Goodman v. State
Decision Date | 21 April 1981 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 272 |
Citation | 401 So.2d 208 |
Parties | Carolyn GOODMAN v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Richard D. Shinbaum, Montgomery, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Jean Williams Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Carolyn Goodman was indicted under § 13A-8-17, Code of Alabama 1975, for "receiving, retaining, or disposing of stolen property," a gold necklace with a gold cross, "while knowing that it was stolen or having reasonable grounds to believe that it had been stolen." The charge in the indictment was for a first degree offense, the stolen property allegedly worth $1,500.00. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of "second degree receiving stolen property" under § 13A-8-18, Code of Alabama 1975, since proof at trial showed the value of the stolen property to be less than one thousand but greater than one hundred dollars.
The trial court set sentence at seven years' imprisonment in the penitentiary after a thorough pre-sentence investigation.
Appellant's subsequent motion for a new trial, based on the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's actions in overruling several objections of the appellant during trial, was denied.
During the first week of September, 1979, Charles Barnes burglarized the apartment of Barbara Wingo in Shelby County, Alabama, taking, among other items, a gold necklace with a gold cross. Soon thereafter, this necklace was given by Mr. Barnes to the appellant. The evidence is in sharp conflict as to the circumstances under which Mr. Barnes transferred this property to appellant.
Mr. Barnes testified that he gave appellant the necklace in payment for her future services in trying to negotiate a sale for him of the other merchandise taken during the burglary. Another witness, Chris Hobbs, testified that he witnessed Barnes and appellant discussing a box full of stolen merchandise and saw Barnes give the gold necklace to appellant.
Appellant testified that Barnes gave her the necklace as a birthday present because she was helpful to him while he was in the hospital. She stated that Barnes told her he won it in a poker game. One of appellant's friends, Connie Fuller, confirmed the birthday present explanation, and denied (as did appellant) that there was any discussion about stolen merchandise.
The state produced three witnesses from the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department; Sergeant Dan Jones, Captain W. J. Walker, and Deputy Sheriff David Bryan. In sum, they testified that during the investigation of an unrelated burglary, they had occasion to question appellant about the gold necklace she was wearing. She told them that Charlie Barnes had given her the necklace and denied knowledge that it was stolen. After further investigation, they discovered that it was stolen property, so they returned with a warrant and recovered the necklace from her.
Appellant called as witnesses Kenneth Hitson and D. E. Billingsley, detectives with the Montgomery Police Department. Their cumulative testimony was that due to information they had received from the Elmore County Sheriff's office, they had set up surveillance of appellant's store and her adjoining house trailer. The surveillance lasted approximately four days and occurred between the time of the Wingo burglary and the time the county officers recovered the gold necklace. Officers Hitson and Billingsley concluded that during their surveillance they uncovered nothing to indicate that appellant was dealing in stolen merchandise or that she had received any stolen property knowing it to be stolen.
In rebuttal, the state produced evidence to the effect that appellant used some silver items, also stolen during the Wingo burglary, to purchase drugs from Robert (Bob) Thomas. This evidence was supported by the testimony of two witnesses, Bob Thomas and Teresa Loffa.
Appellant denied this.
The state also introduced evidence, without objection by appellant, that appellant, Carolyn Goodman, sold Chris Hobbs a television set and told him to be careful in taking it to a repair shop because it had been stolen.
Appellant also denied any participation in this transaction.
Appellant contends that the state failed to prove a prima facie case for "receiving stolen property" in that the prosecution did not establish that she had "knowledge" that the necklace was stolen property at the time she received it. We disagree.
The current Alabama statute § 13A-8-16, Code of Alabama 1975, defines the crime of receiving stolen property as follows:
This statute clearly sets out the Alabama rule that possession of recently stolen goods raises a presumption that the defendant had the requisite "knowledge." Stanley v. State, 46 Ala.App. 542, 245 So.2d 827, cert. denied, 286 Ala. 738, 245 So.2d 828 (1970). Character v. State, 51 Ala.App. 589, 287 So.2d 916, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 775, 287 So.2d 919 (1973). Vines v. State, 57 Ala.App. 117, 326 So.2d 307 (1976); Hunt v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 331 So.2d 834 (1976); Bolding v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 342 So.2d 1372 (1977); Stamps v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 380 So.2d 406 (1980).
The often quoted rationale for this rule appears in Character v. State, supra, where this court stated:
In the instant case appellant admitted that she had possession of the recently stolen gold necklace. The state's prima facie burden was, therefore, satisfied.
The appellant rebutted this presumption of "knowledge" on her part by her corroborated testimony that the stolen necklace was given to her as a birthday present under circumstances which did not lead her to believe it had been stolen.
Since the state produced evidence to the contrary, the question of knowledge became one for the jury. The jury was free to infer the requisite scienter from the facts and circumstances surrounding the whole transaction. Hunt v. State, supra; Carroll v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 338 So.2d 432 (1976); Waters v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 360 So.2d 358, cert. denied, Ala., 360 So.2d 367 (1978); Franklin v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 378 So.2d 267, cert. denied, Ala., 378 So.2d 270 (1979).
The jury could determine that the requisite "knowledge" was satisfied under the "having reasonable grounds to believe it has been stolen" clause of the statute. Farzley v. State, 231 Ala. 60, 163 So. 394 (1935).
The Alabama Supreme Court in Farzley explained:
The jury was adequately instructed in the instant case and, apparently, was convinced by the whole of the evidence that appellant had at least "reasonable grounds for believing" that the necklace she received was stolen.
During the trial of this case the trial court allowed into evidence information regarding the disposition of other merchandise which was stolen at the same time as the gold necklace and testimony about a television set that appellant, allegedly, sold with a warning that it was "probably stolen" merchandise. Appellant raises these actions as error.
As to the latter testimony, there were no objections made during the trial of the case. Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal since review by this court is limited to those matters on which rulings are invoked in the trial court. Harris v. State,...
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