Goodman v. Parwatikar

• Decision Date: 27 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1113C(4).,76-1113C(4).
• Citation: 431 F. Supp. 1250
• Parties: Mortimer GOODMAN, Guardian of the person and estate of Rachel Goodman (an incompetent), Individually and as member of a class of mental patients who are presently hospitalized and have been hospitalized in the St. Louis State Hospital for mental treatment, Plaintiffs, v. Dr. Sadashiv D. PARWATIKAR, Individually, and as acting superintendent of St. Louis State Hospital, Mary H. Sandall, Individually, and as clinical director of St. Louis State Hospital and the St. Louis State Hospital, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

431 F. Supp. 1250

Mortimer GOODMAN, Guardian of the person and estate of Rachel Goodman (an incompetent), Individually and as member of a class of mental patients who are presently hospitalized and have been hospitalized in the St. Louis State Hospital for mental treatment, Plaintiffs, v. Dr. Sadashiv D. PARWATIKAR, Individually, and as acting superintendent of St. Louis State Hospital, Mary H. Sandall, Individually, and as clinical director of St. Louis State Hospital and the St. Louis State Hospital, Defendants.

No. 76-1113C(4).

United States District Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D.

May 27, 1977.

Louis Gilden, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Daniel P. Card, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Mo., Jefferson City, Mo., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

NANGLE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon a variety of motions filed by all defendants herein. Plaintiff, as guardian of the person and estate of Rachel Goodman, brought this suit individually and as a class representative, seeking injunctive and monetary relief. Jurisdiction herein is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Defendants are Dr. Sadashiv D. Parwatikar, Acting Superintendent of the St. Louis State Hospital, Dr. Mary H. Sandall, Clinical Director of the St. Louis State Hospital, and the St. Louis State Hospital. In Count I of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that Rachel Goodman has been a patient at St. Louis State Hospital at various times from 1965 to present; that each time, she was prematurely released; that in 1974 and 1976, she was rejected for treatment; that she suffered physical and mental abuse because she was unable to care for herself; and that she has been placed in boarding houses by defendants although said boarding houses have inadequate medical treatment, custodial care and supervision. Plaintiff alleges that these actions violate constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count II of the complaint, against the same defendants, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that § 202.787, R.S.Mo. (1969) violates the Fourteenth Amendment. This section provides:

The head of the hospital shall discharge any voluntary patient who has recovered or whose hospitalization he determines to be no longer advisable. He may discharge any voluntary patient if to do so would, in the judgment of the head of the hospital, contribute to the most effective use of the hospital in the care and treatment of the mentally ill.

Plaintiff contends that the second sentence of this section violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the decision to discharge need not be "based on the need to care and treat the mentally ill". Plaintiff further alleges that the criteria "effective use of the hospital" is constitutionally impermissible since "the constitutional right to medical treatment is paramount over effective use of the hospital". Plaintiff further alleges that the statute places total discretion in the head of the hospital without providing standards for the exercise of the same and that therefore the law is vague and overbroad.

From the briefs and documents submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the various motions filed by defendants, it appears that Rachel Goodman was at all times a voluntary patient at the St. Louis State Hospital, although she has since been adjudged incompetent. It further appears that the allegations of physical and mental abuse resulting from Ms. Goodman's inability to care for herself are based on physical and mental abuse suffered not in the Hospital but at times of release. It also appears that Dr. Parwatikar did not become Superintendent of the Hospital until 1976.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the St. Louis State Hospital, contending that the Hospital is an entity of the state and cannot be sued. Additionally, defendants contend that the Hospital, as an entity of the state, is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus there is no jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Court reviewed the legislative history of that act which is presently 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and concluded that the word "person" as used in the act did not include municipalities. Since that decision, courts have held that city agencies, and school districts, are not persons within the meaning of § 1983. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Martin v. Davison, 322 F.Supp. 318 (W.D.Pa.1971); Ransom v. City of Philadelphia, 311 F.Supp. 973 (E.D.Pa.1970). In Bennett v. People of the State of California, 406 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966, 89 S.Ct. 1320, 22 L.Ed.2d 568 (1969), the court held that state agencies are also not persons within the meaning of § 1983. Accord, Sykes v. State of California (Department of Motor Vehicles), 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974); Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 F.Supp. 454 (E.D.Pa.1973); Duisen v. Administrator & Staff, Fulton State Hospital No. 1, Fulton, Missouri, 332 F.Supp. 125 (W.D.Mo.1971). In Williford v. People of the State of California, 352 F.2d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 1965), the court noted

A municipal corporation is but a political subdivision of a state, and if a state's political subdivisions are not "persons" under the statute, then neither is the state.

This Court agrees and concludes that the St. Louis State Hospital is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

Plaintiff, however, has also asserted 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a jurisdictional basis. Defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the Hospital. The Court agrees. It is clear that a state may not be sued without its consent. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S.Ct. 368, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), it was held that suits against state officials to enjoin violations of constitutional rights were not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment. See also, Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). The State Hospital, however, is not a state official; it is an arm of the state itself. It is the Court's opinion that the Hospital does not fall within the exception stated in Ex parte Young, supra, and accordingly, must be dismissed from the suit.

Defendants also seek to dismiss the two individual defendants, claiming that they have a qualified governmental immunity thus barring liability for damages; that any damages recovered would be paid from the state treasury and thus the action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and that the complaint fails to allege any specific conduct by a particular defendant and that the doctrine of respondeat superior can not apply herein.

Ordinarily, an individual will not be held liable under § 1983 unless he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973); Hopkins v. Hall, 372 F.Supp. 182 (E.D.Okl.1974); Duisen v. Administrator & Staff, Fulton State Hospital No. 1, Fulton, Missouri, supra; Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, supra. It appears, however, that when the alleged deprivations are part of a policy or practice, rather than an isolated incident, the requirement of personal involvement diminishes. See Floyd v. Trice, 490 F.2d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 1974), a racial discrimination case, in which the court stated:

The specific allegation in the complaint is that E. D. Trice was the school district's chief administrative officer and the more general allegations connecting all of the defendants with the alleged discriminatory policies are sufficient when read together to withstand the objection that the complaint fails to state a claim against him upon which relief can be granted. Indeed, the Superintendent of Schools is a proper party when it is alleged that the schools which he heads are guilty of discriminatory policies. cite omitted This is not to say that a school superintendent is ordinarily responsible for individual acts of discrimination committed by teachers or employees. It is only to say that when discriminatory policies are alleged, the plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to prove discrimination and that the defendant superintendent is wholly or partially responsible for the alleged violations of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

See also, Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974); Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, supra. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to preclude dismissal of the individual defendants for failure to state a claim as to them.

The immunity granted to a public official acting in the course of his duties is qualified. Liability exists

if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the .. individual affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the ... individual.... A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

See also, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975); Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121 (1st Cir. 1976). Because of the serious doubts which the Court has with reference to the claimed deprivations of...