Goodman v. Dist. Of D.C..
| Decision Date | 23 January 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 434.,434. |
| Citation | 50 A.2d 812 |
| Parties | GOODMAN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Criminal Division.
M. Harold Goodman was convicted of violating the Baby Broker's Law, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Joseph A. Kaufmann, of Washington, D. C. (F. Joseph Donohue and Milton S. Kronheim, Jr., both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Edward A. Beard, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Washington, D. C. (Vernon E. West, Corp. Counsel, and Chester H. Gray, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.
Appellant, who is a practicing lawyer, was found guilty of violating the so-called Baby Broker's Law. Code 1940, §§ 32-781 to 32-789. He appeals.
Appellant was associated as counsel for a woman who was separated from her husband and who was being sued for divorce in Rhode Island on the ground of adultery. She was eager that the divorce be granted and so she was advised to let the case go by default. At their first conference she revealed that she was pregnant by a man other than her husband, and asked appellant to find someone who would provide a good home for her child when born, and adopt it. He advised her to go to a welfare agency or to a certain infants' home of her religious denomination. She rejected this advice because she had herself been in an orphanage and did not wish her child brought up in such an institution; she insisted on having it placed in a private home.
Appellant told her that if he heard of any suitable potential foster parents he would let her know. She phoned him persistently at his home and office several times a week to inquire if he knew of anyone who would take her child. Finally when she called him about two months before the child was born he told her that he had learned of a couple interested in adopting the child, and he would have them contact her; she told him she preferred to remain anonymous and did not want to know the names of the prospective parents. Thereupon, as the transcript recites, appellant ‘offered to talk to the prospective adopters, report to her, and to otherwise conclude the matter for her so that the parties would not have to meet face to face.’ And so it was agreed that appellant should come to the hospital after the confinement and arrange for the transfer of the child. The mother had in the meantime instructed the hospital to permit the couple to see the child. The couple had through their own physician obtained from the mother's physician a satisfactory report as to her physical condition. After the child was born appellant took a release agreement to the hospital which he read to the mother in the presence of two of her friends and which she willingly signed. When she was ready to leave the hospital, appellant went there, took the child from her, and physically delivered it to the adopting father who was waiting at the front door of the hospital, while the mother left by a side door. The couple later adopted the child through court proceedings in Maryland.
Appellant charged the mother nothing in the divorce case and refused to accept any fee for his services in connection with placing the child for adoption. He did, however, accept about one-third of $294.90, which he had collected from the adopting couple to cover the mother's medical expenses.
The mother later changed her mind and sought appellant's services in regaining custody of the child. He refused, saying that he ‘could not accept such an assignment in good conscience and that the child had probably been adopted.’ Not long afterwards a complaint was filed against appellant with the Board of Public Welfare on the ground that he had no license to place children for adoption. Such complaint resulted in the prosecution and conviction which are here under review.
The Act under which appellant was prosecuted was passed early in 1944 and was the culmination of many years of struggle on the part of social agencies and others to put an end to the unregulated transfer, placing and brokerage of babies and the social evils which resulted therefrom. Until that time this was one of the very few jurisdictions in which there was no control over such activities.
The Act is comprehensive in nature and expresses the purpose of Congress to secure for children under sixteen who are placed in family homes other than their own or those of relatives, the best care and guidance, so as to serve the welfare of such children and the best interests of the community. To accomplish that purpose Congress prohibited the operation of any child-placing agency by anyone not specifically licensed for that purpose by the Commissioners. It authorized the Board of Public Welfare to investigate applicants for licenses and if found to meet certain requirements set out in the statute, to recommend them to the Commissioners. To prevent ‘careless placement of babies for adoption, without adequate consideration of the interests of the parents, the children, and the adopting parents,' 1 Congress wrote into the Act this provision:
‘Any person, firm, corporation, association, or public agency that receives or accepts a child under sixteen years of age and places or offers to place such child for temporary or permanent care in a family home other than that of a relative within the third degree shall be deemed to be maintaining a child-placing agency.’ Code 1940, § 32-782.
and followed it with this later provision:
‘No person other than the parent, guardian, or relative within the third degree, and no firm, corporation, association, or agency, other than a licensed child-placing agency, may place or arrange or assist in placing or arranging for the placement of a child under sixteen years of age in a family home or for adoption.’ Code 1940, § 32-785.
The purpose of Congress in enacting this legislation is of course our first point of inquiry, 2 for that purpose is traceable to the evils it sought to correct. 3 It was brought to the attention of Congress in hearings before committees of both the House and Senate, 4 that a flourishing business was operating in the District, supplying the demand for children wanted for adoption. At the hearings it was emphasized that the placement of children for adoption could not be expected to succeed without a...
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Petition of Gally
...a child for adoption is subject to a penalty. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 210, § 11A, as appearing in St.1950, c. 737, § 6. Goodman v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 50 A.2d 812. See also In re Adoption of Jaren, 223 Minn. 561, 27 N.W.2d 656; In re Adoption of Anderson, Minn.; 2 Matter of Hurter,......
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Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 3248.
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