Goodman v. Albany Transport, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-CV-2022 (LEK/DRH).,96-CV-2022 (LEK/DRH). |
| Citation | 103 F.Supp.2d 112 |
| Parties | Randall J. GOODMAN, Plaintiff, v. ALBANY TRANSPORT, INC.; Commercial Labor Services, Inc., Defendants. Albany Transport, Inc., Cross-Claimant, v. Commercial Labor Services, Inc., Cross-Defendant. Commercial Labor Services, Inc., Cross-Claimant, v. Albany Transport, Inc., Cross-Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Office of Joseph Hein, Altamont, NY, Joseph Hein, of counsel, for plaintiff.
Wayne M. Davis, P.C., Albany, NY, Wayne M. Davis, of counsel, for defendant Albany Transport, Inc.
Willacy, LoPresti & Marcovy, Cleveland, OH, Salvatore J. LoPresti, of counsel, for defendant Commercial Labor Services, Inc.
The court here addresses the problem of the proper disposition of a summary judgment motion for which the Movant failed to submit a timely statement of material facts, an ommission that would ordinarily render the motion fatally defective. At the same time, a summary judgment motion by the other Defendant calls on the Court to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact regarding which Defendant actually employed (and discharged) Plaintiff, whether the Movant was aware of Plaintiff's wife's medical expenses; and, even if it was aware, whether statutory protections shielded Plaintiff's employer from adverse consequences of high health insurance claims, thereby eliminating the employer's purported improper motivation for discharging Plaintiff. Finally, the Court must determine whether it is appropriate to grant one Defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgment against the other Defendant's cross-claim for contribution and indemnification.
Plaintiff Mr Randall J. Goodman brings this action claiming Defendants have discriminated against him by discharging him from his employment at Defendant Albany Transport, Inc. ("Albany Transport" or "ATI"), because of the costs of his wife's medical treatments. He claims causes of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and its implementing regulations ( citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343(a)(4) (civil rights). Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of a declaration that Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights under the ADA and federal regulations, compensatory and punitive damages of $300,000, an award of costs, disbursements and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205, and such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Defendant Albany Transport has filed a cross-claim against co-Defendant Commercial Labor Services, Inc. ("Commercial Labor" or "CLS") for indemnification or contribution, including attorney's fees and costs and disbursements, asserting that Commercial Labor was Plaintiff's employer, that any damages sustained by Plaintiff resulted from Commercial Labor's conduct, and that Commercial Labor has agreed to hold Albany Transport harmless in all actions by Commercial Labor employees. (See ATI Answer at 2 ¶¶ 7-10 (Doc. 4, 10 Mar. 1997).) Commercial Labor has filed a cross-claim against Albany Transport, asserting that Albany Transport made the decision — if any was indeed made — to discharge Plaintiff, and is thus solely liable for any damages arising therefrom; and that if the Court or trier of fact does deem Commercial Labor liable to Plaintiff, then Commercial Labor has a right of indemnification or contribution against Albany transport, against which CLS also requests the recovery of attorney's fees and costs and disbursements of this action. (See Answer of CLS to Pl.'s Compl., and Cross-Claim Against ATI at 3-4 ¶¶ 13-14 (Doc. 7, 27 Mar. 1997).)
Now before the Court are two motions for summary judgment. Defendant Albany Transport moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). (See ATI Notice Mot. (Doc. 25, 23 Jan. 1998).) Defendant Commercial Labor moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it, and for summary judgment dismissing Albany Transport's cross-claim against it, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. (See Def. CLS's Notice Mot.Summ.J. (Doc. 31, 26 Jan. 1998).)
A. Standards of Decision
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). (Black, J.) In assessing the sufficiency of a pleading, "all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true," LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991), and all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); see also Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1099 (2d Cir.1988), (applying the principles of construing inferences in favor of plaintiff) cert. denied sub nom. Soifer v. Bankers Trust Co., 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1642, 104 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989).
[C]onsideration is limited to the factual allegations in [the] complaint, which are accepted as true, to documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference, to matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or to documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.
Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993).
The Rules do not require the plaintiff to set out in detail the facts upon which the claim is based, but only that a defendant be given "fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. Individual allegations, however, that are so baldly conclusory that they fail to give notice of the basic events and circumstances of which the plaintiff complains are meaningless as a practical matter and, as a matter of law, insufficient to state a claim. See Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir.1987) ().
Summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir.1991). (Oakes, C.J.) The moving party carries the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir.1990). Facts, inferences therefrom, and ambiguities must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 968 (2d Cir.1983). A genuine issue is an issue that, if resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would permit a jury to return a verdict for that party. R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
When the moving party has met the burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. At that point, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. To withstand a summary judgment motion, evidence must exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Thus, summary judgment is proper where there is "little or no evidence ... in support of the non-moving party's case." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994).
Summary judgment is usually unwarranted when the defendant's state of mind is at issue. Clements v. Nassau County, 835 F.2d 1000, 1005 (2d Cir.1987). In order to raise a fact issue regarding state of mind, however, there must be solid circumstantial evidence to prove plaintiff's case. Id. "Mere conclusory allegations, speculation or conjecture will not avail a party resisting summary judgment." Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1996).
The Court addresses the motions on the basis of these standards.
Defendant Albany Transport's motion seeks "to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 56." (ATI Notice Mot. at 1.) Rule 56 governs summary judgment, and the Court will proceed on the understanding that this is a motion for summary judgment, subject to the laws and rules pertaining to summary judgment.
At the time this motion was filed, actions in the Northern District were subject to the version of the Local Rules that had been amended 1 January 1997. Summary judgment motions were governed by L.R. 7.1(f), which read:
On all motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, there shall be annexed to the notice of motion a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue, with specific citations to the record where such facts are set...
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