Goodman v. State

• Decision Date: 26 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 882S302,882S302
• Parties: William Mark GOODMAN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 984

453 N.E.2d 984

William Mark GOODMAN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 882S302.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Sept. 26, 1983.

Walter E. Bravard, Jr., Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Defendant (Appellant) was convicted after a bench trial of Murder, a class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1(1) (Burns 1979), and sentenced to forty (40) years imprisonment.

This direct appeal presents two issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to hold a third competency hearing prior to Defendant's trial.

2. Whether Defendant's confession was voluntarily given.

The record disclosed that on December 14, 1977, the Defendant and his girlfriend, Mary Spitznagel, argued about money, and, in the presence of a guest, Jimmy Rogers, the Defendant hit her repeatedly with a pool stick. When she fell to the floor, Defendant stepped on her throat inflicting injuries which led to her death. The Defendant and Rogers placed the victim in Defendant's automobile and left her in an abandoned house where her body was found on December 17, 1977.

After Defendant filed a missing person report, he and Rogers fled to Utah. Eventually Rogers provided information which led to the arrest of the Defendant in Tulsa, Oklahoma. On February 6, 1978, in Tulsa, the Defendant gave a statement in which he admitted killing Mary Spitznagel.

On July 3, 1978, the Defendant filed a Suggestion of Insanity, and Drs. Hull and Schuster were appointed by the court to evaluate him. On August 25, 1978, at a competency hearing, the court determined that Defendant lacked the competency to stand trial and ordered him to be committed to the Department of Mental Health.

On August 11, 1981, the court was advised by the Mental Health authorities that the Defendant was capable of assisting in his defense. On September 23, 1981, the Defendant filed a second Suggestion of Insanity, and Drs. Hull and Schuster were again appointed to evaluate the Defendant. On October 22, 1981, they submitted their report declaring Defendant competent to stand trial. The court held a hearing on October 28, 1981 at which both Drs. Hull and Schuster testified; the Defendant was found competent to stand trial. Subsequently, the Defendant requested additional psychiatric evaluation, and Drs. Periolat and Nie were appointed to examine him. On January 7, 1982, Dr. Nie sent a letter to the court in which he stated that it was doubtful that Defendant would ever be competent enough to stand trial. His opinion was based on an examination of the Defendant made on January 3, 1982. However, during the trial, on February 17, 1982, Dr. Nie testified that he had changed his opinion about the Defendant's competency to stand trial and that he was, in fact, then competent to stand trial.

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ISSUE I

The Defendant contends that the trial court should have held a third competency hearing after Dr. Nie's letter was received by the court and before the trial inasmuch as the letter constituted "reasonable grounds" to hold another competency hearing pursuant to Ind.Code Sec. 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1979) which provides:

"(a) If at any time before the final submission of any criminal case to the court or jury trying the same, the court, either from its own knowledge or upon the suggestion of any person, has reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant has that ability. The court shall appoint two (2) competent disinterested psychiatrists, who shall examine the defendant for the purpose of forming an opinion as to whether the defendant has that ability and shall testify concerning the same at the hearing."

The right to a competency hearing is not absolute. Feggins v. State, (1980) In the case at bar, two competency hearings had been held previously. The Defendant had been found incompetent at the first hearing in August, 1978. Three years later, on October 28, 1981, another full competency hearing was held. Both court appointed psychiatrists testified that the Defendant was competent to stand trial based upon their recent examinations and observations of him. Also received into evidence at that hearing was Dr. John Keating's psychiatric report and letter declaring that, in his opinion, "the patient has a reasonable understanding of the proceedings and will be able to assist his lawyer in his own defense." Conflicting evidence was admitted in the form of a letter from Dr. Periolat who had examined the Defendant several years earlier and on the day prior to the competency hearing. His letter stated that the Defendant had no memory of the crime or victim and had no understanding of the purpose of the court procedure; therefore, in his opinion, the Defendant was not competent to stand trial at the time. However, his letter further indicated that the Defendant, at the time of his examination, was "alert, oriented to the year and place [and] aware of his circumstances and surroundings." In addition, Dr. Periolat stated that the Defendant was "aware of the charge against him and of the possible consequences." After submission of all the evidence, the court found the Defendant competent to stand trial.

Ind., 400 N.E.2d 164, 166. Such a hearing is required by the above statute and due process only when there is evidence before the trial court that creates a reasonable or bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency. Pate v. Robinson, (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 822; Cook v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 667, 670, 284 N.E.2d 81, 83. The presence of indicators sufficient to require the court to hold a hearing under Ind.Code Sec. 35-5-3.1-1 must, of necessity, be determined upon the facts of each case as it arises, and the decision whether to hold a competency hearing lies in the province of the trial judge. Malo v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 157, 160-161, 361 N.E.2d 1201, 1204. This is particularly true when no petition for a competency hearing has been filed, as was the case here. Mato v. State, (1982) Ind., 429 N.E.2d 945, 947.

On December 2, 1982, the Defendant petitioned for the employment of additional psychiatrists to examine him in preparation for an insanity defense and to testify at the trial; the court granted that petition, appointing Dr. Nie as one of the examining psychiatrists. Dr. Nie examined the Defendant on January 3, 1982 and notified the court on January 7, 1982 that, in his opinion, the Defendant was not competent to stand trial. His letter to the court concluded thus:

"On the basis of the present examination, it seems that this man understands the nature of the charge against him but at the present time, I doubt that he has the capacity to cooperate adequately with his attorney in defending himself. It's difficult to determine whether his impaired memory functions are due to true organic disease or whether or not this might be a form of malingering. From the meager history that this man gives however, it seems that his life-long pattern has been makred (sic) by emotionally unstable behavior by excessive alcohol intake. I have no way of evaluating what his mental state was at the time of the alleged crime, but it seems quite clear that this man belongs in a protective environment at the present time. I believe it's doubtful that he will ever be able to stand trial."

A somewhat similar situation arose in Malo v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 157, 361 N.E.2d 1201, in which, prior to trial, the defendant had requested a third competency hearing. In that case we wrote:

"There was no event or occurrence subsequent to the determination of competence which amounted to reasonable grounds requiring a third hearing. Conceivably, incompetence might occur subsequent to a determination of competence, in which event a trial should not be had or, if commenced, a mistrial declared. Were we to follow the course of action urged by the defendant, however, a trial could Dr. Nie was appointed to examine the Defendant in preparation for his insanity defense. His letter to the court was unsolicited and irrelevant at that time. Notwithstanding other conflicting evidence, the court had determined that the Defendant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Nie's letter, taken into consideration with all of the other circumstances and evidence presented in the court proceedings to date, did not constitute reasonable grounds to mandate a third competency hearing.

                never be had where the defendant's incompetence was being urged.  Under such circumstances, there will always be indicators present which could be the basis of a reasonable ground for believing the defendant to have insufficient comprehension to be brought to trial.  The existence of facts which would be reasonable grounds under some circumstances does not ipso facto mandate a hearing under all circumstances.  The decision whether or not to hold a hearing lies in the province of the trial judge and should be disturbed upon review, only upon a showing of clear error.  The indicators proffered by the defendant did not, in the context of this case, mandate a third hearing."   Malo at 1204
                

Assuming arguendo, however, that the trial court did abuse its discretion in failing to hold a third competency hearing, the error was rendered harmless by Dr. Nie's testimony at the trial. At that time, Dr. Nie, during cross-examination by Defendant's counsel, testified as follows:

"Q. Is it still your opinion that the defendant is not able to now stand trial?

"A. No, I think subsequent events probably would have modified that opinion in the sense that with the knowledge of the crime that he demonstrates, and with the evidence and character of his so-called memory deficits that I could...