Goodman v. Continental Cas. Co.
Decision Date | 29 May 1996 |
Citation | 918 P.2d 438,141 Or.App. 379 |
Parties | Roy GOODMAN, Jr., Respondent, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO., Appellant. 9406-04195; CA A88824. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
John R. Faust, Jr., Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt.
Garry L. Kahn, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief was Kathryn H. Clarke.
Before DEITS, P.J., and De MUNIZ and HASELTON, JJ.
Defendant Continental Casualty Co. appeals from the trial court's judgment that awarded plaintiff Roy Goodman damages on his action for breach of an insurance contract. We reverse and remand.
This case concerns a dispute over defendant's discontinuation of disability insurance benefits for injuries plaintiff suffered while working as a legal investigator in August 1968. The material facts are uncontroverted: Between 1955 and 1968, plaintiff was employed by a Portland law firm as a legal investigator. Between 15 and 20 percent of plaintiff's assignments involved investigating the circumstances of maritime-related personal injuries, which, on occasion, required him to climb into the lower holds of vessels.
Sometime before August 22, 1968, plaintiff purchased two policies of insurance from defendant. The first (policy # 23596035) provided that defendant would pay benefits of $500 per month in the event that plaintiff was totally disabled as the result of "injury" or "sickness or disease." If plaintiff was disabled because of "injury," benefits would continue throughout his lifetime. If, however, disability was the result of "sickness or disease," benefits would terminate at age 65. That policy defined the operative terms as follows:
In contrast to the first policy, the second (policy # 5-A-5116) provided that, in the event of disability from either "injury" or "sickness or disease," plaintiff was to receive payments of (an additional) $200 a month for up to two years.
On August 22, 1968, after working a full day, plaintiff was contacted around midnight and asked to investigate an accident involving a longshoreman who had been injured in the lower hold of a docked ship. Thereafter, plaintiff descended an 80-foot ladder into the vessel's hold, while carrying a 60-pound equipment bag. After completing his investigation, plaintiff ascended the ladder and, as he approached the top, experienced sudden and extreme chest pain, accompanied by sweating and weakness. He hung onto the ladder for a few minutes until he could maneuver himself over the edge of the ship hatch onto the deck. A doctor determined that plaintiff had suffered a heart attack. Ultimately, that incident rendered plaintiff totally disabled and prevented him from returning to work.
Plaintiff subsequently filed claims for disability benefits under both of the disability insurance policies defendant had issued. In filing those claims, plaintiff stated that his disabling condition was the result of an "injury." In response to plaintiff's claim under the second policy, defendant notified plaintiff that his claim for an "injury" had been given "favorable consideration." In addition, in response to plaintiff's claim under the first policy, defendant began to pay plaintiff $500 a month; in doing so, however, defendant did not either dispute or specifically accept plaintiff's characterization of his condition as resulting from an "injury."
Defendant paid plaintiff $500 per month under the first policy from 1968 until 1994. 1 In 1994, defendant discontinued the benefits, contending that the coverage had been for "sickness" and not "injury," and that, thus, benefits ended when plaintiff turned 65, in 1994.
Plaintiff brought this action, alleging that, because his on-the-job heart attack constituted an "injury," defendant had breached the parties' contract by terminating benefits at age 65, rather than continuing them throughout his lifetime. Plaintiff sought damages of $90,000, as well as attorney fees. The complaint did not plead estoppel, based on the parties' 26-year course of dealings.
At trial, defendant asserted that the question of whether plaintiff's heart attack was an "injury" within the meaning of the first policy was controlled by Botts v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 284 Or. 95, 585 P.2d 657 (1978). In Botts, as amplified below, the court held that an on-the-job heart attack is "accidental" for purposes of disability insurance coverage if "the job-related activity leading to a victim's heart attack was abnormal and unusual, taking into consideration the ordinary requirements of his job performance." Id. at 103, 585 P.2d 657.
At trial, plaintiff introduced, inter alia, a copy of the first policy (# 23596035) and copies of correspondence concerning plaintiff's claims under both policies and defendant's processing of those claims. Plaintiff did not, however, introduce a copy of the second policy (# 5-A-5116). 2 Plaintiff was the only witness. In addition to describing the particular circumstances of the heart attack and defendant's subsequent payment of benefits, he offered the following testimony:
After the close of evidence, the trial court expressed its belief that However, the trial court expressed concern about the fact that defendant had, in fact, paid benefits under the first policy for approximately 26 years, and invited further briefing on that issue.
The parties subsequently submitted post-trial memoranda. 3 Concurrently, plaintiff moved to reopen his case to introduce as an exhibit an excerpt of an insurance policy, which plaintiff asserted included operative terms and definitions that were identical to those of the missing second policy (# 5-A-5116). Plaintiff contended that that exhibit showed that the definition of "injury" in the second policy was identical to the definition of "injury" in the first policy and, thus, that because defendant had accepted plaintiff's condition as an "injury" under the second policy, his condition was, necessarily, an "injury" for purposes of coverage under the first (now disputed) policy.
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to reopen and, based in part on the newly proffered exhibit, held that defendant had breached the insurance policy. In so holding, the court concluded that Botts was materially distinguishable and that the parties' post-casualty course of dealing evinced a mutual understanding that plaintiff's condition was the result of an accidental "injury" within the first policy's coverage:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Apeldyn Corp. v. Eidos, LLC
...in relation to the agreement is instructive in our determination of what must have been intended.”))); Goodman v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 141 Or.App. 379, 918 P.2d 438, 443 (1996) (parties' performance is persuasive evidence of meaning). In the absence of any such direct or circumstantial evidence......
-
Complete Distribution Servs., Inc. v. All States Transp., LLC
...themselves in relation to the agreement is instructive in our determination of what must have been intended."); Goodman v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 141 Or. App. 379, 389 (1996) (parties' performance is persuasive evidence of meaning). In the absence of both direct and circumstantial evidence of the......
-
North Clackamas School Dist. No. 12 v. OSBA
...meaning of "accident" as used in OSBA's general liability policy is well-established and unambiguous. See Goodman v. Continental Casualty Co., 141 Or.App. 379, 389, 918 P.2d 438, rev. den. 324 Or. 305, 925 P.2d 909 (1996) ("matter of law" construction of "accidental" injury in prior case co......
-
Black & Veatch Constr. Inc. v. Jh Kelly LLC
...the Settlement Agreement, 6 or of the parties' conduct after they executed the settlement agreement.7See Goodman v. ContinentalCas. Co., 141 Or. App. 379, 918 P.2d 438 (1996) (parties' performance is persuasive evidence of meaning); Yogman, 325 Or. at 364 (the parties' "practical constructi......