Goodlow v. Colvin, Case No. 3:13-cv-01396-SI
Decision Date | 24 September 2014 |
Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-01396-SI |
Parties | LORI JEAN GOODLOW, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Lisa R.J. Porter, KP LAW LLC, 16200 SW Pacific Hwy, Suite H-280, Portland, OR 97224. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff.
S. Amanda Marshall, United States Attorney, and Ronald K. Silver, Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF OREGON, 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600, Portland, OR 97204; Richard M. Rodriguez, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A, Seattle, WA 98104. Of Attorneys for Defendant.
Lori Jean Goodlow seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II and supplemental security income ("SSI") under TitleXVI of the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on the proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Bray v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). It means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039).
Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner' s conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's interpretation is a rational reading of the record, and this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Batson v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). "[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). A reviewing court, however, may not affirm the Commissioner on a ground upon which the Commissioner did not rely. Id.; see also Bray, 554 F.3d at 1226.
Plaintiff was born on July 28, 1970 and is 44 years old. She filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income on October 29, 2009, alleging a disability onset date of December 5, 2005. AR 21. Plaintiff alleged disability based on bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, degenerative joint disease of the left knee, carpal tunnel syndrome, schizophrenia, left hip pain, gastroesophageal reflux and a history of drug and alcohol abuse. AR 23. The claim was denied initially on April 9, 2010, and upon reconsideration on December 31, 2010. AR 21. An administrative hearing was held before an ALJ on August 10, 2011. Id. The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim, finding that she was not disabled, as defined under the Social Security Act, at any time from December 5, 2005, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2010, the date last insured. AR 23. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final and entitling Plaintiff to review by this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). AR. 21.
A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). "Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." Keyser v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (DIB), 416.920 (SSI); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). Each step is potentially dispositive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The five-step sequential process asks the following series of questions:
3. Does the claimant's severe impairment "meet or equal" one or more of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, then the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment does not meet or equal one or more of the listed impairments, the analysis continues. At that point, the ALJ must evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to assess and determine the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC"). This is an assessment of work-related activities that the claimant may still perform on a regular and continuing basis, despite any limitations imposed by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(b)-(c), 416.920(e), 416.945(b)-(c). After the ALJ determines the claimant's RFC, the analysis proceeds to step four.
4. Can the claimant perform his or her "past relevant work" with this RFC assessment? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
5. Considering the claimant's RFC and age, education, and work experience, is the claimant able to make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1560(c), 416.960(c). If the claimant cannot perform such work, he or she is disabled. Id.
See also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Id. at 953; see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999); Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41. The Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, "taking into consideration the claimant' s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience." Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966 ( ). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If, however, the Commissioner proves that the claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54; Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2010. AR 23. The ALJ then applied the sequential analysis. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after the alleged onset date of December 5, 2005. Id. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: "bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, degenerative joint disease of the left knee, carpal tunnel syndrome, and history of drug and alcohol abuse." Id. The ALJ found that other symptoms and complaints in Plaintiff's medical records, including schizophrenia, left hip pain, and gastroesophageal reflux, were unsupported by acceptable medical documentation. AR 24. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in the relevant regulations. Id.
The ALJ next assessed Plaintiff's RFC. The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the following RFC:
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: stand and walk two hours at a time and six hours in an eight-hour workday; sit two hours at a time and eight hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; understand, remember, and perform simple and detailed - but not complex - tasks, consistent with SVP 1 or SVP 2; no more than superficial, infrequent public contact; work in proximity to co-workers, but not in a team or tandem setting; moderate noise level in the environment; and no work in a fast-paced environment...
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