Goodman v. Sapp
Decision Date | 15 April 1889 |
Citation | 9 S.E. 483,102 N.C. 477 |
Parties | GOODMAN et al. v. SAPP et al. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, Cabarrus county; BROWN, Judge.
Special proceeding by J. P. Goodman and others against T. H. Sapp and others. Defendants appeal.
It is within the discretion of the court to permit counsel in the argument to state that the adverse party, who was not sworn was in court, and had the right to contradict certain testimony, and did not avail himself of the opportunity.
W. J Montgomery, for appellants.
Lee S Overman and Paul B. Means, for appellees.
This was a special proceeding commenced before the clerk of the superior court of Cabarrus county for sale of land for partition, and heard before BROWN, J., at January term, 1889, of the superior court in term, upon issues presented by the complaint and answer. The complaint alleges that Katie Safrit died in 1882, seised and possessed of the land in controversy, and that the plaintiffs and defendants (other than Peter Cruse) are her heirs at law, upon whom the said real estate descended, and that Peter Cruse claims title in fee under a pretended deed from Thomas H. Sapp to a portion of the land described. The defendants Thomas H. Sapp and Sarah, his wife, answer, denying all the allegations of the complaint, and alleging that the defendant Sarah Sapp is the sole owner in fee of said land, except a portion named, which they say is owned by their codefendant, Cruse. The defendant Cruse answers, and claims to be the sole owner in fee of the portion of said land described in his answer. Upon the trial before his honor, the defendants moved to dismiss the action, "upon the ground that it was apparent upon the pleadings that the clerk did not have jurisdiction." "His honor intimated that the clerk did not have jurisdiction of the matter in controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendant Cruse, whereupon the action was dismissed as to the defendant Cruse, and the land claimed by him," and his honor held that the court had jurisdiction as to the other defendants. The defendants excepted. Whether his honor erred in ruling that the clerk had no jurisdiction as to the defendant Cruse we are not called upon to determine. The plaintiffs did not appeal.
We think it clear that the court had jurisdiction as to the other defendants. McBryde v. Patterson, 73 N.C. 478. Whatever may be the construction to be placed upon chapter 276 of the Acts of 1887, the action ought not to have been dismissed, and there was no error in his honor's ruling of which the defendants can complain. This disposes of the first exception.
The following issues were submitted: The defendants offered in evidence a deed from Katie Safrit to George Safrit dated August 25, 1873, and a deed from George Safrit to Sarah Sapp dated September 2, 1873, conveying the land in controversy. The consideration in both deeds was stated to be $500. Many witnesses were examined on both sides, and the evidence is sent up with the record. That on the part of the plaintiffs tended to show that Katie Safrit was an old woman, of very weak mind; that she was incapable of understanding, attending to, or transacting any business; that she could not understand a deed; and one of the witnesses speaks of her as "idiotic." The evidence also tended to show that the land was worth $3,000. George W. Safrit testified, among other things, as follows: He also said: "Sapp never paid me anything." George Shank testified that he was at Roseman's; that Sapp and Safrit asked Roseman to write for them; that he wrote some, and asked to whom the deed was to be made. Sapp said: "To Sarah Sapp, of course." etc. T. J. Safrit testified that he was a son of Katie Safrit. Saw her at Sapp's and at Goodman's. This witness was allowed to testify, after objection: "She [Katie Safrit] was no more competent to make a deed two weeks after date of the deed than she was before." This constitued the defendant's second exception. The witness had testified without objection that her mind was very weak, and that she did not know what she "was about, in making the deed." We can see no force in the objection. The testimony of the witnesses for the defendant tended to show that Katie Safrit had capacity to make a deed. S. Fisher testified that he knew Katie Safrit. etc.
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