determined as of the date of the decease of his last surviving child, such "heirs" take only contingent interests.
It is has been frequently stated that "the law favors the vesting of estates, and if the intention of testator be doubtful a legacy will if possible be held to be vested rather than contingent." In re Norris, 46 R. I. 57, 125 A. 81.
At the present time the terms "right heirs" and "heirs" are synonymous. Kenyon, Petitioner, 17 R. I. 163, 20 A. 294; 29 C. J. 344. An heir is one on whom the local law of descent casts the inheritance on the ancestor's death. 29 C. J. 291. The testator's heirs, speaking technically, were his four children. The testator uses the word "heirs," a word which has a well-known legal meaning, and, unless something appears to clearly indicate a different intention, it must be presumed that he used the word in its ordinary legal sense.
In Stokes v. Van Wyck, 83 Va. 724, 3 S. E. 387, a testator devised real estate to his daughter for life, remainder in fee to her issue, and, in default thereof, to his own right heirs. At the testator's death said daughter was his only heir. It was held that the daughter took a vested remainder, which would have been divested if she had left issue.
In Kenyon, Petitioner, supra, A devised his entire...
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Starrett v. Botsford, 1459.
...his will, it is presumed, in the absence of a clearly indicated contrary intent in the will, that he used it in that sense. Goodgeon v. Stuart, 50 R.I. 6, 144 A. 670. And it has also been by this court that: "Under the well-established rules of construction the word 'heirs' is held to refer......
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Hay v. Hay
...in its ordinary legal sense; an ‘heir’ being one on whom local law of descent casts inheritance on the ancestor's death.' Goodgeon v. Stuart, 50 R. I. 6, 144 A. 670, cited in Words and Phrases, Perm.Ed., vol. 19, p. 257. ‘An heir is one who receives, inherits, or is entitled to succeed to t......
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Champagne v. Fortin
...testator intended that those answering the description of his heirs should be determined at a time other than his death. Goodgeon v. Stuart, 50 R.I. 6, 144 A. 670. But this modification of the general rule is dependent for its application upon testamentary language before the court for cons......
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Carpenter v. Smith
...was vested but was subject to the life estate of the Drown sisters. Kenyon, Petitioner, 17 R.I. 149, 164, 20 A. 294; Goodgeon v. Stuart, 50 R.I. 6, 144 A. 670; Starrett v. Botsford, 64 R.I. 1, 9 A.2d However, one of the respondents Maude E. Sparne, an heir at law and next of kin of Mabel Wa......