Goodhue v. Ballard

• Decision Date: 04 March 1937
• Citation: 191 A. 101,122 Conn. 542
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GOODHUE v. BALLARD.

191 A. 101

122 Conn. 542

GOODHUE v. BALLARD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 4, 1937

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.

Action by Amy S. Goodhue against Mary M. Ballard to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. From a decision setting aside a verdict of the jury for the plaintiff, the plaintiff appeals.

Error and judgment directed for the plaintiff upon the verdict.

John Keogh, Jr., and John Keogh, both of South Norwalk, for appellant.

Maurice J. Buckley, of Stamford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN JJ.

BROWN, Judge.

The only error alleged upon this appeal is the setting aside by the trial court of the verdict as contrary to the evidence. The court ruled that the undisputed testimony of the plaintiff's son, driver of the car in which she was riding when it collided in a street intersection with the defendant's car, clearly established that his negligence and not that of the defendant was the substantial factor causing the accident, and that therefore the verdict was so manifestly unjust as to show that the jury failed to apply, as was its duty, the legal principles given it by the court.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the jury might reasonably have found these material facts. At about 6:45 p. m. on December 14, 1935, the automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger, owned and driven by her son, as it proceeded easterly on North street in Stamford, collided with the defendant's car as she drove it northerly on Hubbard avenue, at a point just east of the middle of the intersection of the two streets. After the impact the two cars came to rest at the northeasterly corner of the intersection, the Goodhue car with its left side against the curb and heading slightly southeast, and the defendant's car headed into the right side of it just back of the middle. The plaintiff was thrown out and injured. The defendant's car was a sedan and considerably heavier than the Goodhue car, which was a coupe. For quite a distance before arriving at the intersection, each driver had a view across the southwest corner of the other car as it was approaching, obstructed only in places by tree trunks, and by a brick pier, a light pole, and a letter box near the corner. It was dark, and the street light on this pole was lighted. It was a clear, dry night. The streets as they lead into the intersection are from 24 to 32 feet wide, and practically level. They are hardsurfaced, and intersect at right angles.

The plaintiff's son, as he drove his car, with brakes in good condition and headlights lighted, at a speed of at least 20 miles per hour toward the intersection, at a point a considerable distance west of it saw the lights of the defendant's car 200 feet south of it, approaching at a very fast rate. Upon reaching the intersection, without having watched or again looked at the defendant's car, and without having reduced the speed of his own car, he assumed that he could drive through without a collision, and continued on at the same speed. He next noticed the defendant's car when near the center of the intersection just before the impact, and as he veered left to avoid it, the front of it crashed into the right side of his car. The defendant, as she drove her car toward the intersection, with brakes in good condition and headlights lighted, proceeded at a speed of from 35 to 40 miles per hour. As she continued on through it, she did not reduce her speed, and at no time until she was well out into the intersection and the Goodhue car was right in front of her, did she see its lights or become conscious of its approach. In the same instant the collision occurred.

Upon these facts it is apparent that the jury as reasonable men were warranted in concluding that the defendant was negligent in operating at excessive speed under the circumstances, in failing to keep her car under proper control, and in failing to keep a proper lookout, and further that this negligence was a substantial factor in producing the collision. Their conclusion so reached, the court could not disturb. Lewis v. Healy, 73 Conn. 136, 138, 46 A. 869; Porcello v Finnan, 113 Conn. 730, 733, 156 A. 863. Whether the jury could properly have found that the ...